Sikes v. Guest

Decision Date16 December 1964
Docket NumberNo. 4479,4479
Citation170 So.2d 322
PartiesGrace SIKES, Appellant, v. Maurice C. GUEST, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Edward J. Hunter, Tampa, for appellant.

T. Paine Kelly, Jr., of Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, Tampa, for appellee.

SHANNON, Acting Chief Judge.

The plaintiff, allegedly the widow of the deceased, James F. Sikes, brought suit under the wrongful death statute claiming that the defendant negligently caused the death of the deceased. The lower court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that the plaintiff was not the wife of the deceased, and the plaintiff has appealed.

In the summary final judgment the chancellor found that the plaintiff was divorced on May 25, 1949, from one Ruggles. In August, 1950, the plaintiff and Lewis Meighen went through the motions of a ceremonial marriage, but Meighen lacked the capacity to marry as he was already married to Mary J. Meighen, which fact was unknown to the laintiff. Mary J. Meighen secured a divorce from Lewis Meighen on October 21, 1952. The plaintiff alleges that she did not find out about Meighen's previous marriage until late in 1953, and that she immediately left him.

In January, 1957, plaintiff filed suit for divorce against Meighen. In this suit plaintiff testified that she lived with Meighen as his wife until February 10, 1954, at which time Meighen did not return home and hasn't been heard from since. This divorce suit proceeded until September, 1958, when it was dismissed for failure to prosecute. In 1958 it appears that the plaintiff and the deceased entered into a relationship which would constitute a common-law marriage if the plaintiff had had the capacity to marry, that is, if she were not married to Meighen.

It appears that the trial court granted the summary judgment mainly because the plaintiff had established a marital relationship with Meighen as shown by the plaintiff's subsequent divorce proceeding against Meighen which was dismissed.

It is well established in Florida that when a person has allegedly been married twice there is a strong presumption of the validity of the second marriage. See In re Hind's Estate, Fla.App.,App.1961, 135 So.2d 13; McBride v. McBride, Fla.App.,App.1961, 130 So .2d 302; Teel v. Nolen Brown Motors, Inc., Fla.App.,1957, 93 So.2d 874; and Roberts v. Roberts, 1936, 124 Fla.App., 116, 167 So. 808.

In the case of In re Hind's Estate, supra, Judge White said:

'In civil actions the proof of a couple living together and holding each other out as man and wife raises an inference or presumption of marriage, but the presumption of continuance of a previous marriage is not equal in force to the presumption of validity of a subsequent marriage. Accordingly in cases of conflict of presumptions arising from two marriages of the same party, the general current of authority holds that the presumption in favor of the subsequent marriage overcomes that in favor of the former. Bagdad Land & Lumber Co. v. Poston, 1915, 69 Fla.App., 340, 68 So. 180; Jones v. Jones, 1935, 119 Fla.App., 824, 161 So. 836, 104 A.L.R. 1; Roberts v. Roberts, 1936, 124 Fla.App., 116, 167 So. 808, 809.'

In order to overcome the presumption of the validity of the second marriage, it is not enough to show a previous marriage and uncompleted divorce proceedings against the prior spouse, as was shown in this case. There must also be some evidence showing that the previous marriage has not been dissolved by death or divorce. This procedure has been set out in Roberts v. Roberts, supra, and in 21 Fla.App.,Jur., Marriage, Sec. 54, which states:

'54.--Proof Relative to Competing Marriages.

'To sustain the burden of proof of the invalidity of a subsequent marriage because of the existence of a previous marriage, it is necessary to prove or establish the previous marriage, its validity, and its continuation and nondissolution by death or divorce at the time of the subsequent marriage.

'In order to establish the continuation and nondissolution of the former marriage, it is not necessary to eliminate each and every remote possibility that a divorce has been secured by the husband or wife; rather, it is sufficient if the evidence establishes that there is no reasonable probability that a divorce has been secured. Thus, it is not necessary to go into every county of the state where the spouse may have been in order to show that no divorce had been secured therein, but it is sufficient to show that no divorce was granted in those counties in which he or she was legally qualified to obtain a divorce during the period of the separation until the time of the alleged subsequent marriage.'

The evidence in this case concerning the invalidity of the subsequent marriage to the decedent was not enough to justify the entering of a summary judgment against the plaintiff.

Reversed and remanded.

WEHLE, VICTOR O., Associate Judge, concurs.

WHITE, J., concurs specially.

WHITE, Judge (concurring specially).

Although I agree that he case should not have been disposed of on summary proceedings, I am unable to accept the rationale upon which the majority opinion is predicated, viz. that the law presumes the validity of a subsequent asserted common-law marriage. Only after the party asserting the same has carried the burden of proving its existence should a putative common-law union be entitled to the presumption accorded a formally licensed or ceremonial marriage. In fact, evidence tending to establish consensual marriages should be examined 'with increasing caution * * *.' McClish v. Rankin, 1943, 153 Fla.App., 324, 14 So.2d 714, 717. It is in this context that I venture the following opinion.

It appears that the trial court granted the summary judgment mainly because of his conclusion that the plaintiff had established a marital relationship with Meighen as shown by the plaintiff's subsequent divorce proceeding against Meighen which was dismissed. I approach the problem bearing in mind that the crucial point for determination is whether or not the record discloses a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to withstand the motion for summary judgment after resolving all doubts in favor of the party against whom the motion was directed.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment alleged that plaintiff affirmatively established that she was not the lawful wife of the decedent; that she was twice before married; that she had instituted a divorce action against her second husband on 17 January 1957; and that said suit was dismissed for want of prosecution. No exhibits or supporting affidavits were attached to the motion.

Plaintiff's affidavit in opposition to the motion stated, inter alia, that she is the widow of James F. Sikes, deceased; that she was previously married to and divorced from one Calvin Ruggles in Mahoning, Ohio as shown by a final decree attached thereto; and that she thereafter believed herself to be married to one Lewis Meighen by virtue of a civil marriage until she discovered that the union was void because Meighen was already married to one Mary Jane Meighen and lacked capacity to marry her. She further stated that although Lewis Meighen and Mary Jane Meighen subsequently obtained a divorce on 21 October 1952, she did not discover the fact until the latter part of 1953 and after discovery of the fact she immediately left him. She asserted that she did not enter any commonlaw agreement or other marital contract with Meighen after discovering that their ceremonial marriage was void. She states that she had been advised that Meighen has remarried and has several children by his present wife.

As to her asserted marriage to James F. Sikes, the affiant stated that shortly after 9 May 1958 they agreed to become husband and wife; that the decedent sent for her and she came to Florida; that the decedent gave her a wedding ring and they agreed to live together as husband and wife; and they continued the marital relationship until the death of James F. Sikes; that in the course of such 'marriage' they purchased property together, held themselves out as husband and wife, were known to everyone as husband and wife and assumed to each other the duties and responsibilities of husband and wife. Attached to the affidavit was (1) a certified copy of the Ohio final divorce decree from Calvin Ruggles; (2) a copy of her Kentucky marriage certificate to Lewis Meighen; (3) a copy of the Ohio divorce decree between Mary Jane Meighen and Lewis R. Meighen; (4) a copy of telegram dated...

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2 cases
  • Borders v. Liberty Apartment Corp., 80-2116
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 10 Noviembre 1981
    ...marriage to the decedent was not enough to justify the entering of a summary judgment against the plaintiff. See Sikes v. Guest, 170 So.2d 322 (Fla.2d DCA 1965). Reversed and 1 Appellant claims to have consummated a common-law marriage to the deceased in 1962 when such marriages were recogn......
  • Estate of McClenahen, In re
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 24 Julio 1985
    ...of capacity which, along with consent, cohabitation, and public recognition, are the elements required by this court in Sikes v. Guest, 170 So.2d 322 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964), for a valid common-law marriage. Where one or both of the parties is married, the union is meretricious from its inceptio......

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