Sigular v. Gilson

• Decision Date: 02 April 2013
• Docket Number: No. 33703.,33703.
• Citation: 141 Conn.App. 581,62 A.3d 564
• Parties: Natalie SIGULAR v. William E. GILSON.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

141 Conn.App. 581

62 A.3d 564

Natalie SIGULAR

v.William E. GILSON.

No. 33703.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 25, 2012.

Decided April 2, 2013.

John F. Buckley, Jr., with whom was John M. Parese, New Haven, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Julie Harris, Glastonbury, with whom was Yelena Akim, for the appellee (defendant).

BEACH, ESPINOSA and SCHALLER, Js.^*

SCHALLER, J.

In this negligence action, the plaintiff, Natalie Sigular, appeals from the judgment rendered in accordance with the jury's verdict. On appeal, she claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to set aside the verdict and order a new trial because the verdict was (1) inherently ambiguous and contrary to the law and evidence and (2) wholly inadequate, shocked the conscience and was governed by mistake, prejudice or corruption. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following procedural history and facts, which the jury could have reasonably found, are relevant to the plaintiff's claims. On or about April 19, 2008, the decedent, William Gilson, entered an intersection in violation of a stop sign and struck the front end of the plaintiff's vehicle.¹ The plaintiff initiated this action seeking damages from the defendant and alleging that, as a result of the decedent's negligence and violation of motor vehicle laws, she suffered abrasions, a head injury, cervical and lumbar spine sprains and injuries to the tissues surrounding the aforementioned areas, as well as pain and anguish. The plaintiff alleges that, as a result of the automobile accident, she sustained physical injuries and incurred financial obligations due to medical care. The plaintiff did not allege any damage to property, and, although alleged in the operative complaint, the plaintiff made no claim at trial for lost wages or earning capacity.

After the accident, plaintiff sought treatment at the emergency room for head pain, burns and abrasions. The next day, the plaintiff began experiencing lower back pain and stiffness, and sought treatment from Phillip Luchini, an orthopedic surgeon, shortly thereafter. Luchini initially examined the plaintiff in April, 2008. The plaintiff's exam revealed stiffness and muscle spasm in her lower back,² but there was no evidence of nerve damage or pain radiating to the her legs and her X ray was normal. Luchini diagnosed the plaintiff with a soft tissue lumbar sprain and prescribed physical therapy as well as an anti-inflammatory medication. The plaintiff underwent physical therapy, which improved the pain and stiffness. After completing physical therapy, the plaintiff was able to engage in all desired activities, but, at times, she remained hesitant to do so. The plaintiff had occasional spasms, which would subside when taking her prescribed anti-inflammatory medication and engaging in the exercises prescribed by her physician.

The plaintiff returned to Luchini for another exam in May, 2008, during which she indicated that stiffness and pain in her lower back were less severe. The plaintiff saw Luchini again in June, 2008, at which time her symptoms had resolved and she reported no discomfort in her lower back area. Luchini told the plaintiff that she could resume her regular activities and to return if she had any recurring problems. The plaintiff returned to Luchini for another follow up examination in February, 2009. Upon finding that the plaintiff's lower back symptoms had resolved, and that she had no spasms and excellent range of motion, Luchini discharged the plaintiff.

The plaintiff returned to see Luchini in October, 2009, with recurring spasm and stiffness in her lower back; Luchini suggested that the plaintiff take anti-inflammatory medication and indicated that she might require additional physical therapy should her symptoms become more severe, but did not prescribe physical therapy during her visit. At this time, Luchini diagnosed the plaintiff with a 5 percent impairment of her lumbar sacral spine. ³ About one year later, in November, 2010, the plaintiff again presented to Luchini with complaints of back stiffness. Luchini ordered new X rays, which he testified were normal, and he again prescribed anti-inflammatory medication and another course of physical therapy. The plaintiff made her final visit to Luchini in February, 2011, indicating that she still experienced lower back pain, that the pain was less severe and that it tended to recur with strenuous activity.

The jury heard conflicting testimony regarding the nature and extent of the plaintiff's claimed injuries. During cross-examination the plaintiff admitted that in previous depositions she reported pain radiating from her back to her legs. These symptoms, however, were not reported to Luchini during any of the plaintiff's visits. The defendant also asked the plaintiff, on cross-examination, about her responses to interrogatories in which she stated that she suffered a neck injury. The plaintiff had previously testified during trial to the contrary that she did not experience any pain or injury to her neck. The plaintiff was also questioned regarding the extent to which her injury limited her ability to participate in various activities. The plaintiff had testified that she was not incapable of performing any activities, but performed some with caution.⁴

The court instructed the jury regarding the plaintiff's claims of negligence and negligence per se. The jury was provided with a defendant's general verdict form and a plaintiff's verdict interrogatory form. The plaintiff's form posed three questions. The first question asked whether the negligence of the decedent proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries and directed that, if answered affirmatively, the jury proceed with question two. Question two then asked whether the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the decedent's negligence, and instructed that, if answered affirmatively, the jury should continue on to question three, but if answered negatively, the jury should report that it had reached a defendant's verdict. Question three asked the jury to determine the amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff, by specifically listing the relevant economic and noneconomic damages.

The jury first returned a verdict for the plaintiff and awarded zero economic damages and $5000 noneconomic damages to the plaintiff. The court accepted the verdict, and the plaintiff objected on the ground that the verdict was inconsistent as a matter of law. The court vacated its order accepting and recording the verdict and instructed the jury that the jury must review its verdict, but need not change it, and repeated its instructions pertaining to economic damages. The jury again returned a verdict for the plaintiff, answering yes to interrogatories one and two on the plaintiff's verdict form, but awarding zero economic and zero noneconomic damages.⁵

The plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the verdict and order a new trial. The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion, concluding that the jury's failure to award damages was not inherently ambiguous. Specifically, the court stated that the evidence was such that “the jury could [have drawn] a reasonable conclusion that the plaintiff did not sufficiently establish the amount of injuries and damages she received as a result of the accident....” The trial court further held that “[t]he plaintiff did not present, nor did the court see, any factors that could have improperly influenced the jury such that the verdict would shock the conscience.” This appeal followed.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the court should have set aside the verdict on the grounds that it was (1) inherently ambiguous for the jury to return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff but to award zero damages and (2) contrary to the evidence and the law. We are not persuaded.

As a preliminary matter, we set forth the standard of review that will guide our analysis. “[T]he role of the trial court on a motion to set aside the jury's verdict is not to sit as a seventh juror, but, rather, to decide whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the jury could reasonably have reached the verdict that it did.... A verdict is not defective as a matter of law as long as it contains an intelligible finding so that its meaning is clear.... A verdict will be deemed intelligible if it clearly manifests the intent of the jury.... [T]he amount of a damage award is a matter peculiarly within the province of the trier of fact ... and [i]f, on the evidence, the jury could reasonably have decided as [it] did, [the reviewing court] will not find error in the trial court's acceptance of the verdict.... In reviewing the action of the trial court in denying the motions ... to set aside the verdict, our primary concern is to determine whether the court abused its discretion and we decide only whether, on the evidence presented, the jury could fairly reach the verdict [it] did. The trial court's decision is significant because the trial judge has had the same opportunity as the jury to view the witnesses, to assess their credibility and to determine the weight that should be given to their evidence. Moreover, the trial judge can gauge the tenor of the trial, as we, on the written record, cannot, and can detect those factors, if any, that could improperly have influenced the jury.... Our task is to determine whether the total damages awarded falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of fair and reasonable compensation in the particular case....” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Froom Development Corp. v. Developers Realty, Inc., 114 Conn.App. 618, 632, 972 A.2d 239, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 922, 980 A.2d 909 (2009).

The plaintiff first asserts that the jury's verdict was inherently ambiguous. We disagree. In support of her argument, the plaintiff cites Hall v. Bergman, 296 Conn. 169, 994 A.2d 666 (2010), Ginsberg v....