Simon v. U.S. Dep't of Justice
| Decision Date | 22 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No.: 20-0580 (RC) |
| Parties | CHARLES SIMON, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Pro se Plaintiff Charles Simon has filed a complaint against the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ"), Federal Prison Industries, Inc. ("FPI"), Steve Schwalb, in his official capacity as Chief Operating Officer of FPI, and T. Speights, Coordinator of FPI (collectively "Defendants"). Plaintiff initially challenged the amount of a monthly compensation award he received in 1994 pursuant to the Inmate Accident Compensation Act ("IACA"), 28 C.F.R. § 301, for a back injury he sustained while incarcerated, as well as the termination of said award in 2018. The claim relating to the calculation of his compensatory award has since been dismissed by this Court, leaving only the claim challenging the termination of his benefits, which this Court has construed as being brought under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. Defendants have moved to dismiss the remaining claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), asserting that Congress has provided an exclusive statutory remedy for the alleged injury, and that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Court grants the motion based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust.
The Court presumes familiarity with its prior opinion, Simon v. U.S. Dep't of Just., No. 20-cv-580, 2020 WL 4569425 (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2020). Briefly, Plaintiff Charles Simon suffered a back injury in 1987 while incarcerated in a federal facility. Id. at *1; Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 1. He began receiving compensation for this injury in 1994 under the IACA in the amount of $73.57 per month, a payment that would adjust in line with increases in the federal minimum wage. Simon, 2020 WL 4569425 at *1.
In June 2018, Plaintiff's benefits were suspended pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 301.315(b), due to his failure to provide the required statement of earnings. Compl. ¶¶ 1-7; see also 28 C.F.R. § 301.315(b) ( ). Plaintiff does not contend that he has since provided the necessary statements of earnings, and has filed this action challenging the calculation of his benefits and alleging wrongful termination of his benefits in violation of his due process rights and Title VII. See Compl. ¶ 1.
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Judgment on May 7, 2020, ECF No. 2, a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on May 28, 2020, ECF No. 6, and a Motion to Disqualify on June 9, 2020, ECF No. 7. All three motions were denied. See Simon, 2020 WL 4569425, at *2-3.
Defendants filed their first Motion to Dismiss on May 14, 2020, arguing that Plaintiff's claims challenging the calculation of his benefits and the termination of his benefits were barred by res judicata and, in the alternative, that venue is improper. See Defs.' First Mot. to Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 3. The motion to dismiss was granted with regard to Plaintiff's claim challenging his award calculation, but Plaintiff's challenge of his benefit termination survived. See Simon, 2020 WL 4569425, at *4.
Defendants have now filed a Motion to Dismiss, positing that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) due to IACA being the exclusive remedy for federal prisoners injured during prison employment. See Defs.' Motion to Dismiss ( ) at 1, ECF No. 14. Defendants also assert that the Court lacks jurisdiction because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Id. Additionally, Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Declaratory Judgment, ECF No. 16, and a Motion to Expedite, ECF No. 19. Because the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss, these motions are both denied as moot.
Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts must dismiss any claim over which they lack subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); see also Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506-07 (2006). If exhaustion of administrative remedies is required by statute, "[f]ailure to exhaust . . . is a jurisdictional defect, requiring dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)." Doak v. Johnson, 19 F. Supp. 3d 259, 268 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing Ellison v. Napolitano, 901 F. Supp. 2d 118, 124 (D.D.C. 2012)); see also Pappas v. District of Columbia, No. 19-cv-2800, 2021 WL 106468, at *8 (D.D.C. 2021). Acourt also lacks subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss a case when a statute provides the exclusive remedy for a certain type of claim. See Lindsay v. George Washington Univ., 279 F.2d 819, 820-21 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
In evaluating a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court is not limited (as is typical) to the allegations contained in the complaint. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 16 n. 10 (D.C. Cir. 1987). This is because the motion focuses on the Court's very power to hear a claim. Id. Instead, "where necessary, the court may consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)).
A complaint survives a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if it "contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the pleaded factual content "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678. When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court presumes that the complaint's factual allegations are true and construes them liberally in the plaintiff's favor. See Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). But, "the court need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiff[] if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint." Id. Nor must a court accept "a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation," or "naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (). Even though the Court holds a pro se complaint to a "less stringent standard[ ]" than would be applied to a complaint drafted by a lawyer, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), the complaint "must plead 'factual matter' that permits the court to infer 'more than the mere possibility of misconduct'" by defendants, Atherton v. Dist. of Columbia Off. of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal 556 U.S. at 678-79). "In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, [the Court] may consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which [the Court] may take judicial notice." EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Schl., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a common-law doctrine providing "that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted." McKart v. U.S., 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969) (quoting Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938)). The term "exhaustion" describes two distinct concepts. Avocados Plus Inc. v. Veneman, 370 F.3d 1243, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 2004). One type is "jurisdictional exhaustion," in which exhaustion is explicitly required and may never be excused by a court. Id.; see also Munsell v. Dep't of Agric., 509 F.3d 572, 579 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In order to find that an exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional, "a statute must contain 'sweeping and direct statutory language indicating that there is no federal jurisdiction prior to exhaustion, or the exhaustion requirement is treated as an element of the underlying claim.'" Pappas, 2021 WL 106468, at *8 (quoting Veneman, 370 F.3d at 1248).
Non-jurisdictional exhaustion, by contrast, allows the court the discretion to "excuse exhaustion if 'the litigant's interests in immediate judicial review outweigh the government's interests in the efficiency or administrative autonomy that the exhaustion doctrine is designed to further.'" Veneman, 370 F.3d at 1247 (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 146 (1992)); see also Vermont Dep't of Pub. Serv. v. U.S., 684 F.3d 149, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Non-jurisdictional exhaustion serves several purposes, including preserving "the autonomy of the administrative agency by allowing the agency to apply its expertise and exercise its discretion." Gaines v. U.S., 424 F. Supp. 2d 219, 223 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing Athlone Indus., Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 707 F. 2d 1485, 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). This Court has held that...
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