Silvia v. State, SC12–1863.

• Decision Date: 11 September 2013
• Docket Number: No. SC12–1863.,SC12–1863.
• Citation: 123 So.3d 1148
• Parties: William Frances SILVIA, Appellant(s) v. STATE of Florida, Appellee(s).
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

123 So.3d 1148

William Frances SILVIA, Appellant(s)

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee(s).

No. SC12–1863.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 11, 2013.

William Frances Silvia, a prisoner under sentence of death, has waived his postconviction proceedings and counsel. After conducting a hearing and the required colloquy on June 26, 2012, the trial court entered an order finding that there were no reasonable grounds to believe that Silvia was not mentally competent for purposes of the hearing and that Silvia's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The trial court accordingly dismissed Silvia's postconviction proceedings and discharged Silvia's counsel. Pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 3.851(i), discharged counsel has appealed that order to this Court.

Competency

Discharged counsel does not raise Silvia's competency as an issue in this case. Silvia's counsel represented to the trial court at the hearing that he could not in good faith argue that Silvia was incompetent. The trial court in its order determined that there were “no reasonable grounds to believe that [Silvia] is not mentally competent to proceed for the purposes this hearing.” SeeFla. R.Crim. P. 3.851(i)(4). On appeal, although discharged counsel argues that Silvia has mental health problems that would form the basis for postconviction claims, discharged counsel does not argue that the trial court erred in its finding or that there are questions as to Silvia's competency. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there were no reasonable grounds to believe that Silvia was incompetent for purposes of waiving his postconviction counsel and proceedings.

Waiver

This Court has explained that “capital defendants who are competent can waive postconviction counsel and postconviction proceedings, reasoning ‘[i]f the right to representation can be waived at trial, we see no reason why the statutory right to collateral counsel cannot also be waived.’ This Court explained that it ‘cannot deny [a death row inmate] his right to control his destiny to whatever extent remains.’ “ Trease v. State, 41 So.3d 119, 123 (Fla.2010) (quoting Durocher v. Singletary, 623 So.2d 482, 484 (Fla.1993)). However, this Court has also explained that under such circumstances, an inquiry is required to ensure that the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Trease, 41 So.3d at 123. That procedure was since codified in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(i).

The transcript of the hearing in this case reflects that, as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(i)(3)-(4), the trial court held a hearing and conducted an inquiry of Silvia, eliciting that Silvia was not under the...