Simmons v. Georgia Iron & Coal Co.
| Decision Date | 13 March 1903 |
| Citation | 43 S.E. 780,117 Ga. 305 |
| Parties | SIMMONS v. GEORGIA IRON & COAL CO. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The proceeding by habeas corpus is not, strictly speaking, either a civil or criminal action, but a summary remedy created for the benefit of a person illegally held in custody by another and having for its sole object the restoration to liberty of such person. The origin, history, and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum discussed.
2. While the writ of habeas corpus is a "writ of right," it does not issue as a matter of course, but only when the application therefor contains allegations which, if true, would authorize the discharge of the person held in custody.
3. The technical rules of pleading are not applicable in a proceeding of this character, and where a writ has been issued, and in response thereto the person detained has been brought into court, it is not the proper practice to demur to the petition for want of sufficient allegations. While a motion to quash the writ may be made on this ground, the better practice, when the person detained is before the court, is to inquire into the cause of the restraint, and pass such order as the justice of the case requires.
4. No response will satisfy the writ unless accompanied with the body of the person held in custody, or unless a satisfactory reason for his nonproduction is given; and where, in a given instance, a writ has been issued, and the respondents have appeared at the time appointed in the writ, and a hearing is had, it will be presumed, nothing to the contrary appearing that the person claimed to be illegally restrained of his liberty was before the court at that time.
5. Although a judge may have no authority to issue a writ directed to a person holding another in custody beyond certain territorial limits, yet where he does issue the writ thus directed, and the respondent obeys its mandate by producing into court the person detained, a plea that the court had no jurisdiction to issue the writ should be overruled, and the cause of the detention inquired into.
6. The judge of a city court, the jurisdiction of which extends over the whole of the county in which it is located, has power to grant the writ directed to any person having another in illegal custody within the territorial limits of the county and to make it returnable to any place within the county, notwithstanding such person may be a nonresident of the county.
7. The fact that the application may show that the person held in custody is detained under a void sentence of the superior court would not prevent the judge of a city court having power to grant the writ from taking jurisdiction of the proceeding.
8. Where four sentences in misdemeanor cases are imposed against the same person on the same day, each one after the first providing that the term of service should begin to run at the expiration of the time fixed by those preceding, the convict is not entitled to be discharged from custody until he has served the aggregate time fixed by the four sentences.
9. Convicts cannot be worked in private chain gangs controlled by private individuals, and a convict confined on such a chain gang should be released from the custody of the individuals controlling it, and remanded to the custody of the authorities lawfully entitled thereto.
10. The fact that the averments of a petition for habeas corpus, which it is claimed show the detention to be illegal, are made "on information and belief," is no ground for quashing the writ or refusing to issue it. More especially is this so where the application is made by a person other than the one alleged to be restrained of his liberty.
11. While there is no precedent for issuing a writ of habeas corpus directed to a corporation as such, yet where a writ is directed to a corporation, "and its officers, agents, and employés," and one or more of such persons respond by producing the body of the person detained, the irregularity in the address of the writ will be no ground for refusing to investigate the cause of the detention. The practice, however, of thus issuing the writ, is not to be commended; but it should be directed to the individual having the actual physical custody and control of the person detained, and, if this cannot readily be ascertained, then to some one who is manifestly a party to the detention, and aids and abets it.
Error from City Court of Cartersville; A. M. Foute, Judge.
Application by Winnie Simmons for a writ of habeas corpus directed to the Georgia Iron & Coal Company. From a judgment dismissing the writ, petitioner brings error. Reversed.
J. B. Conyers, for plaintiff in error.
John W. & Paul F. Akin and Sam P. Maddox, Sol. Gen., for defendant in error.
Winnie Simmons presented to the judge of the city court of Cartersville a petition for habeas corpus, alleging substantially the following: Petitioner's husband, Wess Simmons, is now, and has been for more than 12 months past, confined in a chain gang in Bartow county, which is maintained and operated, "as your petitioner is informed, believes, and alleges," by the Georgia Iron & Coal Company, a private corporation doing a mining business in that county. On November 8, 1901, four separate misdemeanor sentences were pronounced against petitioner's husband by the superior court of Bartow county; the first two imposing an alternative sentence of 12 months' labor in the chain gang on the public works, and the last two each imposing an alternative of 6 months' labor in such chain gang. Each sentence after the first provided that it was to commence at the expiration of the terms fixed in the previous sentences. Being unable to pay the fines imposed in the judgments referred to, the convict was on November 9th delivered to the corporation above named, which corporation, by its agents, servants, and employés, placed him in a chain gang, where he has been confined at hard labor, except when he was wholly unable to work. Petitioner does not know, of her own knowledge, whether this chaingang is a legal place of confinement, or not, but, upon information and belief, alleges that the county commissioners, acting through the solicitor general, made a contract with the corporation by which it was to pay the commissioners a stated sum per month as hire for the convict for a term of three years from his reception by the corporation under the several sentences of the court referred to. Petitioner also alleges, upon information and belief, that the servants, agents, and employés controlling and operating the chain gang are in the employ of the corporation, and are paid for their services by it, and that her husband is not now confined in a chain gang on the public works, as the law contemplates, but that he is illegally detained and confined in a chain gang unauthorized by the laws of Georgia, under a contract made as aforesaid, which contract petitioner alleges, upon information and belief, is illegal and unauthorized by law. Petitioner also knows, upon information and belief, that the superior court of Bartow county had no legal right to suspend the operation of three of the sentences pronounced against her husband; that, while section 1041 of the Penal Code of 1895 authorizes this to be done in felony cases, there is no authority of law for such action in misdemeanor offenses. Petitioner alleges that the sentences referred to run concurrently, and that after the lapse of 12 months all are satisfied. Petitioner does not attach a copy of the contract with the corporation and the county commissioners, because she does not know whether such contract was in writing or parol. The prayer was that the writ of habeas corpus be issued, directed to the "Georgia Iron & Coal Company, a corporation as aforesaid, and its officers, agents, and employés who have the charge and custody of said Wess Simmons." The writ was issued, and directed to the corporation, "its officers, agents, and employés." It was served upon a named person as superintendent and agent of the corporation. At the time set for a hearing, the respondents appeared and filed what they termed a demurrer to the petition, on the grounds that the judge of the city court had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition, or to grant the relief prayed for; that "no cause of action is set forth in the petition," and no jurisdiction of "this defendant" is shown by the petition. The petitioner objected to the consideration of the demurrer, on the ground that, the writ having been issued, it was incumbent upon the respondents to file an answer to the same, and that the petition was not subject to attack by demurrer. The judge overruled this objection, heard argument on the demurrer, and sustained the same. To these rulings the petitioner excepted.
1. Questions growing out of an alleged illegal restraint of a person's liberty are always questions of much delicacy and importance. They impose upon the judiciary the duty of instituting a careful and painstaking investigation into the cause of the detention, and, if it be shown to be illegal the courts should not be too astute in finding technical objections to the manner in which the legality of the restraint is called in question. On account of the character and importance of the questions made by the record, it is necessary to make some inquiry into the nature and object of the writ of habeas corpus, and the proceedings upon which it is issued. Many are accustomed to regard the writ as almost obsolete and of little practical value, and this results, doubtless, from the fact that it is so seldom called into operation. But the writ is as much a palladium of liberty to-day as it was during the abuses existing in the days of the ancient English...
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