Simmons v. Suffolk Cnty.

• Decision Date: 24 May 1918
• Citation: 119 N.E. 751,230 Mass. 236
• Parties: SIMMONS v. SUFFOLK COUNTY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

230 Mass. 236

119 N.E. 751

SIMMONS

v.SUFFOLK COUNTY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 24, 1918.

Report from Superior Court, Suffolk County; John A. Aiken, Judge.

Action by Frederick E. Simmons against the County of Suffolk, resulting in finding for plaintiff. On report to the Supreme Judicial Court. Judgment ordered for plaintiff.

Wilson, Juggins & Murphy, of Boston, and Chas. A. De Courcey, of Lawrence, for plaintiff.

Jos. P. Lyons, of Boston, for defendant.

PIERCE, J.

The plaintiff is now, and has been from a time before June 12, 1917, a duly appointed assistant clerk of the municipal court of the Dorchester district, and as such clerk has held the office and performed the duties of an assistant clerk of that court. Clerks and assistant clerks of police, district and municipal courts, other than the municipal court of the city of Boston, since St. 1904, c. 453, as amended by St. 1910, c. 501, have received salaries which under the statute of 1904 were determined by a percentage of the salary of the justice of their several courts, ‘the salaries of the clerks being in amount three-fifths of the salaries of the justices, and the salaries of the assistant clerks two-thirds of the salaries of the clerks.’ By the acceptance of St. 1917, c. 340, by the city council and the mayor of the city of Boston, on June 12, 1917, the salary of the clerk of the court of which the plaintiff is the assistant clerk was increased from three-fifths to three-fourths of the salary received by the justice of that court. It is the contention of the plaintiff that the salary of the assistant clerk was by the acceptance of the act automatically increased from two-thirds of three-fifths to two-thirds of three-fourths of the salary received by the justice of that court. On the other hand, the defendant argues that the salaries of the assistant clerks are not affected by the acceptance of St. 1917, c. 340, because ‘no mention is made, in the act just quoted, of assistant clerks,’ and because the salaries of the clerks were fixed and defined in numerical terms under the class to which the respective courts were assigned.

[1][2] We are of opinion the contention of the plaintiff is correct. The maxim of statutory construction that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another, invoked by the defendant, is not conclusive of legislative intent, but is to be considered with regard to the object sought to be obtained by the entire legislat...