Shumate v. Selma City Bd. of Educ.

Decision Date04 March 2013
Docket NumberCivil No. 11–0078–CG–M.
Citation928 F.Supp.2d 1302
PartiesMarilyn K. SHUMATE, Plaintiff v. SELMA CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION and Joe J. Peterson, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Alicia K. Haynes, Haynes & Haynes P.C., Tammy C. Woolley, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.

Elizabeth Brannen Carter, James R. Seale, Hill, Hill, Carter, Franco, Cole & Black, P.C., Montgomery, AL, Katy S. Campbell, Katy Smith Campbell Attorney at Law, Tuskegee, AL, for Defendants.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

CALLIE V.S. GRANADE, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on the motion for summary judgment (Doc. 40) and supplemental motion for summary judgment (Doc. 57) filed by the defendants, the Selma City Board of Education (the Board) and Joe J. Peterson (Peterson) (collectively, the defendants). The parties have filed briefs and evidentiary materials in support of their respective positions, and the motion is now ripe for resolution. After careful consideration, the court concludes that the defendants' summary judgment motions are due to be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiff, Marilyn Shumate (Shumate), is a Caucasian woman over 40 years of age who has worked for the Board as an elementary school cafeteria cook since 2003, and is still employed by the Board. (Doc. 75 at 3–4). She has completed one year of college and has worked at various Selma schools during her tenure. Doc. 66–1 at 3; Doc. 75 at 3–4. Occasionally throughout her career, Shumate would “fill in” for an absent cafeteria manager. Id. at 4.

In 2009, while Shumate was working in the cafeteria at Edgewood Elementary (“Edgewood”), the manager position there became available upon the retirement of the previous manager, and Shumate applied for the vacancy. Id. at 5. The posted minimum requirements for the job were a high school diploma or GED and three years of school food service or related work. Id. The Board convened a three-member panel to interview candidates and select one to be the new manager. Id. The members of the 2009 Edgewood panel included Edgewood's principal, defendant Peterson; the Board's Child Nutrition Program (“CNP”) Director, Smyley Kirkpatrick (“Kirkpatrick”); and Raymond Matthews, Jr., (“Matthews”). Id. After interviewing all the applicants, the panel hired Wanda Smith, stating that she “was the most effective candidate for the position.” (Doc. 66–10 at 9). Smith, who is African–American, is approximately 16 years younger than Shumate and has no college education, but otherwise met the job requirements of holding a high school diploma and having at least three years' experience in school food service or related work. (Doc. 75 at 6).

After Smith was hired for the Edgewood position, Shumate filed three successive EEOC charges in October 2009, March 2010, and April 2010. See Doc. 41–14 at 2–9. In her charges, Shumate alleged that “an individual” approached her after she submitted her application and informed her that “it had already been decided” that Smith would be selected for the manager position rather than Shumate. Id. at 5. Shumate further alleged that she had been discriminated against on account of her race and age, and that she was better qualified than Smith. Id. at 6. Shumate's latter two EEOC charges indicate that she alleged retaliation by the Board (insofar as the box marked “retaliation” is checked); however, Shumate's attached statements only mentioned her claims of discrimination. Id. at 4–9. On October 8, 2010, the EEOC issued its “Dismissal and Notice of Rights,” also known as a “right to sue letter,” in which it stated that it was “unable to conclude that the information obtained establishes violations of the [discrimination] statutes.” Doc. 1–4 at 2. Subsequently, in January 2011, Shumate filed the instant lawsuit. See Doc. 1.

In 2011, as her lawsuit over the Edgewood position was pending, the Board posted job announcements for three more cafeteria manager positions at Kingston Elementary School (“Kingston”), Clark Elementary School (“Clark”) and the School of Discovery. Doc. 51 at 6; Doc. 41–2 at 39. Shumate applied for the Kingston position and was offered an interview. See Doc. 75 at 7. Shumate did not apply for the Clark or School of Discovery positions, and claims that she was not aware of either of them despite the fact that her own second amended complaint states that “three positions for CNP manager were posted at the same time.” Doc. 51 at 6; Doc. 75 at 12. Nevertheless, the 2011 interview panel considered Shumate for the latter two positions anyway, based upon the fact that she applied and interviewed for the Kingston position. Id.

Shumate was not hired for any of the three vacancies. (Doc. 75 at 8). The three successful candidates were Sharon Dower (Kingston), Michael Steele (Clark), and Cynthia Burnette (School of Discovery). Id. Steele and Dower are African–American; Burnette is Caucasian. Doc. 41–10 at 4; Doc. 59 at 16; Doc. 41–15 at 4. All three successful candidates are at least nine years younger than Shumate. (Doc. 75 at 8).

After Dower, Steele, and Burnette were hired, Shumate filed a fourth EEOC complaint on September 26, 2011, alleging race and age discrimination with regard to the Kingston position, and alleging retaliation for her prior EEOC charges and the instant lawsuit. (Doc. 41–14 at 10–12). Shumate received a right to sue letter from the EEOC on January 25, 2012. (Doc. 35 at 1). Later, during the discovery phase of litigation in May or June 2012, Shumate learned of that the 2011 interview panel considered her for the School of Discovery and Clark positions even though she did not apply for them. (Doc. 75 at 12). Shumate subsequently amended her complaint in August 2012 to add the two jobs to her various claims. (Doc. 51).

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The trial court's function is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “The mere existence of some evidence to support the non-moving party is not sufficient for denial of summary judgment; there must be ‘sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.’ Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. (internal citations omitted).

The basic issue before the court on a motion for summary judgment is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” SeeAnderson, 477 U.S. at 251–252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The moving party bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists. O'Ferrell v. United States, 253 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir.2001). In evaluating the argument of the moving party, the court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in its favor. Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir.1999). “If reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then a court should deny summary judgment.” Hinesville Bank v. Pony Exp. Courier Corp., 868 F.2d 1532, 1535 (11th Cir.1989) (citing Mercantile Bank & Trust v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 750 F.2d 838, 841 (11th Cir.1985)).

Once the movant satisfies his initial burden under Rule 56(a), the nonmoving party “must make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of each essential element to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Howard v. BP Oil Co., 32 F.3d 520, 524 (11th Cir.1994) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Otherwise stated, the non-movant must “demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991). The non-moving party “may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response .... must be by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule be set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Vega v. Invsco Group, Ltd., 432 Fed.Appx. 867, 870 (11th Cir.2011). “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the [non-moving] party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir.1990) (citation omitted). [T]he nonmoving party may avail itself of all facts and justifiable inferences in the record taken as a whole.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH–Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998 (11th Cir.1992). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

III. ALLEGED FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES (RETALIATION CLAIM)

Shumate filed four EEOC charges and the instant lawsuit after her unsuccessful applications for the cafeteria manager position at Edgewood Elementary in 2009 and the cafeteria manager position at Kingston Elementary in 2011. See Doc. 1; Doc. 41–14. Neither the EEOC charges nor the initial complaint referred to two additional cafeteria manager positions at the School of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • Ely v. Mobile Cnty. Sch. Bd.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama
    • May 11, 2016
    ...against state law tort claims granted to school board members in their official capacities); Shumate v. Selma City Bd. of Edu., 928 F.Supp.2d 1302, 1327-28 (S.D. Ala. 2013) (school board was considered "an arm of the state" and § 14 immunity attached for purposes of state law claims); see a......
  • United States v. $25,846.96
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama
    • March 6, 2013
  • Frazier v. City of Mobile
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama
    • January 31, 2018
    ...in suits under § 1981 is the same as that used in Title VII discriminatory treatment cases." Shumate v. Selma City Bd. of Educ., 928 F.Supp.2d 1302, 1318 (S.D. Ala. 2013). Absent direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff may establish the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case of gender an......
  • Smith v. Glasscock
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
    • May 8, 2020
    ...Alabama in the past" and there was no allegation of conduct which contravenes public policy); see also Shumate v. Selma City Bd. of Educ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1330 (S.D. Ala. 2013) (distinguishing Lees and granting summary judgment where the facts do not fit the limited categories of outr......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT