Sias v. General Motors Corp.
| Decision Date | 06 April 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 52,52 |
| Citation | 372 Mich. 542,127 N.W.2d 357 |
| Parties | Gale R. SIAS, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a foreign corporation authorized to do business in Michigan, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Marvin L. Failer, Flint, for plaintiff and appellee.
McAra. Palmer & Keil, Flint, for defendant and appellant; Robert P. Keil, Flint, of counsel.
Before the Entire Bench, except SOURIS and SMITH, JJ.
This appeal is from denials of defendant's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, to set aside the verdict, for a new trial and for an order of remittitur. Plaintiff had verdict for slander in the amounts of $24,800 for 'general' damages, and $4,500 for 'hurt feelings.'
The essential facts are: Gale R. Sias, plaintiff, 42, prior to the institution of his action was employed by General Motors Corporation in the Buick plant protection department. His duties were, generally, partrol by unmarked car, gate supervision, time clock runs and protection of company property. He started in this capacity in December, 1950. On December 10, 1960, his employment terminated. It is the circumstances of the termination of the employment and its aftermath which give rise to the case we consider.
Properly part of the record and virtually uncontradicted is plaintiff's standing and general reputation in the community. He was active in many civic and fraternal organizations and service clubs. He participated actively in the eyesight conservation program of one of the service clubs. He attained recognition at State and National level in other organizations. He was a more than passive parent-teacher association member. It is an indisputable conclusion of fact that by reason of the foregoing activity he was reasonably well known and had achieved a moderate degree of recognition as a 'substantial citizen' in his native city of Flint. So much of the record factually is not in serious dispute. Disputed factual issues arise in the area of the events attending his separation from defendant's employ.
Plaintiff contends: That the generator on his car became inoperative; that he was no mechanic and didn't know what was wrong with it; that he mentioned this to a fellow employee who was a mechanic; that he (the mechanic) offered to obtain a surplus generator for plaintiff. Sias alleges he understood the purchase of the generator could be arranged as salvage from the company. The mechanic was supposed to leave it on his workbench for plaintiff to pick up. The foregoing is supported by the testimony of plaintiff and the mechanic Stevens. Apparently the mechanic did not in fact find the type of generator or parts for the generator needed before the time plaintiff believed the mechanic had obtained it.
On the night preceding plaintiff's separation, while on one of his 'clock runs,' he observed a generator on Stevens' bench. Stevens, the mechanic, was working days, plaintiff nights. Plaintiff picked up from the bench what he claims he believed was the generator Stevens had selected. He asked still another employee who was working in the area of Stevens' station whether that generator was the one Stevens had procured for him (plaintiff). The employee, Herrick, according to plaintiff, confirmed that it was. Herrick contrariwise contends that he told plaintiff he did not know whether it was or not. The following day it appeared that the generator plaintiff took was not a salvageable item but was being repaired for use by the company. Meanwhile plaintiff had taken the item to the plant protection booth at the Michigan avenue entrance and set it on the floor, telling another officer Thomas who was on duty there, that he, plaintiff was going to take it to salvage the next morning to buy it. Plaintiff who at that time was being treated at the plant medical office for an injured eye claims he then went for another treatment. When he returned to get the generator and explain the situation to the salvage sales department he was met by 3 of his superiors. The chief of the plant protection force told him his conduct was not in accordance with regulations. He is said to have charged plaintiff with misappropriating company property. It should be noted here that there is a considerable amount of semantic toe-dancing on the head of a terminological pin concerning the difference between theft and misappropriation. We agree with the trial court. It has no merit. To a plant protection guard accused of one or the other, the difference is academic.
After plaintiff's separation, which in actuality became a resignation at his request in lieu of a pending discharge, a marked lowering in the morale of the plant protection department took place. There was testimony that there were rumors circulating which were damaging to that morale. Management chose to call in at random several plant protection men, fellow employees of plaintiff off each shift and explain why plaintiff 'resigned.' It is not unreasonable to assume that curiosity existed among them as to whether plaintiff's separation was a resignation in fact or a discharge and, if so, for what. It was to these men, fellow employees in the same status as plaintiff before discharge, that defendant chose to explain the situation in order to arrest the rumors and restore morale. In so doing, an agent of defendant corporation in the course of his employment said plaintiff was released for 'misappropriation of company property.' In October of 1961, plaintiff instituted his action resulting in the verdict appealed from.
The statement we are concerned with is variously said to be 'misappropriation of company property,' or 'conspiring to misappropriate company property.' Whatever the form, the plain import was theft. To charge another with theft falsely is actionable per se. Bacon v. Michigan Central R. R. Co., 55 Mich. 224, 21 N.W. 324. We must read the verdict of the jury in this case to find that the charge was false.
Appellant presents 7 claimed errors. Five are concerned with the court's charge. One is a refusal by the judge to ask a specific question of the jurors on voir dire. The other deals with the construction of the statute granting absolute privilege to communications, reports or statements made to the Michigan employment security commission.
Appellees in different phrasing state the questions somewhat similarly.
We believe the following questions should be discussed:
(1) Did defendant publish a slanderous statement?
(2) Was the statement actionalbe per se?
(3) Was its publication protected by a qualified privilege?
(4) Was reversible error committed by the court in allowing counsel to use the transcript of an employment security referee's hearing in cross-examining defense witnesses?
(5) Was reversible error committed by the court, either in its charge, or upon voir dire examination?
(6) Was the verdict, if validly rendered, excessive?
On the question of the publication of the statement we hold that in calling in fellow employees of plaintiff and 'explaining' the circumstances of his separation, defendant-corporation was serving its own particular interest. That interest, as described by defendant's representatives, was to restore morale in the plant protection force and to quiet rumors that were circulating among its members, adversely affecting the company. These men were not supervisors, personnel department representatives, nor company officials. They were simply fellow employees in the identical work. No privilege extended to the communication to them and the trial court properly so held. See Bostetter v. Kirsch Co., 319 Mich. 547, 30 N.W.2d 276, for a discussion of the doctrine of qualified privilege. We answer our first 3 questions as did the trial judge. The statement falsely made and published was actionable per se and was not protected by qualified privilege.
We direct ourselves to the question of the use of the transcript from an employment security commission hearing on cross-examination as affected by statutory privilege. Had the hearing been the only place the statements had been uttered, a different situation would have been presented. The statute 1 is explicit. Its pertinent excerpt is:
'Any report * * * written or verbal * * * shall be a privileged communication and no person, firm or corporation shall be held liable for slander or libel on account of any such report or statement.'
In this case we are not concerned with an invasion of the privilege and an attempted action for libel or slander by reason of any communication to the commission. Here the actionable statement was previously made. The fact of its having been made was...
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