Simons v. Harris, 41420.

• Decision Date: 13 December 1932
• Docket Number: No. 41420.,41420.
• Citation: 215 Iowa 479,245 N.W. 875
• Parties: SIMONS v. HARRIS.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

215 Iowa 479

245 N.W. 875

SIMONS

v.HARRIS.

No. 41420.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 13, 1932.

Appeal from District Court, Louisa County; Oscar Hale, Judge.

Action by plaintiff (appellee), Nora Simons, to recover damages from John L. Harris, defendant, for alleged slander per se. The defendant in answer thereto pleaded a general denial and denied that he used the words claimed to have been uttered of and concerning the plaintiff-appellee. Trial was had to a jury and a verdict rendered in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $1,000 and costs. Judgment was entered accordingly. The defendant appeals.

Affirmed.Arthur Springer, of Wapello, and J. G. Kammerer, of Muscatine, for appellant.

D. N. Johnson, of Wapello, and E. J. Dahms, of Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

DE GRAFF, J.

The record, briefly stated, discloses the following facts: The plaintiff is a widow 49 years of age and was employed at the time of the alleged slander as a domestic in the home of the defendant, John L. Harris, who resided on a farm, as owner, in Louisa county, Iowa. The family of the defendant consisted of himself, his invalid wife, and a farm hand, James C. Brown, a man of about 65 years of age. It is alleged that the plaintiff and defendant had a controversy and during this verbal quarrel that the defendant called the plaintiff, Nora Simons, a “G____ damn whore and everything but a decent woman.” The plaintiff theretofore had lived on the Harris farm for two years. She had been married, but her husband was dead. The particular allegation of damage as stated in her petition is as follows: “That on account of this slanderous statement so made by the said defendant verbally, maliciously, and before and in the presence of other persons, that plaintiff's character has been slandered and said slanderous words so spoken publicly of this plaintiff has tended to expose plaintiff to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, disgrace, and to induce an evil opinion of her in the minds of other right thinking and respectable people, and to deprive her of their friendly intercourse and society, and said slanderous defaming words so spoken, as aforesaid by said defendant, will tend to injure this plaintiff by making it difficult for her to get employment among decent and respectable people or in public places.”

One James C. Brown was present when the alleged slanderous words were spoken of and concerning Nora Simons on or about November 13, 1930. Brown testified that he was a laborer, knew John Harris, and had worked on his farm, and was shucking corn for him in October and November, 1930. Brown testified that he was present in the Harris home about noon on the 13th day of November, 1930, the date in question. He testified that there was some trouble between Mrs. Simons and the defendant, Harris. Mrs. Simons was in the house when Brown came in. The defendant Harris was also there, and he (Brown) heard Harris call Mrs. Simons a “God * * * damn dirty whore.” The above words constituted the publication relied upon in the instant case.

After the verdict of $1,000 was returned, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial, and as grounds therefor stated:

(1) That the verdict of the jury is excessive.

(2) That the verdict of the jury is contrary to the evidence and instructions of the court. (The abstract does not contain the instructions given to the jury or the requested instructions asked for by the defendant.)

(3) That the verdict of the jury is the result of passion and prejudice on their part and not in accordance with the evidence and instructions. (The abstract does not contain the evidence in toto introduced upon the trial.)

(4) That the verdict of the jury shows passion and prejudice for the reason the actual damages that could have been sustained by the plaintiff are but nominal.

(5) That the damages allowed by the jury in the sum of $1,000, in the light of the testimony and the instructions of the court, of necessity, must be principally exemplary or punitive damages.

(6) That the actual damages and punitive damages allowed by the jury are disproportionate, and that the exemplary damages are largely in excess of the actual damages, as the said actual damages cannot be more than nominal.

(7) That it clearly appears in the evidence in this case that the plaintiff in no way sustained damages to her reputation, her society, or her ability to procure employment, but on the contrary she specifically testified that she suffered no such damages.

(8) That it clearly appears in the evidence in this case that there was no malice for the reason that the defendant in using the alleged...