Silvester v. Kerelejza
| Decision Date | 28 October 1969 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Stacia SILVESTER et al. v. Thomas KERELEJZA. |
John J. Langenbach, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).
George S. Linardos, Hartford, for appellees (plaintiffs).
Before KING, C.J., and ALCORN, HOUSE, THIM and RYAN, JJ.
The plaintiffs offered evidence to prove and claimed to have proved that the plaintiff Stacia Silvester was operating an automobile in a southerly direction on Willard Avenue, a public highway in the town of Newington, at about 10:30 p.m. on April 24, 1959; that the plaintiff Gail Silvester, Stacia's daughter, was twelve, years old at the time and was seated on the right front seat of the vehicle; that Stacia brought her automobile to a stop facing a flashing red signal light at the intersection of Willard Avenue and New Britain Avenue; and that, after Stacia saw lights heading toward her from her left, she proceeded into the intersection at about five miles per hour.
The defendant Thomas Kerelejza offered evidence to prove and claimed to have proved that he was traveling west on New Britain Avenue, toward its intersection with Willard Avenue, where there was a flashing yellow, or caution, light facing him. He reduced the speed of his vehicle to about twenty miles per hour and continued at that speed into the intersection, observing no automobile lights heading toward the intersection on Willard Avenue. When the defendant was within the intersection he observed bright headlights approaching from his right, whereupon his car was struck by the Silvester vehicle as he attempted to avoid the collision.
The plaintiffs Stacia and Gail recovered damages for personal injuries sustained by them as a result of the collision. In the same action, the plaintiff Fiori Silvester, Stacia's husband, recovered consequential damages for the medical expenses of his daughter, Gail. The defendant has appealed from the denial of his motion to set aside the verdict and from the judgment. The denial of the motion to set aside the verdict is not pursued in the brief.
In his assignment of errors, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in giving a supplemental charge, in that it failed to clarify adequately the issue of contributory negligence in response to a question raised by the jury during their deliberation. The defendant had interposed a special defense of contributory negligence which the court, without objection from either party, limited to Stacia in its original charge. There can be no doubt that the issue of contributory negligence was crucial to Stacia's recovery. The parties conceded that the court adequately and correctly charged the jury on this question. The jury were instructed to render a verdict for the defendant as to the plaintiff Stacia if they found that she failed to stop at the intersection and that her negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. Later in the charge, the court stated that Stacia could not recover if the jury found negligence on the part of both her and the defendant which operated concurrently as a proximate cause of any injury. It should also be noted that the court's charge on the matter of proximate cause was adequate, both as to neligence in general and as to its application to the defendant's allegations of contributory negligence.
The jury retired, and, after approximately two hours of deliberation, court was adjourned until the following Wednesday, five days later. After retiring again for two and one-half hours, the jury returned with the following question: 'If both are negligent, but he is considered the primary cause, can she recover?' Without repeating any portion of its original charge as to contributory negligence, the court restated the requirement that negligence in general be a proximate cause of the injury. The defendant duly excepted to this supplemental charge, stating that the court should have repeated its instructions as to contributory negligence. Twenty-five minutes later, the jury returned their verdict for all plaintiffs.
It is apparent that the court interpreted the jury's question as indicating confusion between the legal concept of proximate cause and the lay concept of primary (as opposed to secondary) cause. If the question was in fact concerned with understanding the difference in these two concepts, it was proper to charge that the primary-secondary concept is of no legal import and that proximate cause is the sole test of liability. But because the jury's question postulated that both the plaintiff...
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State v. Fletcher
...instructions which fully and adequately address the confusion, notwithstanding a proper prior charge. Id.; see Silvester v. Kerelejza, 158 Conn. 433, 262 A.2d 157 (1969); Bottaro v. Schoenborn, 157 Conn. 194, 251 A.2d 79 (1968); Montagna v. Jewell, 119 Conn. 178, 175 A. 570 (1934); Annes v.......
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DePaola v. Seamour
...137 A.2d 544, 546; see Maltbie, Conn.App.Proc. § 160. The situation presented here is entirely different from that in Silvester v. Kerelejza, 158 Conn. 433, 262 A.2d 157, where there intervened between the court's original charge and the controversial supplemental charge a period of five da......
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Labatt v. Grunewald
...Co., 97 Conn. 419, 422-23, 117 A. 498 (1922); the trial court is obliged to set the verdict aside. See Silvester v. Kerelejza, 158 Conn. 433, 437, 262 A.2d 157 (1969); Bottaro v. Schoenborn, 157 Conn. 194, 197, 251 A.2d 79 There is error, the judgment is set aside and a new trial is ordered......