Shuler v. State, No. 2D99-4723

• Decision Date: 17 May 2002
• Docket Number: No. 2D99-4834., No. 2D99-4723
• Parties: Curtis SHULER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

816 So.2d 257

Curtis SHULER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. 2D99-4723, 2D99-4834.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 17, 2002.

Ronald N. Toward, Bartow, for Appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Sonya Roebuck Horbelt, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

STRINGER, Judge.

In these consolidated cases, Curtis Shuler challenges his convictions for first-degree murder, armed burglary, and shooting into an occupied vehicle.¹ Shuler alleges that the trial court erred in finding that the State's alleged reason for striking an African American juror was genuine. We reverse.

The final venire in this case consisted of fifty-three potential jurors. Only three members of the venire were African-American. During the first challenge conference, the State used a peremptory challenge to remove one of the African-American venirepersons. Shuler objected to the dismissal, noted the potential juror's race, and requested a race-neutral reason for the action. The State responded that the juror worked for a corporation that had been under investigation by the state attorney. The trial court determined that this reason was race-neutral and overruled Shuler's objection.

Shortly thereafter, a second African-American juror, Ms. Johnson, was stricken by the State. Again, Shuler objected and noted the potential juror's race. The trial court requested a race-neutral explanation for the challenge to which the State responded that the juror "is single, she's in her [forties], she doesn't have any children, but, most importantly to the State, sat on a murder trial that she cannot recall." The trial court noted that it was a "close call on the validity of the reasons" but observed, "I'm not allowed at this stage to consider whether those are good reasons or bad reasons as long as they are race-neutral reasons." No African-Americans served on the jury at Shuler's trial.

Peremptory strikes based upon race are invalid. The supreme court has outlined the three-step procedure to challenge a race-based peremptory strike:

A party objecting to the other side's use of a peremptory challenge on racial grounds must: a) make a timely objection on that basis, b) show that the venireperson is a member of a distinct racial group, and c) request that the court ask the striking party its reason for the strike. If these initial requirements are met (step 1), the trial court must ask the proponent of the strike to explain the reason for the strike.

At this point, the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step 2). If the explanation is facially race-neutral and the court believes that, given all the circumstances surrounding the strike, the explanation is not a pretext, the strike will be sustained (step 3). The court's focus in step 3 is not on the reasonableness of the explanation but rather its genuineness.

Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759, 764 (Fla.1996) (footnotes omitted). In examining the relevant circumstances, the trial court may consider the racial make-up of the venire, prior strikes exercised against the same racial group, whether the strike is based on a reason equally applicable to an unchallenged juror, or whether the juror was singled out for special questioning designed to evoke a certain response. Melbourne, 679 So.2d at 764 n. 8. "The presence of one or more of these factors will tend to show that the proffered reason is an impermissible pretext." Overstreet v. State, 712 So.2d 1174, 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). "The goal of these guidelines is the elimination of racial discrimination in the...