Siao-Pao v. Connolly

• Decision Date: 25 June 2008
• Docket Number: No. 06 Civ. 10172(VM).,06 Civ. 10172(VM).
• Citation: 564 F.Supp.2d 232
• Parties: Leopold SIAO-PAO, Petitioner, v. Superintendent William J. CONNOLLY, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Page 232

564 F.Supp.2d 232

Leopold SIAO-PAO, Petitioner, v. Superintendent William J. CONNOLLY, Respondent.

No. 06 Civ. 10172(VM).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

June 25, 2008.

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Leopold Siao-Pao, pro se.

DECISION AND ORDER

VICTOR MARRERO, District Judge.

Pro se petitioner Leopold Siao-Pao ("Siao-Pao") seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in connection with his denial of parole on August, 27, 2003 by the New York State Parole Board (the "Parole Board"). Siao-Pao raises four claims in his petition: (1) the Parole Board's determination was arbitrary and capricious; (2) the Parole Board violated Siao-Pao's constitutional due process rights ("Due Process") by failing to provide a written statement of reasons for parole denial; (3) the Parole Board violated Siao-Pao's equal protection rights ("Equal Protection"); and (4) the denial of parole for Siao-Pao was arbitrary because the Parole Board permitted political pressure and public opinion to influence its decision-making. For the reasons stated below, his petition is denied.

I. BACKGROUND¹

A. THE UNDERLYING CRIME

On September 26, 1981, Siao-Pao stabbed and killed 38-year-old Patrick Kehn ("Kehn") while robbing him and a companion in Manhattan's East River Park. On August 24, 1982, pursuant to a plea agreement, Siao-Pao was sentenced to 18 years to life on second-degree murder charges and 8 1/3 to 25 years for first degree robbery, with the two sentences to run concurrently.

Siao-Pao's minimum 18-year sentence expired in 1999. New York prison regulations provide for biannual parole applications. Since Siao-Pao's 1999 sentence expiration, he has applied for parole four times: in August 1999, August 2001, August 2003, and August 2005.² The Parole Board has denied his application on each occasion. The August 2003 parole denial is challenged in this action.

B. THE 2003 PAROLE DENIAL

Before reaching its decision to deny Siao-Pao parole in 2003, the Parole Board conducted a hearing in which Siao-Pao expressed remorse for murdering Kehn and a desire for a second chance. After admitting to his "very minor record," Siao-Pao answered affirmatively when asked by Commissioner Gailor ("Gailor") if "this was a really serious escalation of your life-." (Parole Transcript 2-3, attached as Exhibit A to Steward Decl.) After Siao-Pao's affirmative answer, Gailor completed the previous question with the following statement: "your activities, criminal activities. Why did it happen?" Siao-Pao proceeded with his response, explaining that prior to the incident, he had lost his job and was experiencing difficulty in securing employment; he then began spending time on the streets. During the interview, Siao-Pao also acknowledged the wrongfulness of his action, which he said was not premeditated, and noted his daily reflection on what had transpired. Siao-Pao told the Parole Board that he had had a clean disciplinary record since his 2001 Parole Board appearance, and that he had been working as a paralegal in the law library. Siao-Pao also indicated that he had options for a place to live in upon release and had not secured employment, but was flexible, with the ultimate goal of obtaining a commercial driver's license or warehouse work.

At the conclusion of the 2003 hearing, the Parole Board denied Siao-Pao parole and issued the following opinion:

During the course of an in-concert robbery you stabbed your victim to death. These offenses represent a serious escalation of your criminal behavior and a total disrespect for human life. All factors considered leads the panel to believe that your release is incompatible with the public welfare.

(Parole Board Release Decision Notice, attached as Ex. B to Steward Decl.)

C. APPEALS OF THE 2003 PAROLE DENIAL

Siao-Pao appealed the Parole Board's decision to the Parole Board Appeals Unit (the "Appeals Unit"). The Appeals Unit denied Siao-Pao's appeal on August 26, 2004. The Appeals Unit concluded that "[t]he record demonstrates that the Board considered all of the factors relevant to the disposition of [Siao-Pao's] application for parole, including [Siao-Pao's] good behavior, accomplishments, his employability, his involvement in institutional programs and his plans upon release." (Administrative Appeal Decision Notice 1, attached as Ex. E to Steward Decl.)

On or about May 19, 2004, Siao-Pao sought relief through a proceeding in the New York State Supreme Court (the "State Court") pursuant to Article 78 ("Article 78") of the New York State Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR"), arguing that (1) he had received a cursory, pro forma hearing from a biased panel that had already decided to deny his parole application; (2) the Parole Board's decision was based upon an incomplete record; (3) the Parole Board wrongly concluded that his offense constituted a "serious escalation" of his "criminal behavior"; (4) the Parole Board did not properly weigh the statutory factors in reaching its decision, and issued a nonspecific boilerplate written decision; (5) the Parole Board's grant of parole to Kathy Boudin, an inmate also convicted of first-degree armed robbery and second-degree murder, demonstrated that he was denied the Equal Protection of the law; and (6) the Parole Board's denial of his petition was the result of political pressure exerted by then New York Governor George Pataki ("Pataki") to deny parole to inmates convicted of violent crimes. Siao-Pao asked the State Court to either (1) annul the Parole Board's determination and direct his release, or (2) order a new hearing.

In an opinion dated March 28, 2005, the State Court held that the Parole Board's denial was within its discretion, because the record showed that the Board made an individualized determination after considering the statutorily mandated factors. See In re. Siao-Pao v. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, Index No. 401841/04 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty 2005). The State Court elaborated that there was "simply no evidence in the record to demonstrate that the Board's determination reflects intentionally disparate treatment" of Siao-Pao and that it was "unpersuaded that the Parole Board's determination was affected by irrationality bordering on impropriety." Id. (internal quotation omitted). On appeal to the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division (the "Appellate Division"), Siao-Pao argued that the Parole Board had failed to properly weigh the statutory factors of Executive Law § 259-i. The Appellate Division unanimously dismissed the appeal as moot given Siao-Pao's subsequent August 2005 hearing and, in the alternative, found that the Parole Board had properly considered the statutory factors set forth in Executive Law § 259-i, including the presentence report and the victim impact statement. See In re Siao-Pao v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 353, 813 N.Y.S.2d 658, 659 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2006).

Siao-Pao sought leave to appeal the Appellate Division's decision to the New York Court of Appeals, which denied his motion without comment. See In re Siao-Pao v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 7 N.Y.3d 710, 822 N.Y.S.2d 758, 855 N.E.2d 1173 (2006).

While Siao-Pao's Article 78 motion was still pending in the State Court, he filed a pro se habeas petition challenging his 2003 parole denial. On January 26, 2005, Judge George B. Daniels ordered the petition dismissed without prejudice to allow Siao-Pao to refile his petition within ninety days after State Court exhaustion. Siao-Pao subsequently filed this timely pro se habeas petition challenging the August 2003 parole denial.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Siao-Pao is proceeding pro se, and that his submissions should thus be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Ferran v. Town of Nassau, 11 F.3d 21, 22 (2d Cir.1993) (quoting Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 101 S.Ct. 173, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980)). Moreover, when a plaintiff brings a case pro se, the Court must construe his pleadings liberally and interpret them "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.1994)). Still, pro se status "does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Boddie v. New York State Div. of Parole, 285 F.Supp.2d 421, 426 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.1983)).

Federal habeas review of state court decisions is governed by the standards prescribed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"):

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court decision is "contrary to" established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion on a question of law that is opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court, or if the state court adjudicates essentially the same facts as a prior Supreme Court case but reaches an opposite result. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-6, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (citations omitted). A state court decision is an "unreasonable application" of established federal law if (1) the state court correctly identifies the relevant legal principle but unreasonably applies it to a set of facts; (2) the state court unreasonably extends an existing principle to a...