Siglar v. State

• Decision Date: 10 August 1989
• Docket Number: No. 1185,1185
• Citation: 541 N.E.2d 944
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court
• Parties: John SIGLAR, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). S 448.

Page 944

541 N.E.2d 944

John SIGLAR, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 1185 S 448.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Aug. 10, 1989.

Woodrow S. Nasser, Public Defender for Appeal, Terre Haute, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Jay Rodia, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

After a jury trial, John Siglar was convicted of murder, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-1-1 (Burns 1985 Repl.) and of conspiracy to commit murder, Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-5-2 (Burns 1985 Repl.). The trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of fifty years for conspiracy and sixty years for murder.

Siglar raises five issues on appeal:

I. Whether his sixth amendment right to counsel was violated as a result of ineffective assistance;

II. Whether the trial court erred in allowing hearsay statements into evidence;

III. Whether the trial court erred in overruling Siglar's motion for mistrial based on prejudicial comments by the prosecutor;

IV. Whether the trial court erred in overruling Siglar's objection to statements the prosecutor made while cross-examining Siglar; and

V. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict.

In late July or early August 1983, Loretta Stonebreaker offered to pay Helen Williams to kill her husband, Leon Marion "Red" Stonebreaker. Williams refused. In early February 1984, Loretta asked Williams to reconsider and offered to pay Williams and her friend John Siglar $2500 to kill Red. Later that month Siglar and Williams went to Florida together to look for work. Just before they left, Loretta offered them $3000 to kill Red. They declined again.

Soon after arriving in Florida, Siglar and Williams decided to return home because they had no money. On the way back they decided to accept Loretta's offer. On February 13, 1984, they told Loretta they would kill her husband for her. Loretta suggested they use an ice pick. She told them to kill him in a pig lot so that the pigs would eat his body.

Loretta set up the scheme by telling her husband that they needed meat and asking him to steal a hog. She suggested that he take Siglar and Williams along to help him. This plan came to fruition on February 24, 1984. That night Loretta gave Williams two ice picks to take with her. Siglar, Williams and Red drove around that evening looking for a hog lot. They stopped at a round barn in Lodi, Indiana, and Siglar and Red exited the car. Siglar, who was carrying his gun, told Williams to leave for a little while. She returned 15 to 20 minutes later, and Siglar got back in the car alone and said, "It's over. Done." He had Red's coin purse with him.

The next morning Arthur Uplinger found Red's body near the round barn. Red was dead, the result of a gunshot wound to the back of his head.

According to John Siglar, all the witnesses who gave testimony linking him to Red's death were either lying or mistaken.

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Siglar argues that his attorney was ineffective. Among other complaints, he claims his lawyer did not prepare adequately, failed to object to certain evidence and to certain statements by the prosecutor, and lacked the ability to question witnesses properly.

Judicial scrutiny of an attorney's performance is highly deferential. The standard for counsel's performance is that of reasonably effective assistance. To prevail on his claim, Siglar must show that his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. He also must prove that his attorney's failure to function was so prejudicial as to deprive him of a fair trial. A fair trial is denied when the conviction or sentence results from a breakdown of the adversarial process that renders the result unreliable. McChristion v. State (1987), Ind., 511 N.E.2d 297, 300 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).

A. Preparation. Siglar argues that his attorney was ineffective because he failed to interview defense witnesses prior to trial. Failure to interview defense witnesses prior to trial may constitute ineffective assistance if it appears that such interviews would have produced something substantive. Standing alone, it does not necessarily establish ineffective representation. See Kelly v. State (1983), Ind., 452 N.E.2d 907.

Siglar presents his attorney's failure to request that the court sequester the jury as another example of ineffective performance, especially given that his co-conspirator was tried in the same court the week before. This Court has noted that failure to request a change of venue despite pretrial publicity can be categorized as trial strategy and will not be considered ineffective assistance. Wood v. State (1987), Ind., 512 N.E.2d 1094. The failure of Siglar's attorney to request sequestering the jury is much the same. Without some demonstration of particular harm, it does not necessitate a finding of ineffective assistance.

B. Failure to Object to Evidence. Siglar cites his attorney's failure to object to the admission of the ice picks, the rifle, the bullet removed from Red Stonebreaker's head, a shell casing, and insurance policies. To establish that the failure to object to this evidence resulted in inadequate representation, Siglar must show that his counsel's objections would have been sustained if they had been made. Kimble v. State (1983), Ind., 451 N.E.2d 302.

Siglar argues generally that the evidence was inadmissible because it was not proven to be relevant. For example, he claims the ice picks had nothing to do with the issues in the case, that the rifle was not proven to be the weapon that discharged the bullet, and that neither the bullet nor the shell casing were positively proven to have come from the rifle. He also asserts that counsel should have objected to the insurance policies on the grounds that he was not a beneficiary. As for the rifle and ballistics evidence, this Court has said that while the State might strengthen its case by connecting the gun taken from the defendant to the gun that fired the bullet into the victim it is not required to do so. Livingston v. State (1972), 257 Ind. 620, 277 N.E.2d 363. As there was plenty of testimony linking each of these items to the conspiracy, Siglar fails to convince us that the trial court would have sustained these objections had they been made.

C. Failure to Object to Statements by the Prosecutor. Siglar claims that he received ineffective assistance because his trial attorney failed to object to comments the prosecutor made during his closing statement. Siglar argues that the prosecutor's statements put him in grave peril and concludes this section of his brief by invoking the pre-Strickland "mockery of justice" standard. The following examples are representative of the statements Siglar cites in his brief, arguing that had his attorney objected to these statements the court should have admonished the jury to disregard them, or even granted a mistrial.

1. Appellate counsel claims the prosecutor's reference to "defendants" in his closing argument was designed to invoke the conviction a week earlier of Siglar's co-conspirator, Loretta Stonebreaker. In fact, what the prosecutor said was, "It's unfortunate when a defendant or defendants decide they are going to commit a murder that they don't take a camera with them...." This reference is general and in no way invokes the conviction of Siglar's co-conspirator. It did not prejudice Siglar.

2. Appellate counsel suggests that Siglar was prejudiced by the prosecutor's statement that the victim was killed in a pig lot, when in fact the evidence only established that the victim was found dead in a pig lot. It is appropriate, and not prejudicial, for the prosecutor to present his theory of the case in closing argument.

3. Siglar argues that the prosecutor invaded the province of the jury by commenting on the credibility of a witness when he said in closing, "Leroy ain't smart enough to lie to you." In support of this claim Siglar makes reference to language from Doyle v. State (1984), Ind.App., 468 N.E.2d 528, 538, which states that a prosecutor's statement of personal opinion as to the defendant's guilt may require a mistrial. This claim, however, can be distinguished from that case as this statement does not address the guilt of the defendant, but rather the capability of a witness. While we do not condone this type of comment, it does not create the damage described in Doyle.

4. Without an accurate reference to the record, Siglar asks us to consider the prosecutor's statements to the jury that Siglar was "a pretty cool cucumber" and that "a decision by you is important to those police officers" as an inappropriate request that the jury convict in order to please others. In the context of the entire passage, however, it seems clear that the prosecutor was discussing the weight of the evidence in a permissible manner. He said:

We have established and proved beyond any reasonable doubt that this man is the man that pulled the trigger.... Ladies and gentlemen this is serious and a decision by you is important to the State. It's important to these police officers. They haven't been in here to present a prefabrication for you or lie to you.

Grave peril is determined by the probable persuasive effect of the misconduct on the jury's decision, not by the degree of impropriety of the conduct. Maldonado v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 492, 355 N.E.2d 843. The prosecutor's closing statements were within the bounds of proper argument, and defense counsel's failure to object to them does not establish ineffectiveness.

D. Other Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims. Siglar also claims that his counsel failed to represent him adequately because of his inability to question witnesses, his presentation of conflicting evidence, and his failure to renew the motion for directed verdict at the end of trial.

Siglar quotes at...