Simmons v. City of Mamou
| Decision Date | 15 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 09-663 |
| Parties | BOBBY FELIX SIMMONS v. CITY OF MAMOU, ET AL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
Before this Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the Defendants, the Town of Mamou; Chief Greg Dupuis, individually and in his official capacity as Chief of Police of the Town of Mamou; Officer Todd Ortis, individually and in his official capacity as a police officer for the Town of Mamou; Officer Albert Moore, individually and in his official capacity as a police officer for the Town of Mamou;1 Officer David Charlie, individually and in his official capacity as a police officer for the Town of Mamou; and Officer Lucas Lavergne, individually and in his official capacity as a police officer for the Town of Mamou (collectively "Defendants"). [Record Documents 37, 55]. Defendants contend summary judgment should be entered in their favor and that Plaintiff's claims of false arrest, interference with the exercise of free speech, failure to release on bond and failure to provide adequate medical care in violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments should be dismissed in their entirety. See id. Plaintiff opposesthis motion. See Record Documents 41, 57. For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
On May 19, 2008, Plaintiff, Bobby Simmons, a former police officer, contacted the Ville Platte Gazette ("the Gazette") via email inquiring as to why the Gazette had not run a story regarding the alleged arrest of Greg Dupuis, Chief of Police of the Town of Mamou ("Dupuis"), and Dupuis' alleged interference with the Louisiana State Police, who were subjecting one of Dupuis' female officers to DUI testing.2 See Record Document 62-1, p. 25. The Gazette responded to Plaintiff stating that it had confirmed a female Mamou police officer had been cited by State Police while off-duty; however, the newspaper had been unable to verify the allegations regarding Dupuis. Id. Plaintiff replied to the Gazette, providing more details regarding the incidents alleged.3
Although the Gazette did not run a story on Dupuis' alleged arrest or his interference with the arrest of his officer, the newspaper's inquiries, along with other rumors allegedly circulating in the community, prompted Dupuis to act. When the Gazette refused to reveal the source of its information, Dupuis and Officer Todd Ortis ("Ortis") presented the Gazette with a subpoena duces tecum issued by the District Attorney's Office. See Record Document 60, Joint Exhibit 1. Upon obtaining the email exchange between Plaintiff and the Gazette editor, Dupuis and Ortis submitted an affidavit executed by Ortis to Judge Thomas Fuselier, District Court Judge for Evangeline Parish.
Based upon the representations made by Ortis in the affidavit, a warrant issued for Plaintiff's arrest on May 21, 2008. The warrant fixed bond at $1,000. Ortis and Dupuis faxed the warrant to the Franklin Police Department, which executed the warrant, arrested Plaintiff, and held him for approximately three hours until he was picked up by Mamou Police Department Officer Albert Moore ("Moore"). See Record Document 37-1, Dupuis Deposition, pp. 58-59. Although Moore was off-duty at the time of Plaintiff's arrest, Moore was called in to pick up Plaintiff in Franklin (St. Mary Parish) and transport him to Mamou (Evangeline Parish) for booking. See id. Moore did so, and Plaintiff was held overnight at the Mamou Police Department. The next morning, Plaintiff was transported to the Evangeline Parish jail in Ville Platte, Louisiana, where he bonded out.
In an article dated May 27, 2008, which announced Plaintiff's arrest for emailing the Gazette, Dupuis was quoted as stating:
I will be actively searching for the person or persons involved in this defamatory campaign against me . . . and now it will come to an end.
. . .
Anyone with information regarding these unfounded remarks can freely contact me at my office at the Mamou Police Department or come by my home. As stated previously, I am offering 'personally' $500 for information leading to the people responsible for these ridiculous rumors . . .
See Record Document 62-3, p. 71. Additionally, the Gazette reported that, according to Ortis, the Mamou Police were actively investigating the matter to uncover additional sources of the rumor and more arrests would be forthcoming. See id.
On April 22, 2009, Plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") for alleged violations of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. First, he alleges he was unlawfully arrested and detained for exercising his right to free speech. He also claims that his family made repeated attempts to post his bond, which had been set on the arrest warrant; however, the officers in Franklin and Mamou refused to accept bond. Finally, Plaintiff, who suffers from a terminal breathing condition, contends that he repeatedly requested, but was denied, adequate medical care, including prescribed medication and treatment from a nebulizer and/or rescue inhaler, while in Defendants' custody. See Record Documents 1, 46. Defendants now seek summary judgment in theirfavor and dismissal of Plaintiff's claims in their entirety.4 See Record Documents 37, 55. Defendants' motion is based on their assertions that they are entitled to qualified immunity for the claims against them in their individual capacities, and that under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 at n.55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), there is no evidence to support the claims against the Town of Mamou or the Defendants in their official capacities.
Summary judgment is proper pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Rule 56(c)"mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. If the party moving for summary judgment fails to satisfy its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). If the motion is properly made, however, Rule 56(c) requires the nonmovant to go "beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts in the record showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Wallace v. Texas Tech. Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). While the nonmovant's burden may not be satisfied by conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, metaphysical doubt as to the facts, or a scintilla of evidence, Little, 37 F.3d at 1075, Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1047, all factual controversies must be resolved in favor of the nonmovant. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Farese, 423 F.3d 446, 456 (5th Cir. 2005).
Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" against any person acting under color of state law.5 Nonetheless, the doctrine of qualified immunity shieldsgovernment officials from liability for claims against them in their individual capacity "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."6 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Because qualified immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability, . . . it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). Consequently, qualified immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible stage in litigation. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (per curiam).
In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), the Supreme Court held that a court ruling upon the issue of qualified immunity must apply a two-step analysis. First, the Court must determine whether "the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Id. Second, if a violation has been established, the Court must determine whether the officer's actions were objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the conduct in question. Seeid.; Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 411 (5th Cir. 2007).7 "The touchstone of this inquiry is whether a reasonable person would have believed that his conduct conformed to the constitutional standard in light of the information available to him and the clearly established law." Goodson v. Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000). If officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether the plaintiff's rights were violated, the officer's qualified immunity remains intact. See Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 750 (5th Cir. 2005)(citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)( the qualified immunity standard "gives ample room for mistaken judgments" by protecting "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.")) The question...
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