SHURTLIFE v. DEPT. OF RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
| Decision Date | 21 December 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 24819-1-II.,24819-1-II. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Rick A. SHURTLIFF, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, Respondent. |
Mark S. McCarty, Campiche, Hepburn, McCarty & Bianco, Seattle, for Appellant.
Jerome E. Westby, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for Respondent.
This case concerns the Law Enforcement Officers' and Fire Fighters' Retirement System, Plan I (LEOFF I). One question is whether a LEOFF I member withdraws his or her contributions from the LEOFF I fund by receiving a disability retirement allowance. Another question is whether RCW 41.26.140(5) divests a LEOFF I member's right to a service pension, after that right has vested under RCW 41.26.090(2). The answer to each question is no. On December 30, 1946, Rick A. Shurtliff was born. On January 3, 1972, he began LEOFF I employment with the Clark County Sheriff. In the ensuing years, he contributed $38,801 to the LEOFF I fund.
On April 21, 1989, the Sheriff fired Shurtliff for misconduct. Shurtliff did not appeal.
On December 6, 1989, Shurtliff petitioned for a disability leave allowance and, if unable to work after six months, a disability retirement allowance.1 He alleged that before being terminated, and continuously ever since, he had been disabled by depression incurred in the line of duty. Agreeing, the Clark County Disability Board awarded him a disability leave allowance commencing April 22, 1989, and a disability retirement allowance commencing October 23, 1989. The Sheriff asked the Department of Retirement Systems (DRS) to review the Board's decision, but DRS affirmed the Board.
Between October 23, 1989, and March 1, 1990, Shurtliff was paid a disability retirement allowance. The payments totalled $5,712.
On March 1, 1990, the Board cancelled Shurtliff's disability retirement allowance, based on a finding that he had recovered from his disability.2 Shurtliff did not appeal the cancellation.
Later in 1990, Shurtliff demanded that the sheriff restore him to duty. He relied on RCW 41.26.140(2), which provides that when a LEOFF I member ceases to be disabled, "the [disability] retirement allowance shall be cancelled and the member shall be restored to duty[.]" (Emphasis added.) His demand was refused, so he sued for a writ of mandamus. The superior court denied a writ, Shurtliff appealed to this court, and we affirmed. In an unpublished opinion, we held that a LEOFF I member is not entitled to be restored to duty following the cancellation of his or her disability retirement allowance if, before the commencement of the disability retirement allowance,3 the member was terminated from employment.
As a result of these events, Shurtliff neither returned to work nor retired for service after the cancellation of his disability retirement allowance. He could not return to work because the Sheriff would not restore him to duty, and he could not retire for service because he had not yet attained age 50. The State did not return his LEOFF I contributions, unless it did so by paying him a disability retirement allowance from October 23, 1989 to March 1, 1990.
Shurtliff turned 50 on December 30, 1996. Relying on RCW 41.26.090(2), quoted in the text below, he then petitioned for a service retirement allowance based on his 17 years of service. DRS denied his petition for two reasons. It concluded that he was not entitled to a service retirement allowance "because he was a disability beneficiary, and therefore, his pension rights were governed exclusively by RCW 41.26.140(5)[.]"4 It also concluded that he was not entitled to a service retirement allowance "because he did not leave all his contributions in the LEOFF [I] fund."5 Shurtliff appealed to the superior court and, when that court affirmed, again to this court.
The issue on appeal is whether Shurtliff is entitled to a service retirement pension based on his 17 years of service. Shurtliff says yes. DRS says no. We ask (1) whether Shurtliff had a vested right to a service pension before he was fired, and (2) if so, whether he was divested of that right after he was fired.
We begin by inquiring whether Shurtliff acquired the vested right to a service retirement pension. The Law Enforcement Officers' and Fire Fighters' Retirement System, Plan I (LEOFF I) is codified in RCW 41.26. It "is unusual in that it has characteristics of a retirement system, RCW 41.26.090 (retirement for service), and a disability plan, RCW 41.26.120 (); RCW 41.26.125 (); RCW 41.26.160 (death benefits)."6 It applies to officers and firefighters whose employment commenced on or after March 1, 1970, and on or before September 30, 1977.7
RCW 41.26.090 defines when a LEOFF I member can retire for service. It states:
Under RCW 41.26.090(2), a LEOFF I member's right to a service pension vests9 after five years' service, regardless of the member's age at that time. As RCW 41.26.090(3) explicitly recognizes, such vesting is "optional" to the extent that the member may later elect to take his or her contributions in lieu of a pension. Thus, we said in In re Marriage of Kollmer10 that a former police officer with ten years' service "was vested in [LEOFF I] by virtue of the fact that he had served over 5 years as a police officer," even though he was "not eligible to retire under LEOFF I until he reached age 50[.]"11
Here, Shurtliff completed five years' service in January 1977. From then on, his right to a service retirement allowance was vested under RCW 41.26.090(2).
We next inquire whether Shurtliff was divested of his right to a service pension. Preliminarily, we note that DRS does not claim, nor could it claim, that Shurtliff's right to a pension was divested because he was fired as opposed to quitting voluntarily.12 Under RCW 41.26.090, a LEOFF I member with five years' service has a vested right to a pension even if his or her employment terminates before age 50, and even if his or her employment terminates involuntarily.
Although DRS does not claim that Shurtliff was divested because he was fired, it does claim that he was divested for two other reasons: (A) because he withdrew his contributions from the LEOFF I fund when he took a disability retirement allowance, and (B) because he neither returned to work nor retired for service after cancellation of his disability retirement allowance. We analyze each reason separately.
RCW 41.26.170(1) divests the vested LEOFF I member who elects to withdraw his or her contributions. That statute provides:
Should service of a member be discontinued except by death, disability, or retirement,[13] the member shall, upon application therefor, be paid the accumulated contributions within sixty days after the day of application and the rights to all benefits as a member shall cease: PROVIDED, That any member with at least five years' service may elect the provisions of RCW 41.26.090(2).[14]
DRS asserts that Shurtliff withdrew a portion of his contributions when, between October 23, 1989, and March 1, 1990, he received $5,712 in disability retirement benefits. But DRS also acknowledges that Shurtliff "has never asked for a withdrawal of his LEOFF contributions," and that it, DRS, has not returned the remainder of his $33,089 in LEOFF contributions.15 Shurtliff disputes that a LEOFF I member effects a withdrawal of contributions merely by taking a disability retirement allowance.
Logic and principle favor Shurtliff. Suppose that a relatively new LEOFF I member becomes disabled after contributing only a small amount to the fund. He remains disabled for 20 years. He is entitled to disability retirement benefits for the entire 20 years, pursuant to RCW 41.26.120 and RCW 41.26.130(1), (2) and (3), even though such benefits far exceed the amount he contributed to the LEOFF I fund. Necessarily then, he is drawing his benefits from the LEOFF I fund generally, and not from his individual contributions.16
DRS relies on RCW 41.26.140(5). That statute provides:
Should the disability retirement allowance of any disability beneficiary be canceled for any cause other than reentrance into service or retirement for service, he or she shall be paid the excess, if any, of the accumulated contributions at the time of retirement over all payments made on his or her behalf under this chapter.
DRS' reliance is misplaced. RCW 41.26.140(5) provides for a refund of contributions after a disability retirement allowance is cancelled. It does not provide for a refund while a disability retirement allowance is being received. We conclude that Shurtliff did not withdraw...
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...create an absurd result. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Pend Oreille County, 146 Wash.2d at 791, 51 P.3d 744; Shurtliff v. Dep't of Ret. Sys., 103 Wash.App. 815, 825, 15 P.3d 164 (2000). I. REQUIREMENTS FOR LEOFF 1 ¶ 15 Former RCW 41.26.045 (1974)5 requires satisfaction of minimum medical and he......