Silva v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 May 1992
• Docket Number: 78012,Nos. 77980,s. 77980
• Citation: 601 So.2d 1184
• Parties: , 17 Fla. L. Weekly S303 Gerald SILVA, etc., Petitioner, v. SOUTHWEST FLORIDA BLOOD BANK, INC., Respondent. John SMITH, et ux., etc., Petitioners, v. SOUTHWEST FLORIDA BLOOD BANK, INC., Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 1184

601 So.2d 1184

61 USLW 2016, 17 Fla. L. Weekly S303

Gerald SILVA, etc., Petitioner, v. SOUTHWEST FLORIDA BLOOD BANK, INC., Respondent.

John SMITH, et ux., etc., Petitioners, v. SOUTHWEST FLORIDA BLOOD BANK, INC., Respondent.

Nos. 77980, 78012.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 28, 1992.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 14, 1992.

Raymond T. Elligett, Jr. and Charles P. Schropp of Schropp, Buell & Elligett, P.A., and F. Ronald Fraley of Fraley & Fraley, and Robert A. Foster, Jr. of Robert A. Foster, Jr., P.A., Tampa, for petitioner, Silva, etc.

Elizabeth Russo of the Law Offices of Elizabeth Russo, Coconut Grove, and Peeples, Earl & Blank, Sarasota, and Anderson, Moss, Parks & Russo, P.A., Miami, for petitioners, Smith, et ux., etc.

Ted R. Manry, III and D. James Kadyk of Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, Tampa, for respondent.

Kelley B. Gelb of Krupnick, Campbell, Malone & Roselli, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and Andre Perron of Blalock, Landers, Walters & Vogler, P.A., Bradenton, amicus curiae for Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers.

Kennedy Legler, III of Legler & Flynn, Bradenton, amicus curiae for John Doe.

Thomas J. Guilday and Pamela K. Frazier of Huey, Guilday, Kuersteiner & Tucker, P.A., Tallahassee, amicus curiae for Florida Ass'n of Blood Banks, Inc.

Jeannette M. Andrews of Fuller, Johnson & Farrell, P.A., Tallahassee, amicus curiae for American Nat. Red Cross and American Ass'n of Blood Banks.

BARKETT, Justice.

We have before us the consolidated cases of Silva v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc., 578 So.2d 503 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), and Smith v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc., 578 So.2d 501 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), because of direct and express conflict with Durden v. American Hospital Supply Corp., 375 So.2d 1096 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 386 So.2d 633 (Fla.1980). ¹ The issue to be decided in both cases is whether blood banks are subject to the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice suits under section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), or the four-year negligence statute of limitations under section 95.11(3)(a).

The Silva Case

Anne Marie Silva received blood product transfusions from Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc. during the birth of her child. Her doctors relayed Southwest's assurances that its blood supply was safe and free from HIV because of the testing procedures used. Mrs. Silva nonetheless contracted the HIV virus, testing positive at the end of 1986. She died of AIDS in January 1990. The Silvas initiated suit against Southwest in December 1989, ultimately amending the complaint to allege negligence and breach of Southwest's warranty regarding the representation that its blood by-product was safe. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding that Southwest was a health care provider and thus entitled to the medical malpractice statute of limitations. The Second District affirmed, but acknowledged conflict with Durden v. American Hospital Supply Corp., which had refused to apply the medical malpractice limitations statute to an action by a donor against a blood bank.

The Smith Case

In February 1984 the Smith's baby received blood product transfusions supplied by Southwest while hospitalized for suspected meningitis. Southwest notified the Smiths in April 1986 that the donor had tested positive for HIV. The baby then tested positive for HIV. The Smiths filed suit in January 1990 against Southwest alleging negligence. The trial court ruled the suit timebarred under section 95.11(4)(b), finding that Southwest "clearly meets at least the privity requirement of that Statute of Limitations." The Second District did not address the privity argument, but rather affirmed on the authority of Silva.

Analysis

Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), provides:

An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.... An "action for medical malpractice" is defined as a claim in tort or in contract for damages because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person arising out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care by any provider of health care. The limitation of actions within this subsection shall be limited to the health care provider and persons in privity with the provider of health care.

(Emphasis added). Thus, under the statute our inquiry is twofold: (1) whether the action arose out of "medical ... diagnosis, treatment, or care," and (2) whether such diagnosis, treatment, or care was rendered by a "provider of health care."

As the court in Durden recognized, our initial responsibility when construing a statute is to give the words their plain and ordinary meaning.

"In making a judicial effort to ascertain the legislative intent implicit in a statute, the courts are bound by the plain and definite language of the statute and are not authorized to engage in semantic niceties or speculations. If the language of the statute is clear and unequivocal, then the legislative intent must be derived from the words used without involving incidental rules of construction or engaging in speculation as to what the judges might think that the legislators intended or should have intended."

375 So.2d at 1098-99 (quoting Tropical Coach Line, Inc. v. Carter, 121 So.2d 779, 782 (Fla.1960)). A court must not resort to sources outside a statute to interpret clear and unambiguous words the legislature chose to employ. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 556 So.2d 393, 395 (Fla.1990).

In this case, we must also keep in mind the pertinent rules of construction applicable to statutes of limitations. This Court has previously stated that "[w]here a statute of limitations shortens the existing period of time the statute is generally construed strictly, and where there is reasonable doubt as to legislative intent, the preference is to allow the longer period of time." Baskerville-Donovan Eng'rs, Inc. v. Pensacola Executive House Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 581 So.2d 1301, 1303 (Fla.1991); see also Angrand v. Fox, 552 So.2d 1113, 1116 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) ("It is well established that a limitations defense is not favored[,] and that therefore, any substantial doubt on the question should be resolved by choosing the longer rather than the shorter possible statutory period." (citations omitted)), review denied, 563 So.2d 632 (Fla.1990). Thus, ambiguity, if there is any, should be construed in favor of the plaintiffs.

With these rules in mind, we must first ascertain whether Southwest rendered "diagnosis, treatment, or care" to the plaintiff patients in this case. Southwest argues that, as a matter of law, blood banks provide "diagnosis, treatment, or care" to the patients that ultimately receive its blood products. The Second District acknowledged "that at first blush this element [providing diagnosis, treatment, or care] seems incapable of satisfaction ... because Mrs. Silva did not directly receive treatment from Southwest." Silva, 578 So.2d at 505. The court nonetheless found the requirement satisfied by relying on extrinsic materials to interpret the plain words of the statute. We find the analysis of the Second District erroneous in light of the principles of statutory construction discussed above.

First, there is no ambiguity to clarify in the words "diagnosis," "treatment," or "care," and we find that these words should be accorded their plain and unambiguous meaning. In ordinary, common parlance, the average person would understand "diagnosis, treatment, or care" to mean ascertaining a patient's medical condition through examination and testing, prescribing and administering a course of action to effect a cure, and meeting the patient's daily needs during the illness. This parallels the dictionary definitions of those terms. According to Webster's Third International Dictionary (1981), "diagnosis" means "the art or act of identifying a disease from its signs and symptoms." Id. at 622. "Treatment" means "the action or manner of treating a patient medically or surgically." Id. at 2435. "Care" means "provide for or attend to needs or perform necessary personal services (as for a patient or child)." Id. at 338. Likewise, in medical terms, "diagnosis" means "[t]he determination of the nature of a disease." Stedman's Medical Dictionary 428 (25th ed. 1990). "Treatment" means "[m]edical or surgical management of a patient." Id. at 1626. And "care" means "the application of knowledge to the benefit of ... [an] individual." Id. at 249.

Under the allegations in the complaints, Southwest sold the blood product to the treating hospital, which in turn sold it to the plaintiffs. The blood bank and its employees never saw the recipients of the blood product or had any contact whatsoever. Neither the blood bank nor any of its employees had any knowledge or information about the recipients' medical conditions. Southwest played no role in determining the nature of the plaintiff patients' illnesses, did not treat those patients, and did not attend to the personal needs of those patients. The blood bank simply did not deal with the recipient patients, and the Second District's extended discussion of Florida statutes and regulations does not alter the relationship between the patients and the blood bank or otherwise metamorphose the blood bank's activities into "diagnosis, treatment, or care." Although there may be statutes and regulations governing the internal operations of blood banks, as to the specific plaintiffs in this case, Southwest was merely the supplier of a product.

Southwest concedes that a plaintiff would have four years to sue a supplier of drugs or other medical products under the ordinary negligence statute of limitations. See Sec. 95.11(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1989). Southwest maintains, however, that because there is an inherent difference in...