Simoneau v. O'Brien
| Decision Date | 25 February 1942 |
| Citation | 311 Mass. 68,40 N.E.2d 1 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
| Parties | EDWARD T. SIMONEAU v. LILLIAN B. O'BRIEN & another. |
December 3, 1941.
Present: FIELD, C.
J., DONAHUE, DOLAN & COX, JJ.
Probate Court, Jury issues, Decree. Unsound Mind. Undue Influence. Evidence, Of testamentary capacity, Admissions. Res Judicata.
Statements of expected evidence in a contested will case, showing among other things that for years before his death the alleged testator had been suffering from alcoholism and mental paralysis and had been treated periodically in institutions that alienists who had treated him were of the opinion that he was incapable of exercising memory, will power or judgment; and that about three months before his death he married as his second wife a nurse who knew of his condition and a week after the marriage executed the alleged will naming her as sole beneficiary, presented a case proper for jury issues as to his soundness of mind and the exercise of undue influence upon him by her.
A decree of the Probate Court discharging one from guardianship as a spendthrift, entered by consent of his heirs, did not render res judicata the question of his capacity to make a will shortly thereafter, nor was the heirs' consent an admission that he then had testamentary capacity; the discharge was no more than evidence on the issue of such capacity.
A contestant of a will making a statement of expected testimony in support of a motion for jury issues is not required to disclose the names of the witnesses upon whom he relies to give such testimony unless the court so orders.
PETITION for proof of a will, filed in the Probate Court for the county of Middlesex on September 20, 1940.
The motion for jury issues was heard by Leggat, J.
M. H. Sullivan, (R.
E. Sullivan with him,) for the respondents.
G. B. Lourie, for the petitioner.
This is an appeal from a decree, entered in the Probate Court, denying the respondents' motion that issues be framed for jury trial in the matter of the petition for probate of an instrument purporting to be the last will of William E. Brooks, late of Framingham, deceased.
The issues sought to be framed were (1) whether the instrument was executed according to law; (2) whether the decedent was of sound mind at the time of its execution; and (3) whether its execution was procured by the fraud or undue influence of Nellie Ambrose Brooks. The motion for jury issues was filed October 22, 1940. On November 20, 1940, the petitioner filed a motion that the respondents specify "as to what matters are objected to by them" and that they specify "all matters which they claim give rise to the issues of fact as set forth in their `Motion to frame issues for jury trial.'" This motion was allowed on February 25 1941. Following the allowance of this motion the respondents filed their specifications as "containing matters which they offer[ed] to prove" in support of their motion that issues be framed for jury trial. That motion was thereafter heard on these specifications of the respondents and upon a "Statement of Facts" by counsel for the petitioner.
The respective parties appear to be in accord as to the following facts: The decedent, who last dwelt in Framingham, died on August 29, 1940, leaving as his heirs, his widow, two brothers, Henry and Arthur Brooks, and a sister, Lillian B. O'Brien. The sister and Arthur are the respondent appellants. The decedent executed the instrument propounded for probate on May 20, 1940. Under its terms his entire estate of about $40,000 is bequeathed and devised to his widow.
The respondents' offer of expected testimony may be summarized as follows: In 1913 the decedent received a serious head injury in an accident when he was about twenty-eight years of age. (The petitioner stated that the accident occurred in 1913.) He was unconscious for many days and thereafter never was able to carry on business or employment independently, and did little even under the supervision of others. He had been for years prior to his death under continuous medical care for alcoholism which had so impaired his memory, judgment and will, in the opinion of two alienists of long experience who had examined him and treated him over a long period, as to render him incapable of exercising any independent judgment or independent exercise of his will, and after the death of his first wife, Alice Brooks, in March, 1937, his mental collapse was complete. For five years prior to his death he was the subject of "mental treatment." During that time he had been examined at various times by alienists of repute, and was declared by them a fit subject for commitment to an institution for mental diseases. Instead of having him committed, his brothers and sister arranged to have him treated in private institutions where he voluntarily went on four different occasions, the last of such treatments lasting thirteen months, from July 1, 1938, until August 10, 1939. As to this the petitioner stated that the deceased was a patient at the Brattleboro Retreat in Brattleboro, Vermont, during the period, but that it was in pursuance of a plan by his guardian and "some of the contestants" to secure his admission to some institution. A nephew of the decedent was appointed the guardian of the decedent as a spendthrift in December, 1937.
The respondents further stated that they expected to show by the testimony of witnesses that Nellie F. (Ambrose) Brooks, the widow of the decedent, a school nurse in the town of Framingham, "49 years of age," had been a neighbor of the decedent for many years; that in the spring of 1938 she began to influence him against his "housekeeper, guardian, relatives and his own best interests"; that she knew of her own knowledge as a trained nurse that he was physically and mentally incapable of caring for himself, and she exercised undue influence upon him to procure his discharge from guardianship; that at that time she procured an attorney at law, the petitioner in this case, to represent him in procuring his discharge from guardianship; that the attorney represented to the guardian that, as attorney for the decedent, he was interested only in the happiness of his client; that "it was clear that someone had to assist and guide . . . [him] in his personal and property affairs"; that being under guardianship interfered with his happiness, and "because of the complete confidence which . . . [the decedent] had reposed in him that with the guardianship removed, he, the . . . attorney, would cooperate with the relatives to the end that the best interests of . . . [the decedent] would be served"; and that he had known Nellie F. Ambrose (later the wife of the decedent) for many years and felt certain that she had no intention of trying to engage in a marriage with the ward. The respondents further stated that evidence would be introduced to show that in...
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