Simonton v. Forrester

• Decision Date: 01 January 1871
• Citation: 35 Tex. 584
• Parties: SUSAN D. SIMONTON, ADM'X, v. WM. FORRESTER.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

35 Tex. 584

SUSAN D. SIMONTON, ADM'X,

v.WM. FORRESTER.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1871.

1. The rulings in Ward v. Bledsoe, 32 Tex. 251, respecting the grant of new trials by this court in jury cases, must not be held applicable to the district courts; and unless these latter tribunals relax the stringency of their practice in respect to according new trials, the ends of justice will constrain this court to rescind its own rule and adopt the liberal principles which should prevail in the district courts.

2. Bills of exception are not entitled to consideration in this court when they fail to conform to the requirements of rule 27, by stating not only the rulings of the lower court, objected to, but also, and specifically, the grounds of objection there taken. Strong equities, however, may induce this court to waive a strictly technical compliance with this or other rules of practice.

APPEAL from Montgomery. Tried below before the Hon. James Masterson. The details of the case are not necessary to a comprehension of the rulings.

John C. Easton, for appellant.

John R. Peel, for appellee.

WALKER, J.

This action was brought in the district court by Wm. Forrester against Susan D. Simonton, as the administratrix of the estate of Robert S. Simonton, deceased, and P. J. Willis & Brother. The cause was tried by a jury upon special issues; the findings are somewhat indefinite, and are not, perhaps, so exactly responsive to the issues submitted as they should have been. They were understood by the court, however, to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict in an amount about one-half of that claimed by the plaintiff.

We shall not disturb this verdict for reasons often given by this court. In Ward & Co. v. Bledsoe & Clarkson, 32 Tex. 251, the court say, “it has been the constant and unvarying practice of this court never to disturb the verdict of a jury if, at the trial, any evidence was adduced on which it could have been found. It is only in cases where the verdict appears at first blush to be palpably wrong, oppressive, unjust, and subversive of legal right, that a court is justified in setting it aside, unless there has been misdirection of the jury by the court.”

This language states the rule very strongly in its application to this court, and must not be held to apply to the district courts; and we here take occasion again to remark, that unless the district courts are governed by a more liberal rule in granting new trials, for any and every cause which may be justly and legally assigned, we shall be under the necessity, in order to meet the ends of justice, to abolish the rule as above stated in our adjudications, and apply the principle which should apply in the nisi prius courts.

But in the case at bar, this relaxation of the rule is not invoked, for the verdict is fairly supported by the evidence. Were we disposed to treat the assignments for error as well taken, we should...