Shull v. Raymond

• Decision Date: 26 June 1876
• Citation: 23 Minn. 66
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: BELINDA SHULL <I>vs.</I> DYAR RAYMOND.

23 Minn. 66

BELINDA SHULL vs. DYAR RAYMOND.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 26, 1876.

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Dakota county, Crosby, J., presiding, refusing a new trial.

S. L. Pierce, for appellant.

Seagrave Smith, for respondent.

GILFILLAN, C. J.

This is an action for slander, in charging a married woman with having committed adultery. The complaint sets out the words, which, in the meaning given them by the dictionaries, would not be actionable, because not imputing any offence to the plaintiff. But the complaint also alleges that the words are slang words, in common use, and mean sexual intercourse between man and woman, and that they were used by defendant, and understood by the hearers in that sense. The evidence was sufficient to justify the jury in finding that the words were used and understood in that sense.

On the trial defendant offered to prove by a witness, who was not present when the slanderous words were spoken, what was said afterwards, on the same evening. This was objected to, but no ground for the objection stated, and the court sustained the objection. The evidence offered was of that character that it could not have been made proper, though the specific ground of objection had been pointed out; and, even if (in strict practice) it ought to have been specified, no prejudice could have been done defendant by sustaining the objection without such specification.

The defendant presented four separate propositions, requesting the court to give them as instructions to the jury. Of these the court gave three, modified or qualified, and the fourth it refused. It also instructed the jury at large. The exception to the charge and refusals is in these words: "Defendant now excepts to each and every part of the charge, and also to the refusal of the court to give requests of defendant, as requested." This we understand to be but a single exception, and not a statement that a separate exception was taken to each proposition stated by the court in its charge, and to each refusal, and it is, therefore, insufficient. The office of an exception is to point out, and call the attention of the court to, any proposition of law which is claimed to be erroneous, so that, if the court has inadvertently stated any rule of law erroneously, it may at once correct it. If a party, after a charge containing various propositions, states that he excepts to each and every part of it, this does not perform the office of an exception. No question can be raised here upon the exception we have stated.

To the refusal to give one of the requests a proper exception was taken. The request was this: "Words are...