Sillars v. Collier

• Decision Date: 25 February 1890
• Citation: 23 N.E. 723,151 Mass. 50
• Parties: SILLARS v. COLLIER.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

151 Mass. 50

23 N.E. 723

SILLARS v. COLLIER.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

February 25, 1890

COUNSEL

S.H. Phillips, for appellant.

H.F Hurlburt and D.W. Quill, for appellee.

OPINION

C ALLEN, J.

We are ready to assume in favor of the plaintiff that by the declaration it is intended to aver that he was a member of the house of representatives, and that the words set forth were spoken of him with reference to his official position. This being so, no averment of special damages was necessary provided the words are defamatory, and to make them defamatory it is not necessary that they should import a charge of crime. It would be sufficient if they imported such misconduct as would expose him to expulsion, or even to censure, from the house; and we are inclined to think, also, that it would be sufficient if they imported such conduct as would, by the general sense of the community, be deemed immoral or discreditable in such a way as clearly to impair his influence and lessen his position and standing as a public man, and thus to affect him injuriously as a member of the legislature. But, in applying this last suggestion, it is obvious that some caution is necessary, since freedom of speech and of the press is guarantied by the constitution, (Const.U.S. 1 st. Amend.; Const.Mass. arts. 16, 19, Declaration of Rights,) and "entire freedom of discussion in respect to the character and conduct of public men is deemed essential to the judicious exercise of the right of suffrage, and of that control over their rulers which resides in the free people of the United States." 2 Kent, Comm. 17. Bearing this in mind, it is not unreasonable to hold that, in order to be defamatory of one in respect to his public office, the spoken words must go at least so far as to impute to him some incapacity or lack of due qualification to fill the position, on some positive past misconduct which will injuriously affect him in it, or the holding of principles which are hostile to the maintenance of the government.

Looking at the words set forth in the plaintiff's declaration, in the light of the intrinsic facts which he avers, we do not find them fairly capable of the meaning which the plaintiff ascribes to them, or of any meaning which is defamatory, within the sense above expressed. We are not to travel into the region of conjecture, but must confine ourselves to the words themselves, with the other facts contained in the declaration. There is in them no suggestion that the plaintiff has changed his vote or that he has voted at all upon the question of the division of the town of Beverly, or made any speech in the legislature or elsewhere, or taken any public action, or solicited any other member of the legislature to favor a particular side, or, in short, that he has done anything whatever, by way of action or of promise of action, in support of the measure for dividing the town. The whole charge in relation to his change of heart relates merely to what was in his heart; that is, to what he was capable of doing, or, at most, to what he had a purpose of doing in the future. And the statement that "sometimes the change of heart comes from the pocket" does not, when fairly considered, import that the plaintiff's change of heart had come from...