Sigal v. Wise

• Decision Date: 16 February 1932
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: SIGAL v. WISE.

158 A. 891

114 Conn. 297

SIGAL v. WISE.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

February 16, 1932

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Newell Jennings and Alfred E. Baldwin, Judges.

Action by Nathan Sigal against Isidore Wise for a declaratory judgment with respect to a lease, brought to the superior court, where demurrers to the complaint and amended complaint were sustained, and, the plaintiff failing to plead further judgment was rendered for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed.

Error in part, and cause remanded.

Josiah H. Peck, I. Oscar Levine, and Louis H. Katz, all of Hartford for appellant.

Harry L. Nair, Sheldon J. Kahn, and Solomon Elsner, all of Hartford, for appellee.

MALTBIE, C.J.

The following facts are alleged in the complaint as amended. On November 29, 1927, the defendant made a written lease to the plaintiff of a store on Main street in Hartford, with the basement under it except for a certain designated portion for the period from March 1, 1928, to February 28, 1933. The lease also included a space in the rear of the store, at a specified additional yearly payment, and as to this space it was provided that, if the lessor desired it for building or other purposes, the lessee would, within six months from the receipt by him of a written notice of such desire, remove any structure standing upon it at his own expense and relinquish all his rights and interests in it. The plaintiff took possession of the store occupied it until November 7, 1930, and was tenant of it on that day. He also walled in the space in the rear and occupied it for use in connection with the store. On November 7, 1930, the store was completely destroyed by fire without any fault of the plaintiff, but the space in the rear was not seriously injured. On December 18, 1930, the defendant notified the plaintiff that he regarded the latter's rights under the lease as terminated and should treat them accordingly. Subsequently the defendant tore down the walls and tore up the floor of the space in the rear. In December, 1930, an announcement appeared in the newspapers of the city that the defendant proposed to erect a building on the land formerly occupied by that of which the store leased to the plaintiff formed a part, and that the first floor of the new building, at street level, would be suitable for a store and would be leased to a certain corporation for that purpose. The plaintiff believed that this announcement was made with the authority and approval of the defendant. At all times since March 1, 1928, the plaintiff has fully complied with all the terms of the lease. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment and also injunctive relief. The defendant demurred to the complaint and claims for relief upon several grounds, and the trial court sustained the demurrer.

The first prayer was for a declaratory judgment that, if the defendant erects a building of such a character that the space leased to the plaintiff is suitable for store purposes, the plaintiff shall be entitled to occupy that space for the purposes of a retail store in accordance with the terms of the lease. The demurrer attacked this prayer upon the ground that the relief claimed is hypothetical and contingent upon the happening of an uncertain event and does not concern any presently existing rights. The statute authorizing the Superior Court to render declaratory judgments is as broad as it well could be made. General Statutes, § 5334. The rules adopted to carry out the statute authorize the superior court to render such judgments " as to the existence or nonexistence (a) of any right, power, privilege or immunity; or (b) of any fact upon which the existence or nonexistence of such right, power, privilege or immunity does or may depend, whether such right, power, privilege or immunity now exists or will arise in the future." Practice Book 1922, p. 255, § 62. While the rules go on to limit that power in certain respects, neither in them nor in the statute is there any restriction upon the power of the court to render judgments determining rights which are contingent upon the happening of some future event. Indeed, a contrary intent is clearly indicated by the provision in the rules authorizing the determination of any fact upon which the existence or nonexistence of any right, power, privilege, or immunity does or may depend, whether such right, power, privilege, or immunity now exists or will arise in the future. The remedy by means of declaratory judgments is highly remedial, and the statute and rules should be accorded a liberal construction to carry out the purposes underlying such judgments. One great purpose is to enable parties to have their differences authoritatively settled in advance of any claimed invasion of rights, that they may guide their actions accordingly and often may be able to keep them within lawful bounds, and so avoid the expense, bitterness of feeling, and disturbance of the orderly pursuits of life which are so often the incidents of lawsuits. Fully to carry out the purposes intended to be served by such judgments, it is sometimes necessary to determine rights which will arise or become complete only in the contingency of some future happening. Even if the right claimed in this case is a contingent one, its present determination may well serve a very real practical need of the parties for guidance in their future conduct. A construction of our statute and rules which would exclude from the field of their operation the determination of rights, powers, privileges, and immunities which are contingent upon the happening or not happening of some future event would hamper their useful operation. Such a construction does not, however, compel the superior court to decided claims of right which are purely hypothetical or are not of consequence as guides to the present conduct of the parties. The second of the limitations upon the exercise of the power contained in the rules is designed to cover just such situations. It provides that there must be an actual, bona fide, and substantial question or issue in dispute or a substantial uncertainty of legal relations which requires settlement. The allegations of the complaint present such an uncertainty of legal relations as upon the hearing the court might deem to require present settlement.

A further prayer for relief by way of a declaratory judgment sought an adjudication that the store leased to the plaintiff had been rendered unfit for occupancy within the meaning of section 5023 of the General Statutes. The statute referred to is quoted in the footnote^[1] and is the basis of most of the claims made by the plaintiff. The defendant demurred to this claim for relief upon the ground that it did not ask for the determination as to any right, power, privilege or immunity arising under the allegations of the complaint, but did require a determination as to the existence of a conclusion upon which no such present right, power, privilege, or immunity can be based and which could not finally settle any dispute or uncertainty between the parties. If the plaintiff is correct in the construction of the statute he claims, it is a necessary condition precedent to its operation in the case before us that there be a finding that the leased premises were rendered unfit for occupancy as those words are used in it. The question so raised is as to the existence of a factual situation which is within the provision of the rules giving the court power to determine as to the existence of any fact upon which a right does or may depend. If the terms of the statute clearly defined the rights of the parties, the determination of this question would be clearly proper. In view of the varying claims they make as to the meaning of the statute, it is true that its determination would not alone settle their rights. Either present or future. The court may properly refuse to hear a case which seeks a declaration as to the existence of a fact. Where, even though it be found to exist, the rights of the parties will be still left in uncertainty. If the complaint sought nothing more by way of a declaratory judgment, this prayer for relief might have been demurrable. In this instance, however, it but particularizes one factor necessarily involved in the first prayer for relief and might properly have been left in the complaint. In so far as the demurrer attacks the prayers for relief by way of a declaratory judgment it should have been overruled.

The demurrer also attacks the sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint to entitle the plaintiff to the relief which he sought and in particular claims that on the destruction of the building the lease was terminated and the statute we have quoted would not apply to give the plaintiff the right he asserts. A proper interpretation of the statute requires a consideration first of the common law as to the rights of lessees of buildings or portions of buildings which have been destroyed or...