Sibley v. McConnell

• Decision Date: 13 October 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 15–730 (JEB)
• Citation: 139 F.Supp.3d 194
• Parties: Montgomery Blair Sibley, Plaintiff, v. The Honorable Mitch McConnell, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

139 F.Supp.3d 194

Montgomery Blair Sibley, Plaintiff,

v.The Honorable Mitch McConnell, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 15–730 (JEB)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed October 13, 2015

Montgomery Blair Sibley, Rockville, MD, pro se.

Peter Rolf Maier, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, William Bullock Pittard, IV, Sarah Edith Clouse, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JAMES E. BOASBERG, United States District Judge

Calls to amend or rewrite the Constitution have punctuated our nation's history since the document was ratified. Anticipating as much, attendees of the 1787 Constitutional Convention saw fit to include in Article V provisions for assembling another such convention. See The Federalist No. 85 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining that Congress "will be obliged" to call a constitutional convention under the terms of Article V if legislatures of two-thirds of the states request it). In recent years, political-action committees have advocated constitutional conventions for a variety of reasons, including passing the Balanced Budget Amendment or the Single Subject Amendment, repealing Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010), or generally curtailing the powers of the federal government. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, A Real Step to Fix Democracy, The Atlantic (May 30, 2014), available at http://theatln.tc/1yUYLDC ("A convention is .... the chance for America to focus on solutions."). None of these efforts has been successful.

Nor need they be, according to pro se Plaintiff Montgomery Blair Sibley. For, he says, thirty-five states—more than the two-thirds required by Article V—have already voiced their support for a constitutional convention –some as far back as 1901 (Minnesota), some as recently as 1979 (Mississippi). See Compl., Exh. A ("Authority for Article V Convention Call"). In Plaintiff's view, then, a constitutional convention is long overdue, and Congress has egregiously reneged on its Article V obligations.

Sibley originally brought this lawsuit in District of Columbia Superior Court against congressional leaders Mitch McConnell and John Boehner, seeking to rectify their purported inaction. After Defendants removed the matter here, Plaintiff sought remand to Superior Court, and Defendants moved to dismiss. This Court has no opportunity to determine whether Sibley's quest is quixotic; as he concedes he has no Article III standing, remand is the only appropriate outcome.

I. Background

Sibley is a United States citizen with a propensity for filing unmeritorious lawsuits, often against members of state and federal government. See, e.g., Sibley v. Macaluso, No. 13–7128, 2014 WL 211219, at *1 (D.C.Cir. Jan. 9, 2014) ("Appellant [Sibley]'s challenge to this court's summary affirmance procedure is unavailing.... The district court correctly determined that the appellees [—Court of Appeals judges and a clerk for the D.C. Court of Appeals—] are entitled to absolute immunity from appellant's claims for monetary damages.") (citations omitted); Sibley v. Obama, No. 12–5198, 2012 WL 6603088, at *1 (D.C.Cir. Dec. 6, 2012) (summarily affirming denial of quo warranto writ against President Obama "because the writ is only available for someone who would obtain the office if the incumbent were ousted"); Sibley v. Alito, No. 08–1797, 2009 WL 1649491, at *1 (D.D.C. June 11, 2009) (denying motion to appeal in forma pauperis and noting that "Mr. Sibley is a frequent filer[; t]he issue he sought leave of this Court to appeal ... is not only well settled, but it has been decided against Mr. Sibley in a nearly identical case he filed previously in this jurisdiction"); see also In re Discipline of Sibley, 559 U.S. 1002, 130 S.Ct. 1947, 176 L.Ed.2d 411 (2010) ("Montgomery Blair Sibley, of Washington, District of Columbia, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court and a rule will issue ... requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court."); In re Disbarment of Sibley, 560 U.S. 902, 130 S.Ct. 3317, 176 L.Ed.2d 1214 (2010) ("Disbarment order entered.").

Defendant John A. Boehner currently serves as the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, and Defendant Mitch McConnell presently holds the position of Majority Leader of the U.S. Senate; Sibley has sued both Defendants in their official capacities. See Compl., ¶¶ 4–5.

Acting pro se, Sibley filed this action seeking a court order requiring Congress to call a constitutional convention as provided by Article V. He asks that this Court declare that he possesses the "general right" to ensure that "Government be administered according to law"; declare that two-thirds of the States have assented to a constitutional convention but that Congress has failed to call for one; and issue a writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) to compel Defendants to "carry out their duty by ‘calling’ a Convention." Id., ¶¶ 6–11.

Sibley filed this suit in Superior Court, but McConnell removed it here pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), 1442(a), and 1446(b). See Notice of Removal (May 13, 2015). These provisions permit removal of suits filed in state court against "any officer of either House of Congress, for or relating to any act in the discharge of his official duty." 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(4). After the case was transferred to this Court but before either Defendant had answered or otherwise responded to the Complaint, Plaintiff moved to remand the action back to Superior Court. See First Remand Mot. at 1. McConnell then filed a Motion to Dismiss, and Boehner did the same shortly thereafter, largely incorporating the arguments in McConnell's Motion. See ECF Nos. 8, 11. Sibley responded by filing a Second Motion to Remand, a Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, and, later, a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint. See ECF Nos. 13, 14, 30. All of these myriad motions have been briefed and are now ripe for decision.

II. Legal Standard

In evaluating Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, the Court must "treat the complaint's factual allegations as true ... and must grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’ " Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C.Cir.2000) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C.Cir.1979) ) (internal citation omitted); see also Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253–54 (D.C.Cir.2005). This standard governs the Court's consideration of Defendants' Motions under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), both of which apply here. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) ("[I]n passing on a motion to dismiss, whether on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or for failure to state a cause of action, the allegations of the complaint should be construed favorably to the pleader."); Walker v. Jones, 733 F.2d 923, 925–26 (D.C.Cir.1984) (same). The Court need not accept as true, however, "a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation," nor an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the Complaint. Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C.Cir.2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear his claims. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ; U . S . Ecology, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 231 F.3d 20, 24 (D.C.Cir.2000). A court also has an "affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority." Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 13 (D.D.C.2001). "For this reason, ‘the [p]laintiff's factual allegations in the complaint ... will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion’ than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim." Id. at 13–14 (quoting 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350 (2d ed.1987) (alteration in original)). Additionally, unlike with a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court "may consider materials outside the pleadings in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction." Jerome Stevens, 402 F.3d at 1253 ; see also Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. E.E.O.C., 409 F.3d 359, 366 (D.C.Cir.2005).

III. Analysis

In their respective Motions, Defendants offer the Court three reasons to dismiss the Complaint. They first contend that Plaintiff lacks standing, both because he fails to identify a proper injury-in-fact and because whatever injury he does identify cannot be redressed by this Court. See McConnell MTD at 2; Boehner MTD at 2. They further argue that the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, sec. 6, cl. 1, blocks Plaintiff's claims "because they arise out of an alleged failure to take legislative action." McConnell MTD at 2; Boehner MTD at 2. Finally, they assert that the political-question doctrine bars the Court from considering the merits of the suit. See McConnell MTD at 3; Boehner MTD at 3. Persuaded by the first of these arguments—that Plaintiff lacks Article III standing—the Court finds no reason to address Defendants' remaining contentions. After discussing the standing question, the Court will address the issues of remand versus dismissal and whether sanctions are warranted.

A. Standing

Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to resolving "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. A party's standing "is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. To establish standing, a party must, at a constitutional minimum, meet the...