Simpkins v. The Hawkeye Commercial Men's Ass'n
| Decision Date | 10 May 1910 |
| Citation | 126 N.W. 192,148 Iowa 543 |
| Parties | LENA SIMPKINS, as Executrix of the Will of H. E. SIMPKINS, Deceased, Appellee, v. THE HAWKEYE COMMERCIAL MEN'S ASSOCIATION, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Marshall District Court.--HON. C. B. BRADSHAW, Judge.
ACTION to enforce collection of a policy or certificate of accident insurance. Judgment for plaintiff as prayed, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Affirmed.
Bradford & Johnson, for appellant.
Cummings & Mote, for appellee.
The defendant is a mutual benefit association organized for the purpose of insuring its members, upon certain conditions against personal injury and death from accidental causes. On July 9, 1906, H. E. Simpkins, an undertaker by occupation residing and doing business at Marshalltown, Iowa where the defendant's principal office is located, was duly admitted to membership in the association, and remained a member thereof in good standing until his death on February 2, 1907. Among the benefits and indemnities assured to a member in good standing in said association its by-laws provide the following: Article 5, section 2: "Whenever a member in good standing shall, through external, violent, and accidental means, receive bodily injuries which shall, independently of all other causes, result in death within twenty-six weeks from said accident, the beneficiary named in his application for membership, or his heirs, if no beneficiary is named therein, shall be paid the proceeds of one assessment of two dollars upon each member in good standing, but in no case shall such payment exceed the sum of five thousand dollars, which shall be in full satisfaction of all liability to the said deceased member, his beneficiary, heirs or legal representatives." It is the claim of plaintiff that on or about January 9, 1907, said H. E. Simpkins, while engaged in the line of his business in embalming the body of a deceased person, accidentally wounded or punctured the palm of his hand with the point of an embalming needle or trocar, which induced or caused blood poisoning, from which death ensued some three or four weeks later. It is further alleged that within fifteen days from the date of such injury written notice thereof was given to said association, and that within sixty days of the decease of said member notice thereof with proof of the death was also duly served. It is also alleged that at the date of the death of said Simpkins there were in said association one thousand seven hundred and eighty members, but it has wholly failed to pay the amount of benefits to which the estate of the deceased is entitled, and has failed, neglected, and refused to levy any assessment upon its said membership for the purpose of paying such claim. A decree is asked ordering such assessment to be made and payment of the proceeds to the plaintiff. The answer of the defendant admits the membership of Simpkins in good standing at the date of his death, but denies all the other material allegations of the petition. It also alleges that under one of its by-laws, when a member dies from natural causes, there shall become due to his beneficiary or his estate the sum of four cents per capita of the entire membership, and that by the terms of this provision there became due to the plaintiff as executrix the sum of $ 71.60, which sum defendant tendered to plaintiff, who refused to receive it. Said tender is also brought into court and deposited for the plaintiff's acceptance and use. While numerous errors are assigned, counsel for appellant condense and confine the propositions relied upon under three heads, which we shall briefly consider in the order in which they are stated in the printed brief.
I. It is said that no notice was given the defendant of the alleged accidental nature of Simpkins' death. The record does not bear out the objection. Simpkins died on February 2, 1907. On February 4, 1907, proofs of death made out upon the blanks usually employed for that purpose were prepared by the attending physician and others, and furnished the defendant. In the physician's report it was stated in unequivocal language that death was caused by septic poisoning introduced by a needle, and that there was no remote cause of such fatal result. But counsel say this was insufficient, because the physician does not state specifically how the injury was inflicted, or that it was accidental. This is demanding a much higher degree of particularity than reason or the law requires. It has often been held that the notice required in such cases need not incorporate a minute and detailed history of the case. In Correll v. Accident Society, 139 Iowa 36, 116 N.W. 1046, we said that the requirement in cases of this character "is that the fact of death be stated, and, as far as known at the time, the cause thereof." So, too, where "full particulars" are demanded by the contract, it does not mean necessarily a complete recitation of all the facts, but enough to enable the insurer to intelligently pursue the inquiry if it desires to do so. Here the alleged cause of the death was clearly stated and attributed to a bodily injury caused by external and violent means. We think it also sufficiently conveys the information that such injury was accidental. If the proof or notice had shown that deceased had died of a knife wound or a gun shot wound, it would not be necessary to negative the idea that the injury was of a voluntary or suicidal character. The natural inference from such statement would be that such injury and death were accidental.
In this connection reliance is also placed on a clause of the defendant's by-laws, which reads as follows "Provided, further, that the association shall in no event be liable to any beneficiary, heir or legal representative for any claim arising from the death of a member as aforesaid, unless such member, his beneficiary, heirs or legal representative for any claim arising from the death of a member as aforesaid, give written notice to the Secretary of the Association of the accident causing the death, within fifteen days after the happening of said accident, which notice shall state the full name of the member and contain full particulars of such accident, and shall also within sixty days from the time of such death furnish the Board of Directors with affirmative proof in writing of the death, and of its being the proximate result of external and, accidental means." It is insisted that there was no compliance with this condition, and hence there can be no recovery. Strictly speaking, there can be no such thing as an "accident causing death," so long as the injured person lives, and in the nature of things "notice of the accident causing the death" is not...
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