Sibley v. Jeffreys

• Decision Date: 14 December 1953
• Docket Number: No. 5689,5689
• Citation: 76 Ariz. 340,264 P.2d 831
• Parties: SIBLEY et al. v. JEFFREYS.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 831

264 P.2d 831

76 Ariz. 340

SIBLEY et al. v. JEFFREYS.

No. 5689.

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Dec. 14, 1953.

Byrne & Green, Yuma, for appellants.

Westover & Mansfield and John H. Westover, Yuma, for appellees.

WINDES, Justice.

Suit by appellee Sid Jeffreys against appellants Harry Sibley and Phil Sibley for unlawful detainer of 120 acres of unsurveyed land belonging to the United States government. Parties will be referred to as they appeared in the trial court.

Briefly the complaint alleges that the plaintiff for over the years last past has been in the peaceable possession of the propery and the during the past four years plaintiff gave defendants permission, at their request, to enter upon the land and use a portion thereof for hog raising and limited farming; that the plaintiff by written notice terminated defendants' right of occupancy and the defendants refused to surrender possession. Defendants' answer denies that plaintiff ever was or now is entitled to the possession of the property; denies that they took possession with the permission of or as the result of any authority from the plaintiff or that they sought such from him. The answer affirmatively alleges that defendants took possession on their own initiative and expended approximately $12,000 in improving the same. On the issues thus framed the matter was tried before a jury resulting in verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. Upon defendants' motion for new trial being denied, defendants appeal.

Their first assignment of error, containing seven subdivisions, when reduced to its essentials is that the court erred in not granting the motion for new trial because the evidence did not legally warrant the verdict and judgment.

It is claimed that there was no evidence establishing that the plaintiff ever had possession of the property. This presents for solution the problem of what is essential to establish a possessory right to the public domain that the court will protect against an alleged intruder. The property was not enclosed nor were its boundaries well-defined. There was evidence that there was or had been a fence extending part way along the north boundary. The plaintiff owned a herd of goats which had been grazed upon this and other adjacent property for a substantial length of time. Originally one Beasley had constructed improvements consisting of small houses one-fourth of a mile south of the south boundary, which improvements had been purchased by the plaintiff. Stock fences and two wells with pumps were near the houses. Plaintiff testified he had by means of chopping ax cleared some 15 or 20 acres and that the defendants knew he was claiming occupancy of the land. Also, plaintiff testified that defendants requested and were granted permission to occupy the land.

The test of possession seems to depend upon whether one is in the occupancy of land with the intent to control it. Restatement, Torts, Volume 1, Section 157. The comment under this section defines occupancy as 'such acts done upon the land as manifest a claim of exclusive control thereof and indicate to the public that he who has done them has appropriated the land.' Most of the decisions upon the question of what does or does not amount to possession of unenclosed land arose under the issue of adverse possession of privately owned land, but there appears no logical reason for a different test of what may be legally sufficient to constitute the degree of control that will meet the requirements of possession in the case before the court. There are many cases upon the subject and some conflict in the authorities, but we think the proper rule is announced in Sheldon v. Mull, 67 Cal. 299, 7 P. 710, wherein the court said, 'Actual possession of land may be had without fences or inclosure.' See also Myers v. Hatler, 121 Or. 332, 254 P. 355; Webber v. Clarke, 74 Cal. 11, 15 P. 431. We believe that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the plaintiff was in possession of the property at the time the defendants moved thereon.

There is a sharp conflict in the evidence as to whether defendants asked and secured permission from the plaintiff to occupy the property. Plaintiff contends defendants asked for such privilege and it was granted subject to termination at the will of plaintiff. This is disputed. On the assumption that such permission was given (and the jury could have found such fact), plaintiff contends the relationship of landlord and tenant resulted and that consequently under the familiar rule that a tenant cannot dispute the landlord's title these defendants are estopped to deny plaintiff's right of possession. We do not think plaintiff can invoke this rule. The nature of a possessory right to public domain is well stated in Missionary Society of M. E. Church v. Dalles City, 107 U.S. 336, 2 S.Ct. 672, 678, 27 L.Ed. 545, as follows:

'* * * All persons, therefore, who settled upon the public lands acquired no rights thereby as against the government. They were merely tenants by sufferance. The most they could claim was the right of actual occupancy as against other settlers. Such an occupant could yield his right of actual possession to another settler, but he could convey no other interest in the land. If he abandoned the land and another settler occupied it, the former lost all right to the possession. If he transferred the possession to another and the transferee abandoned the land, the first possessor could claim no right in the land unless he again took actual possession. In short, the settler had no right as against the government, and no rights under the laws of the United States as against any one else to the possession of the land in his actual occupancy, except and only so long as such occupancy continued.'

We recognize there is authority for invoking this rule of estoppel when there actually exists a lease between parties and the lessee has recognized the validity of lessor's possessory right by the payment of rent for the use of the premises, Shy v. Brockhause, 7 Okl. 35, 54 P. 306, but we do not think that...