Siino v. City of New York

• Decision Date: 21 December 2021
• Docket Number: 14-CV-7217 (MKB)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
• Parties: CAROLYN JANE SIINO, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant.

CAROLYN JANE SIINO, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant.

No. 14-CV-7217 (MKB)

United States District Court, E.D. New York

December 21, 2021

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

MARGO K. BRODIE, United States District Judge.

Plaintiff Carolyn Jane Siino, proceeding pro se, commenced the above-captioned action on December 8, 2014, against Defendant the City of New York, among others. (Compl., Docket Entry No 1.) Plaintiff's claims in this action arise in connection with the provision of services to her by Adult Protective Services (“APS”), a division of the New York City Human Resources Administration's Office of Special Services, while she was facing eviction for non-payment of rent. (Id.; Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) Docket Entry No. 17.)

By report and recommendation dated February 27, 2020, Judge Bloom recommended that the Court grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's one remaining claim, which the Court liberally construed as a claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (the “ADA”), for Defendant's alleged failure to comply with the ADA's integration mandate (the “R&R”). (R&R 1 & n.1, Docket Entry No. 74.) In addition, Judge Bloom recommended that the Court deny Plaintiff's motion to amend the SAC. (Id. at 1.) By Memorandum and Order dated April 14, 2020, the Court adopted the R&R, granted the motion for summary judgment, and denied Plaintiff's motion to amend the SAC (the “April 2020 Order”). (April 2020 Order 3, Docket Entry No. 79.) Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the April 2020 Order on May 12, 2020 (Pl.'s First Mot. for Recons., Docket Entry No. 82), and the Court denied Plaintiff's motion on August 13, 2020 (the “August 2020 Order”), (August 2020 Order, Docket Entry No. 86). On September 16, 2020, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the August 2020 Order, (Pl.'s Second Mot. for Recons., Docket Entry No. 87), and the Court denied her motion on June 2, 2021 (the “June 2021 Order”), (June 2021 Order, Docket Entry No. 90). On June 28, 2021, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the June 2021 Order, (Pl.'s Third Mot. for Recons., Docket Entry No. 91), and on July 29, 2021, Plaintiff moved to supplement her motion for reconsideration, (Pl.'s Mot. to Suppl., Docket Entry No. 93). Defendant opposes both motions. (Def.'s Resp. to Third Mot. for Recons., Docket Entry No. 92; Def.'s Resp. to Mot. to Suppl., Docket Entry No. 94).

For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies Plaintiff's motions.

I. Background

The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the factual and procedural background of this case, as detailed in the R&R and the April 2020 Order, (see R&R 2-21; April 2020 Order 110), as well as the Court's numerous other prior decisions in this case, (see Mem. and Order dated Apr. 21, 2015, Docket Entry No. 8; Mem. and Order dated July 9, 2015, Docket Entry No. 12; Mem. and Order dated Feb. 19, 2016, Docket Entry No. 16; Mem. and Order dated Sept. 27, 2017, Docket Entry No. 33).

In the April 2020 Order, after a careful review of the record and of Judge Bloom's thorough and comprehensive R&R, the Court found that “no jury could reasonably find that Defendant denied Plaintiff access to services or programs on the basis of her actual or perceived disability, or that Defendant violated the integration mandate.” (April 2020 Order 19.) Accordingly, the Court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's sole remaining claim. (Id. at 21.) After reviewing Plaintiff's proposed Third Amended Complaint, the Court determined that “amendment would be futile, as Plaintiff's conclusory allegations fail[ed] to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ” and denied Plaintiff's motion to amend the SAC. (Id. at 22.)

In her first and second motions for reconsideration, Plaintiff “repeat[ed] various claims and arguments that both Judge Bloom and the Court considered and rejected in granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment and denying Plaintiff's motion to amend the SAC.” (August 2020 Order 3; June 2021 Order 4.) Accordingly, in denying Plaintiff's motions, the Court found that “Plaintiff ha[d] not met the standard for reconsideration” because “Plaintiff ha[d] not pointed to any controlling law or facts that the Court overlooked, and merely raise[d] arguments that both Judge Bloom and the Court ha[d] previously considered and rejected.” (August 2020 Order 4-5; June 2021 Order 5.)

II. Discussion

a. Standards of review

i. Reconsideration

The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration “is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked - matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Van Buskirk v. United Grp. of Cos., 935 F.3d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also Local Civ. R. 6.3 (providing that the moving party must “set[] forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the [c]ourt has overlooked”).

It is thus well-settled that a motion for reconsideration is “not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking [another] bite at the apple.” U.S. for Use & Benefit of Five Star Elec. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 758 Fed.Appx. 97, 101 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Analytical Survs., Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012), as amended (July 13, 2012)). “A motion for reconsideration is ‘neither an occasion for repeating old arguments previously rejected nor an opportunity for making new arguments that could have previously been made.'” Salveson v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 166 F.Supp.3d 242, 248 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Simon v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 18 F.Supp.3d 423, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)), aff'd, 663 Fed.Appx. 71 (2d Cir. 2016).

ii. Rule 60(b)

Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding in the case of:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. ___, ___, 140 S.Ct. 1698, 1709 n.7 (June 1, 2020) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)). “Rule 60(b) strikes a balance between serving the ends of justice and preserving the finality of judgments.” Tapper v. Hearn, 833 F.3d 166, 170 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986)). While such motions must be brought “within a reasonable time, ” Santander Bank, N.A. v. Harrison, 858 Fed.Appx. 408, 410 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1)), “[t]he one-year limitation period for Rule 60(b)[(1)-(3)] motions is absolute, ” Wang v. Int'lBus. Machines Corp., 839 Fed.Appx. 643, 646 (2d Cir. 2021) (second alteration in original) (quoting Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemp. Dance, Inc., 466 F.3d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 2006)). “[A] Rule 60(b) motion is properly denied where it seeks only to relitigate issues already decided.” Pastor v. P'ship for Children's Rts., 856 Fed.Appx. 343, 345 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing Zerman v. Jacobs, 751 F.2d 82, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1984)); see also D'Angelo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 201 F.3d 430, 430 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for appeal and may not be used to relitigate the merits of a case.” (citing Competex, S.A. v. Labow, 783 F.2d 333, 335 (2d Cir. 1986))). “[T]he general rule [is] that a movant bears the burden in Rule 60(b) motions.” Gater Assets Ltd. v. AO Moldovagaz, 2 F.4th 42, 53 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing Kotlicky v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 817 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1987)).

b. The Court denies Plaintiff's third motion for reconsideration and her motion to supplement her motion for reconsideration

In her third motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff argues that the Court overlooked Defendant's “controlling decisions [that] harmed” her, including Defendant's decisions (1) to seek approval for a guardianship for Plaintiff based on a “misdiagnosis” of mental disability and to prevent her “from contesting [her] misdiagnosis ” leading to her institutionalization, (see Pl.'s Third Mot. for Recons. 1, 4-6); (2) to deprive her of “meaningful access . . . to the shelter system, ” although she “never went to a shelter intake facility, ” (see id. at 7-10); and (3) to “make unavailable or deny [her] supportive housing, ” although she “never filled out applications for supportive housing, ” (see id. at 10-11). Plaintiff requests that, if “the Court finds anything [in her motion] of actionable merit, ” it “modify[]/vacat[e] the [latest] judgment; [allow] a new complaint; find[] a violation of the integration mandate, an adverse treatment, a disparate impact, [and] a [section] 1983 action, . . . and order[] an injunction.” (Id. at 12.) In her motion to supplement her motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff states that she “has two newly ripe claims, ” including a deprivation of property claim and an ADA retaliation claim, and “wants the Court to determine whether at least one of these claims is suddenly actionable in a new complaint or should be added to [her] dismissed case via [her] pending [m]otion for [r]e...