Shuman v. Hall

• Citation: 246 N.Y. 51,158 N.E. 16
• Parties: SHUMAN v. HALL et ux.
• Decision Date: 20 July 1927
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

246 N.Y. 51

158 N.E. 16

SHUMAN

v.HALL et ux.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 20, 1927.

Action by Gladys M. Shuman, administratrix of Amzie W. Shuman, deceased, against Chauncey Hall and wife. Judgment for plaintiff. From a judgment of the Appellate Division, Second Department (219 App. Div. 75, 219 N. Y. S. 228), reversing a judgment of the Trial Term, entered on a verdict of the jury in favor of plaintiff, plaintiff appeals.

Reversed as to dismissal of complaint, and new trial granted.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

Ivan A. Gardner, of Middletown (Charles E. Taylor, of Middletown, of counsel), for appellant.

William J. Lamont, of Newburgh (John Bright, of Middletown, of counsel), for respondents.

CRANE, J.

The Maybrook and Campbell Hall road in Orange county runs about east and west. The Neelytown road enters it from the north. At the junction the Neelytown road spreads out, turning by one fork toward the west in the direction of Campbell Hall and by the other fork to the east, or in the direction of Maybrook. Between the forks of the road at the junction is a triangular grass plat. While the Neelytown road at this point joins the other road, it does not cross it. Persons coming down the Neelytown road must turn either to the right or to the left to enter the Maybrook-Campbell Hall road.

On the 22d day of August, 1925, early in the morning, Amzie W. Shuman, a conductor on the Lehigh & Hudson Railroad, was driving his car in a westerly direction along the Maybrook road, approaching the Neelytown road. He had other railroad employees in the car with him, and was going to his home in Warwick, as the railroad terminated at Maybrook. As he approached the junction of these two roads, he blew his horn several times, and slowed down to about 18 miles an hour. As he was thus proceeding the Neelytown road entered at his right, or from the north. His view was obstructed. So also was the view of any person riding on the Neelytown road. Trees and bushes in full foliage obscured the view of approaching vehicles until the intersection of the highways was reached.

The defendants Chauncey Hall and his wife, Anna Hall, were coming along the Neelytown road in their Dodge car. Their view of Shuman in his Cleveland car was obstructed by the same trees and bushes and tall grass which obstructed Shuman's view of them. The two cars collided at the intersection and Shuman was killed. The judgment which his administrator recovered against Hall and his wife for their negligence in causing Shuman's death has been reversed by the Appellate Division and the complaint dismissed, two of the Justices dissenting.

[1][2] The rights of the road and the questions which arise over collisions at intersections of highways are always more or less perplexing. In many of the cases which come before the appellate courts it is difficult to know where to put the blame or to determine when on evidence most favorable to the plaintiff a cause of action has been made out. Much of the uncertainty is due, no doubt, to subdivision 4, § 12, of the General Highway Traffic Law (Consol. Laws, c. 70), which reads:

‘Every driver of a vehicle approaching the intersection of a street or public road shall grant the right of way at such intersection to any vehicle approaching from his right.'

We have had occasion in other cases to construe this law. Metzger v. Cushman's Sons, Inc., 243 N. Y. 118, 152 N. E. 695;Shirley v. Larkin Co., 239 N. Y. 94, 145 N. E. 751;Ward v. Clark, 232 N. Y. 195, 133 N. E. 443.

As we stated in these cases, it is apparent that the application of this statute must depend upon all the surrounding circumstances, the distance of the cars from the intersecting point, the speed, and the relative duties placed upon each. The law does not attempt to say at what particular point the vehicle having the subordinate right must stop or give way. The main purpose of this provision is to demand care of the driver commensurate with the danger, and to require of the driver approaching a street with a vehicle coming from his right to slow up and let that vehicle pass when their positions are such that a reasonably careful man might otherwise be in doubt as to which should go first. If the two vehicles are so near the intersecting point that there is a chance of collision if both keep on at the same speed, then the statute says the vehicle approaching from the right may take precedence. This is no finespun distinction. Driving motor cars is a practical matter, and the statute requires and demands care of both drivers. The highway laws are full of these injunctions, and they are to be obeyed. Circumstances and conditions vary, and we must apply these injunctions and directions to give effect to them if possible. The vehicle having the subordinate right must not take chances, make close calculations, try to slip by on a chance; it must give way to the vehicle on the right when it is anywhere near the crossing. Only in this way can these serious accidents be avoided.

[3] On the other hand, the statute cannot be pressed too far. The intersections of all streets and highways are so numerous that one driver must rely upon the prudence and carefulness of another. No one driver is to obey the rules; all must obey them. The driver coming from the right is equally obliged to exercise care. He also must look out for vehicles coming from his right, so that as he approaches the intersection he must have the same control of his car, and approach it with the same degree of care as is required of the driver coming on his left. More than that, the General Highway Traffic Law, § 11, subd. 3, says:

‘In turning a corner of intersecting streets a vehicle shall be...