Silver Lake Consol. School Dist. v. Parker
| Decision Date | 14 October 1947 |
| Docket Number | 46988. |
| Citation | 29 N.W.2d 214,238 Iowa 984 |
| Parties | SILVER LAKE CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DIST. v. PARKER et al. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
L E. Linnan, of Algona, George C. Murray, of Sheldon, and D. M Kelleher, of Fort Dodge, for appellant.
John M. Rankin, Atty. Gen., R. G. Yoder, First Asst. Atty. Gen and Oscar Strauss, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees.
This is a suit for a declaratory judgment brought by plaintiff consolidated school district in its own behalf and in behalf of all other school corporations, similarly situated, for the purpose of securing a judicial determination of the powers duties, and responsibilities of such school corporation in regard to the transportation of rural school children who attend private schools and live along established bus routes. The action is brought in two counts.
Count One asks for a declaratory judgment determining whether it and similar school corporations have the power, right, and duty to provide transportation for every child of school age living within said corporation more than a mile from said consolidated school, where some of said children so transported do not attend said consolidated school but attend a private school within walking distance therefrom; and also asks a declaratory judgment and decree that plaintiff's right to reimbursement under Chapter 285, 1946 Code of Iowa will not be forfeited or lost by reason of the transportation of such children.
In Count Two plaintiff asks a declaratory judgment, as before, to permit the transportation of children living in the district and more than a mile from the school who attend a private school, upon the condition that the parents of said children pay the pro rata cost of such transportation, and that the right to reimbursement of the school district will not be forfeited or lost by so doing. Further asking, under said count, that the said declaratory judgment determine that plaintiff or similar corporations have power to make contracts, including leases under which school busses may be jointly operated to carry both public and private school pupils in the same busses, on the same schedules, and over the established routes, prorating the cost of pupil transportation, avoiding duplication of transportation facilities and at reduced cost for transportation of the public school pupils. To the plaintiff's petition there was filed a motion to dismiss, which was sustained generally. Thereupon, the plaintiff elected to stand on its petition and not to plead further, and to suffer judgment. Judgment of dismissal and for costs was then rendered.
The questions presented on this appeal and raised by the motion to dismiss are: What are the powers, rights, duties, and responsibilities of such school corporation in regard to the transportation of school children who attend private schools?
No evidence was taken. In the discussion hereinafter references to the Code are to the Code of 1946, unless otherwise stated.
Chapter 133, Acts of the Fifty-first General Assembly, now incorporated in the 1946 Code as Chapter 285, provides that every school district required by law to furnish free transportation to pupils shall be reimbursed by the state for the transportation costs incurred to the amount and in the manner provided by such chapter. After prescribing the basis upon which such reimbursement shall be made, the pupils embraced within the provisions of the statute, the officials by whom the Act shall be administered, and specifically imposing the power and the duty upon the state department of public instruction to exercise general supervision over the school transportation system in the state, the Act specifically imposes upon the local school boards this particular power and duty to: 'Provide transportation for each pupil who attends public school, and who is entitled to transportation under the laws of this state.' Section 285.10, subd. 1. Further, in the same chapter the law provides, in section 285.15: 'The failure of any local district to comply with the provisions of this chapter or any other laws relating to the transportation of pupils, or any rules or regulations made by the state department of public instruction under this chapter or the final decisions of the county board of education, or the final decisions of the state department of public instruction shall cause such district to forfeit any rights to reimbursement for any transportation costs incurred during the period such failure to comply existed.' To carry out the cost of administering the Act an appropriation was made by the legislature.
The motion to dismiss concedes the facts alleged in plaintiff's petition. For many years the plaintiff consolidated school corporation maintained and operated a consolidated school in the town of Ayrshire, Palo Alto county, and provided suitable transportation to and from the consolidated school in the plaintiff district for all children of school age living more than one mile from said school, including pupils who attended a parochial school in Ayrshire which was operated and conducted in conformity with the laws in the state of Iowa applicable to private schools.
It is claimed by plaintiff, in its petition, that the cost of such transportation is not substantially increased by reason of the transportation of children who attend the private school, and the busses, by reason of the transportation of such children, do not deviate from the duly established and approved routes; that the said school district has incurred costs for transportation which amount to a substantial sum; that the school board has contracted with suitable persons for the transportation of children of school age to and from school, including children attending private school, and would continue to incur costs for transportation were it not that the defendants had announced and declared that under the provisions of section 276.26 of the Code the plaintiff-appellant district was authorized only to transport children of school age who attended the plaintiff-appellant's consolidated school, and was not authorized or permitted to transport children who attend a private school located within walking distance from the plaintiff consolidated school. It is further stated that the defendants had warned the plaintiff and officially declared that warrants would not issue or be paid to reimburse the plaintiff district for any of its cost for transportation of any of the children of school age who attend a private school, and that they will not issue or pay any warrants for any part of the costs incurred for the transportation of children to either public or private school, where they are transported in the same vehicle. In other words, that the defendants construe the law to mean that such law authorizes only the transportation of children of school age who attend the consolidated school.
The plaintiff-appellant's first proposition of error is that the trial court, with its order sustaining the defendants' motion to dismiss Count One of plaintiff's petition, erred in holding that any appropriation for the cost of transportation of children who attend private school would be in contravention of applicable statutes, and erred in construing and applying the statutes including Code, section 276.26.
The plaintiff argues that as a matter of law the true construction of the compulsory education statute provides for the same right to attend either private schools or public schools, and the statutes authorizing transportation of every child of school age are expressions of legislative policy to provide, at public expense, for the transportation of all children of the district attending both private schools and public schools. Plaintiff argues that the true construction and meaning of section 276.26, requiring the board to provide 'suitable transportation * * * for every child of school age', based upon its language, legislative history and relation to other statutes, including those pertaining to compulsory school attendance, necessitates a construction and conclusion contrary to that contended for by defendants, and stated in the grounds of their motion to dismiss, which was erroneously sustained.
On the other hand, the defendants argue that the statutes of Iowa limit the power and duty of a consolidated school district to the furnishing of transportation to children attending a public consolidated school. These are, in substance, the issues in this case.
I. The laws of Iowa relating to education are found in Title XII of the Code, being Chapter 257 to Chapter 305, inclusive. They constitute, in general, what may be termed the school code and contain practically all of the statutes having relation to the public school.
Schools are distinguished in section 280.2: 'The expression 'public school' means any school maintained in whole or in part by taxation; the expression 'private school' means any other school.'
The affairs of the public schools are administered by a school board, and such schools are organized into districts for the purpose of management, control, and government. The powers of the board of education or directors, as laid down in the Code, apply only to the public schools, except as otherwise stated. School district has been variously defined. It is a quasi corporation, a creature of the legislature, and is endowed only with powers bestowed upon it by statute. Bruggeman v. Independent School Dist. No. 4, 227 Iowa 661 289 N.W. 5. It is defined as a political or civil subdivision of the state for the purpose of aiding in the exercise of that governmental function which relates to the education of children. Landis v. Ashworth, 57 N.J.L. 509, 31 A. 1017. Is a district of and for the public schools--Smith v. Donahue, 202 A.D. 656, 195...
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