Shumaker v. Ohio Dept. of Human Serv.

• Citation: 691 N.E.2d 690,117 Ohio App.3d 730
• Decision Date: 26 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. 17594,17594
• Parties: SHUMAKER, Appellant, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Appellee. Ninth District, Summit County
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 730

117 Ohio App.3d 730

691 N.E.2d 690

SHUMAKER, Appellant, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Appellee.

No. 17594.

Court of Appeals of Ohio,

Ninth District, Summit County.

Decided Dec. 26, 1996.

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Christopher Carlson, Assistant Attorney General, Columbus, for appellee.

Debra Shumaker, pro se.

SLABY, Judge.

Appellant, Debra Shumaker, appeals from the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas affirming the administrative decision of the Ohio Department of Human Services ("DHS") which denied appellant continuing public benefits under the Aid to Dependent Children ("ADC") and food stamp programs. The trial court ruled, inter alia, that the First Amendment's Free Exercise of Religion Clause was not violated by the administrative regulations and policy which do not allow appellant, or any potential recipient, to strike certain words on the benefit reapplication, even if such alterations are motivated by a recipient's religious beliefs. We affirm.

On November 10, 1994, appellant, a current ADC and food stamp recipient, refused to comply with the administrative regulations during her annual reapplication interview. In particular, she failed to cooperate in the redetermination process by not acknowledging her rights and responsibilities in the final part of the form. For a claimant to continue receiving the desired public benefits, the rules demand cooperation in completing the uniform reapplication. The information required by the form is designed to assist the DHS to determine whether a current benefit recipient is still entitled to participate in government programs. The "rights and responsibilities" section is particularly important. It helps to assure the DHS that the information a recipient has provided is truthful. This portion of the reapplication has another necessary aspect: verification. Verification is the process of cross-checking the information provided by a recipient for accuracy. In acknowledging the "rights and responsibilities," a recipient also gives permission to the DHS to obtain, as well as to third parties to release, otherwise confidential information. While appellant apparently furnished the information required by the form, she refused to sign the form without first making certain alterations in the "rights and responsibilities" part of the reapplication. Specifically, she crossed out the word "authorize" and the phrases "declare under penalty of perjury" and "under penalty of perjury" at the end of the process. As altered, the form read, in pertinent part:

"I any person who furnishes me with health care or supplies to give the Ohio Department of Human Services any information related to the extent, duration, and scope of services provided to me under the Medicaid program. * * *

"By my signature below, I that the information on this application including citizenship and alien status is true and complete to the best of my knowledge. I understand that the law provides penalty of fine or imprisonment (or both) for anyone convicted of accepting assistance he or she is not eligible for. I state that all of the information in this application is true and complete to the best of my knowledge."

Appellant did not attempt to replace the deleted words with others that would be acceptable to her religious beliefs.

The DHS worker immediately informed her that such alterations were not permitted and that the deletions would place her benefits in jeopardy. Appellant protested, explaining that she is a Christian woman and that the words stricken would constitute "swearing," which is prohibited by the Bible. Nevertheless, without a completed application, the DHS could not make a determination as to appellant's continuing eligibility and, as a result, terminated her benefits.

After exhausting her administrative remedies, appellant appealed to the court of common pleas, which affirmed the DHS's denial of public benefits without a hearing. On further appeal from the trial court's judgment, she assigns eight errors. We have rearranged the alleged errors in order to facilitate our review. Fourth Assignment of Error

"The lower court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, unconstitutional, and otherwise contrary to law for the reason that the Appellant was entitled to be assisted with her reapplication for public benefits, and she was entitled to notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard on her appeal before the administrative agency."

Appellant contends that there were procedural irregularities during the oral administrative hearing which did not comport with the fair hearing rules, and as a result, her rights to procedural due process were violated, rendering the DHS's decision void. The record belies appellant's contentions.

It is settled law that an appellate court must presume that the order of an administrative tribunal is valid and arrived at in the proper manner. See, e.g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Evatt (1944), 143 Ohio St. 71, 28 O.O. 21, 54 N.Ed.2d 132; Ohio Motor Vehicle Dealers Bd. v. Cent. Cadillac Co. (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 64, 14 OBR 456, 471 N.E.2d 488. The hearing regulations, while granting an individual paramount procedural protection, see Goldberg v. Kelly (1970), 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287, also provide for informality and allow individuals "the opportunity to present their case in their own way." Ohio Adm.Code 5101:6-6-02(B)(1). See, also, R.C. Chapter 119; R.C. 5101.35.

Appellant argues that during the state hearing, she was not allowed to advance her arguments without undue interference because of interruptions by the hearing officer. See Ohio Adm.Code 5101:6-6-02(B)(2). She also alleges that she was denied an opportunity to question and refute the testimony of the workers representing the DHS in accordance with Ohio Adm.Code 5101:6-6-02(B)(2)(d) and (e).

First, we cannot find that the hearing officer's interruptions constituted undue interference. In fact, the full review of the record reveals just the opposite and refutes appellant's claim that the hearing officer "did not work with her, but against her." ¹ Next, there was no indication that she wanted to refute the testimony of the DHS representative who related the events of her reapplication interview. Besides, there was no need, as the facts concerning her alterations were not in dispute. More compelling, her brief in support of her appeal from the state hearing decision did not complain that she was in any way hindered in presenting her case. See Stores Realty Co. v. Cleveland (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 41, 70 O.O.2d 123, 322 N.E.2d 629; Zieverink v. Ackerman (1981), 1 Ohio App.3d 10, 1 OBR 51, 437 N.E.2d 319.

In summary, the record demonstrates that the DHS complied with the hearing regulations. Accordingly, as the rules articulate the procedures which preserve an individual's due process guarantees during a public benefit determination, appellant received her constitutional due: notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Ohio Adm.Code 5101:6-1 et seq.; R.C. Chapter 119. Accord Section 205.10, Title 45, C.F.R.; Section 273.15, Title 7, C.F.R.

Moreover, the procedural challenges were not presented to the trial court. Appellant chose instead to appeal from the adverse administrative action, asserting generally that the decision of the DHS "is not in accordance with law and is not supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence, and is an abuse of discretion." No further enlightenment was forthcoming. The court, after a thorough perusal of the entire record, reviewed the DHS's power as well as appellant's religious rights under the First Amendment.

It is a fundamental principle "that a party receiving an adverse judgment in the common pleas court may not expand [that party's] claims in the court of appeals to maximize the chances of reversal or remand." Kramp v. Ohio State Racing Comm. (1991), 81 Ohio App.3d 186, 191-192, 610 N.E.2d 1013, 1017, citing Rosenberry v. Chumney (1960), 171 Ohio St. 48, 50, 12 O.O.2d 56, 57, 168 N.E.2d 285, 287. We decline to consider errors "which could have been brought to the trial court's attention and hence avoided or otherwise corrected." Schade v. Carnegie Body Co. (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 207, 210, 24 O.O.3d 316, 317-318, 436 N.E.2d 1001, 1003. The fourth assignment of error is overruled.

Third Assignment of Error

"The lower court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, unconstitutional, and otherwise contrary to law for the reason that it is based on material findings of law and fact which are unsupported by the record."

Appellant argues that the administrative record failed to address the alteration issue and that it was, therefore, improper for the trial court to consider it. She also complains that the DHS's interpretation of its own administrative rules, as well as the application of those rules, was erroneous and that the regulation pertaining to cooperation was inconsistent with the governing statute. Appellant's arguments lack merit.

As to the authority of a court of common pleas upon review of an administrative order, R.C. 119.12 provides:

"The court may affirm the order of the agency complained of in the appeal if it finds, upon consideration of the entire record * * * that the order is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law."

This means that the evidence must not only exist, but be in the record in order to support an affirmance. Doelker v. Ohio Accountancy Bd. (1967), 12 Ohio St.2d 76, 41 O.O.2d 328, 232 N.E.2d 407.

The record clearly demonstrates that appellant's religious concerns with the words on the reapplication were considered, and ultimately rejected, by the DHS. The essential facts are uncontroverted. At her initial interview, a worker confided to appellant that she, too, was a deeply religious person, but informed her that, regardless, every recipient must sign the form without...