Shupe v. Settle, 2194
Decision Date | 14 April 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 2194,2194 |
Citation | 445 S.E.2d 651,315 S.C. 510 |
Parties | Douglas SHUPE and Anna Marie Shupe, Appellants, v. John SETTLE; Oakridge Association, Inc.; and Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, Respondents. . Heard |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Henry L. Deneen and Kellum W. Allen, West Columbia, for appellants.
William P. Donelan, Heyward E. McDonald, and Brett A. Hickman, Columbia, for respondents.
Douglas and Anna Marie Shupe brought an action against Oakridge Association, Inc. and its president, John Settle, for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and against Oakridge's insurer, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, for breach of contract and negligence. The trial court dismissed Hartford as a party directed a verdict in favor of Oakridge and Settle on the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and dismissed Settle as an individual defendant as to the breach of contract action. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Shupes on the remaining breach of contract action. The trial court then granted Oakridge a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Shupes appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
In August of 1986 Mr. and Mrs. Shupe bought a lot in the Oakridge Hunt Club on which they intended to build their retirement home. They then sought to borrow $65,000 through a particular lender, Cameron-Brown, at a favorable fixed interest rate. According to the testimony of the Shupes, they were unable to obtain the loan, however, because Settle, the president and treasurer of Oakridge, refused to provide them certain insurance information. 1 They ultimately obtained a loan from another company, but at a less favorable rate. 2
With respect to the breach of contract claim, Mrs. Shupe testified she asked Settle for the insurance information several times. She further stated she attempted to acquire the information through the efforts of various other individuals, but was unsuccessful. She testified she and her husband gave "many days" notice in requesting both to look at the records and make a copy. Mr. Shupe testified his wife had "some bad experiences" in trying to obtain the necessary information so they decided to visit Mr. Settle. He stated as follows:
We went to Mr. Settle's house early Saturday morning. I rang the doorbell. He answered the door and invited us in. I told Mr. Settle I was sorry to bother him so early in the morning but we have a critical situation here. We've been trying to get this information and we've had no success at all, and I wanted to know why we couldn't get that; that this is critical and I really need this. I told him that I'm subject to lose a great deal of money and it's causing my wife tremendous stress. He said, "Well, Mr. Shupe, I can't let you have that." I said, "I'll tell you what; let me look at the books and I'll copy down what it is, and you don't have to give it to me, or if you don't like that, you tell my lender and I don't even want to know; we just need that information." He said, "I'm sorry, Mr. Shupe; that's not possible; I can't allow you to have that information.
Settle himself admitted that the Shupes requested the information more than once. He also admitted that he probably told the proposed lender that he could not provide the insurance information.
The by-laws of the association provide that the Shupes, as members, were entitled to access to all books and records of Oakridge.
Section 4--Any person acquiring a lot or an interest in a lot in Oakridge Hunt Club shall immediately become a member of the Corporation....
* * * * * *
Section 1--.... All books and records of the Corporation may be inspected by any member or his agent or attorney for any proper purpose at any reasonable time upon the giving of one day's notice.
In its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Oakridge maintained the Shupes failed to give one day's notice and demanded copies of documents, which the Association was not contractually obligated to provide. Oakridge argued the alleged damages resulted from the Shupes' inability to receive these copies of documents, not from their inability to inspect the books and records. The trial judge granted Oakridge's motion finding the by-laws did not obligate the Association to provide copies of the documents to the Shupes and, therefore, the Association did not breach any contractual obligation to the Shupes.
With respect to their claim against Hartford, the Shupes, in their complaint, asserted they were third-party beneficiaries of the contract between Oakridge and Hartford and therefore entitled to the insurance information. 3 The trial judge held the Shupes could not maintain an action against Hartford because they were not the direct beneficiaries of the contract between Oakridge and Hartford, but were merely incidental or consequential beneficiaries of the contract.
As to Mrs. Shupe's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Settle, she testified as follows:
At that time Mr. Settle said to me it is evident that I just don't understand the way things are done in this country, and I asked him why he would not give me the information, and during the conversation he was saying that he just did not like foreigners running the place.
Mr. Shupe testified that his wife was affected by the incident to the point she would not communicate with him, and would snap at him. The Shupes' daughter testified Mrs. Shupe was making a final plea over the telephone to Settle, telling him she was in fear of losing her home, when she burst into tears and was unable to talk further.
The trial court granted a directed verdict motion on the outrage cause of action, finding the evidence did not rise to the level necessary for the tort of outrage.
The trial court then determined that for the remaining breach of contract action, Settle could not be held personally liable, and removed him as an individual defendant. On the remaining breach of contract action against Oakridge, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Shupes for $35,518. The court, however, granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Oakridge.
On appeal, the Shupes argue the trial court erred in granting Oakridge's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the breach of contract action. We agree.
In ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court must view the evidence and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must deny the motions if either the evidence yields more than one reasonable inference or its inferences are in doubt. The verdict will be upheld if there is any evidence to sustain the factual findings implicit in the jury's verdict. Hilton Head Island Realty, Inc. v. Skull Creek Club, 287 S.C. 530, 339 S.E.2d 890 (Ct.App.1986).
The by-laws of the Association outlined a duty on the part of the Association to provide the Shupes the opportunity to inspect the records "at any reasonable time upon the giving of one day's notice." The testimony of the Shupes clearly shows they requested not only copies of the insurance information, but also requested they at least be given the opportunity to inspect the books. Inasmuch as the Shupes requested the information on numerous occasions, we find no merit to the Association's argument that one day's notice was not given that the Shupes wished to inspect the records. Further, it is apparent from Mr. Shupe's testimony regarding the Saturday morning visit that Mr. Settle absolutely denied the Shupe's request to inspect the records, regardless of whether or not the Shupes would have been willing to come back at a "reasonable time" after giving "one...
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