Sieranski v. TJC Esq, Corp.

• Decision Date: 02 March 2021
• Docket Number: AC 43272
• Citation: 203 Conn.App. 75,247 A.3d 201
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Helen SIERANSKI v. TJC ESQ, a Professional Services Corporation

203 Conn.App. 75

247 A.3d 201

Helen SIERANSKI

v.TJC ESQ, a Professional Services Corporation

AC 43272

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 19, 2020

Officially released March 2, 2021

Megan L. Michaud, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Maria Garcia-Quintner, for the appellee (defendant).

Bright, C. J., and Moll and Suarez, Js.

SUAREZ, J.

The plaintiff, Helen Sieranski, brought a three count complaint against her former employer, the defendant, TJC Esq, A Professional Services Corporation, seeking damages for wrongful termination, pregnancy discrimination, and gender discrimination (original complaint). The court granted the defendant's motion to strike the first count of the original complaint, in which the plaintiff alleged common-law wrongful termination in violation of the public policy outlined in General Statutes §§ 3-94h and 53a-157b. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a revised complaint alleging, in one count, pregnancy discrimination. After the court rendered summary judgment as to that count, the plaintiff brought the present appeal in which she challenges the court's judgment striking count one of her original complaint. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.

The following procedural history is relevant to this appeal. On November 13, 2017, the plaintiff filed the original complaint against the defendant alleging (1) wrongful termination of her employment in violation of the public policy embodied in §§ 3-94h and 53a-157b, (2) pregnancy discrimination in violation of General Statutes § 46a-60 (b) (7), and (3) gender discrimination in violation of § 46a-60 (b) (1).¹

The plaintiff alleged the following relevant facts in count one of the original complaint: "The defendant is a law firm .... The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a litigation paralegal. ... While the plaintiff was employed by the defendant she reported to Attorney Brooke Goff. ... On or about March 23, 2017, Attorney Goff realized [that] they had missed the time to appeal an arbitrator's decision on a case and asked the plaintiff to prepare an affidavit stating [that they had] never received the arbitrator's decision, which was not true. ... The plaintiff drafted the affidavit but refused to notarize [it] because she knew it was false. ... For the rest of the week Attorney Goff kept asking the plaintiff what the status was for the affidavit and the plaintiff repeatedly stated [that] it was not filed because the plaintiff would not sign the affidavit. ... The defendant terminated the plaintiff's employment on March 31, 2017.... The defendant stated the reason for the plaintiff's termination was [that] she was not a good fit." The plaintiff further alleged in relevant part: "The defendant terminated the [plaintiff's employment] in retaliation for refusing to notarize a false affidavit. ... The defendant's termination of the plaintiff's employment is in violation of the long-standing public policy outlined in ... § 3-94h and ... § 53a-157b."

On January 22, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to strike each of the three counts in the original complaint. With respect to count one, the defendant argued that the plaintiff "fail[ed] to allege sufficient facts to establish that the employer's conduct at issue contravenes the public policy cited." The court heard oral argument on the motion to strike on March 12, 2018. The plaintiff argued that it was a violation of public policy "for an attorney to force [her] paralegal to draft a knowingly false affidavit and notarize the same for a submission to a judicial fact-finding body." The defendant argued that §§ 3-94h and 53a-157b did not reflect a general public policy against the conduct alleged by the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff's act of notarizing the affidavit was not prohibited by the statutes.

On July 10, 2018, the court granted the defendant's motion to strike the first and third counts of the original complaint, and it denied the motion as to the second count alleging pregnancy discrimination. The court issued a memorandum of decision on the same date. As to count one, which is the subject of the present appeal, the court concluded that, "[a]ccepting the allegations as true, the plaintiff [failed] to make any allegations that the defendant terminated the plaintiff because she refused to perform an official notary act with the intent to deceive or defraud." The court reasoned that "a notary has the authority to administer oaths, take an acknowledgement, and provide a jurat, but does not have the power to themselves affirm the truth of the contents of the document signed by another." Instead, the court explained, the affiant herself swears to the truth of the content of the document, while a notary "just affirms that the signer vouched for the truthfulness." The court concluded, therefore, that § 3-94h was inapplicable to the facts alleged and failed to support the plaintiff's claim. Additionally, the court concluded that § 53a-157b was inapplicable because "the plaintiff failed to allege the content of the affidavit, or that anyone made a false statement intended to mislead a public official, or made such a statement under oath. At most, the plaintiff alleges that she prepared a document at the request of Attorney Goff that was not signed or notarized."

Thereafter, the plaintiff did not plead over with respect to counts one or three. Instead, on July 16, 2018, pursuant to Practice Book §§ 61-2 and 61-5, she filed a notice of her intent to appeal, with respect to count one only, the court's decision granting the defendant's motion to strike.² On July 31, 2018, the defendant filed a request to revise, requesting that the plaintiff remove all allegations from the original complaint that were immaterial to count two, alleging discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, which was the sole remaining claim in the case. On August 6, 2018, in accordance with the defendant's request, the plaintiff filed a revised complaint that removed counts one and three and the allegations that were material only to those counts. On September 5, 2018, the defendant filed its answer and four special defenses. On September 18, 2018, the plaintiff filed a reply to the special defenses.

On December 14, 2018, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to the sole count in the revised complaint, alleging pregnancy discrimination, which the court granted on August 6, 2019.³ The plaintiff filed the present appeal on August 8, 2019.⁴

Additional procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

The plaintiff claims that the court erred in granting the defendant's motion to strike as to count one of the original complaint, which alleged common-law wrongful termination in violation of the public policy outlined in §§ 3-94h and 53a-157b. We agree.

Practice Book § 10-39 (a) provides in relevant part: "A motion to strike shall be used whenever any party wishes to contest ... (1) the legal sufficiency of ... any one or more counts ... to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ...."

"The standard of review in an appeal challenging a trial court's granting of a motion to strike is well established. A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court. As a result, our review of the court's ruling is plenary. ... We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint that has been stricken and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency. ... Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sempey v. Stamford Hospital , 194 Conn. App. 505, 511, 221 A.3d 839 (2019).

Next, we briefly discuss what constitutes common-law wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Our Supreme Court has recognized "the principle that public policy imposes some limits on unbridled discretion to terminate the employment of someone hired at will." Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc. , 179 Conn. 471, 476, 427 A.2d 385 (1980). In creating this public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, the court in Sheets stated that an employee may have a cause of action when the employee alleges "a demonstrably improper reason for dismissal, a reason whose impropriety is derived from some important violation of public policy." (Emphasis omitted.) Id., at 475, 427 A.2d 385.

"Although the court in Sheets recognized a public policy limitation on [this] doctrine in an effort to balance the competing interests of employers and employees ... [it also] recognized the inherent vagueness of the concept of public policy and the difficulty encountered when attempting to define precisely the contours of the public policy exception. In evaluating claims, [courts should] look to see whether the plaintiff has ... alleged that [her] discharge violated any explicit statutory or constitutional provision ... or whether [she] alleged that [her] dismissal contravened any judicially conceived notion of public policy. ...

"Our Supreme Court also repeatedly [has] underscored [that] adherence to the principle that the public policy exception to the general rule allowing unfettered termination of an at-will employment relationship is a narrow one. ... [C]ourts should not lightly intervene to impair the exercise of managerial discretion or to foment unwarranted litigation .... Consequently, we have rejected claims of wrongful discharge that have not been predicated upon an employer's violation of an important and clearly articulated public policy." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Morrissey-Manter v. Saint Francis Hospital & Medical Center , 166 Conn. App. 510, 531, 142 A.3d 363, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 924, 149 A.3d 982 (2016).

Additionally, the court in Sheets stated: "We need not decide whether violation of a state statute is invariably...