Simonds v. Simonds
| Decision Date | 05 March 1897 |
| Citation | 46 N.E. 421,168 Mass. 144 |
| Parties | SIMONDS v. SIMONDS. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Thomas Hunt, for petitioner.
Guy Cunningham, for respondents.
This case presents a single question in regard to the construction of the will of David W. Simonds. He left a widow and two daughters, one of whom was married and the other unmarried. In the first part of the second article of the will he left all his household furniture and property intended for use in housekeeping to his two daughters, as follows: "In trust for the benefit of my wife, Louisa A. Simonds, and my daughter Susan H. Simonds, as long as they remain unmarried and, in case my wife should again marry, or die, I give them to my said daughters for their own use." There is no doubt that this makes an absolute disposition of this part of his property, the testator's obvious purpose being to secure to his wife and unmarried daughter the use of it jointly in their home so long as they should both remain unmarried, and on the death or marriage of the widow, whether the unmarried daughter had then married or not, to give it to his two daughters in equal shares. In the same article of the will he separates his homestead from the rest of his real estate, and gives his widow and unmarried daughter the use and improvement of it while they remain unmarried. His provision in regard to it closes as follows: "The use of said house and personal property to be shared equally by them, they paying the taxes and insurance thereon, and keeping the same in repair; and at the decease of my said wife I give the same to my two daughters and the survivor of them." By Pub.St. c. 127, § 24, it is provided that "every devise shall be construed to convey all the estate which the testator could lawfully devise in the lands mentioned, unless it clearly appears by the will that he intended to convey a less estate." Even under a will made before this statute was passed it was held that, "where land is devised to one for life and over to another, especially to a son, without words of limitation, or any further words to express his intent, such a devise over is construed to be a fee." Plimpton v. Plimpton, 12 Cush. 458-463. The words "the same" in the clause "paying the taxes and insurance thereon and keeping the same in repair" plainly refer to the homestead and the personal property mentioned above, and they have the...
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Bowditch v. Attorney Gen.
...the annuity to Grace Copeland is to be paid to the respondent Frederick C. Bowditch as executor of his will. G. L. c. 184, § 7; Simonds v. Simonds, 168 Mass. 144. The residuary clause created a joint tenancy and related to a contingent interest which became vested in the last survivor, and ......
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Anderson v. Realty Co.
...a less estate was intended a fee simple will be presumed. May v. San Antonio, 83 Tex. 503; Snyder v. Baer, 144 Pa. St., 278; Simonds v. Simonds, 168 Mass. 144; Harris Dyer, 18 R. I., 543. But the case most similar to the one at bar and to which we ask special attention is the case of Devecm......
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Bowditch v. Attorney General
... ... Copeland is to be paid to the defendant Frederick C. Bowditch ... as executor of his will. G.L.c. 184, Section 7. Simonds ... v. Simonds, 168 Mass. 144 ... The residuary clause created ... a joint tenancy and related to a contingent interest which ... became vested in ... ...