Simpler v. State to Use of Boyd

• Decision Date: 11 November 1960
• Docket Number: No. 203,203
• Citation: 223 Md. 456,165 A.2d 464
• Parties: Carroll Alton SIMPLER et al., etc. v. STATE of Maryland, to use of BOYD, surviving husband, et al., etc.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 456

223 Md. 456

165 A.2d 464

Carroll Alton SIMPLER et al., etc.

v.

STATE of Maryland, to use of BOYD, surviving husband, et al., etc.

No. 203.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 11, 1960.

James H. Norris, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen. (C. Ferdinand Sybert, Atty. Gen., on the brief), for appellants.

William H. Adkins, II, Easton (K. Thomas Everngam, Denton, on the brief), for appellees.

Before BRUNE, C. J., and HENDERSON, HAMMOND, PRESCOTT and HORNEY, JJ.

PRESCOTT, Judge.

There are two questions involved in this appeal: (1) Are the provisions of Code (1957), Article 5, Section 1, inapplicable to this appeal due to the fact that the Circuit Court for Caroline County, when it ordered Hooper S. Miles, Treasurer of Maryland and Custodian of the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund (Fund), ¹ to pay damages to the appellees, was acting under a special, limited and summary jurisdiction?; and (2) Even if it were acting under a special and limited jurisdiction, did the court exceed the jurisdiction conferred by Section 160, when its order required payment from the Fund of court costs and interest, in addition to the maximum amount oa damages specified in Section 162?

In Boyd v. Simpler, 1960, 222 Md. 126, 158 A.2d 666, this Court reversed judgments, n. o. v., of the Circuit Court for Caroline County, and reinstated jury verdicts in favor of the present appellees and against appellant Simpler in the total amount of $23,956.98, plus costs. The judgments so entered were based on Simpler's negligent operation of an automobile, which negligence caused the death of appellees' decedent. Simpler was uninsured, and the matter was within the provisions of the Maryland Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law. Following the issuance of this Court's mandate, appellees, having previously complied with the provisions of Section 154, filed an application in the Circuit Court of Caroline County for payment of said judgments, plus interest and costs. The Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board answered said application, denying any liability for interest and costs.

A hearing was held pursuant to Section 159. At this hearing, it was conceded that appellees had complied with all of the requirements of Section 159; the only contested point related to whether or not the Fund could be required to pay court costs and interest, in addition to the maximum damages of $10,000 (less $100) specified by Section 162, 'on account of * * * [the] death of, one person in any one accident * * *.'

As a result of the hearing, the court passed an order directing payment to the appellees from the Fund of damages in the amount of $9,900 (being the maximum amount of $10,000, less $100, as specified by Section 162), plus court costs and interest from the date of the order. The State Treasurer, as custodian of the Fund, and Simpler appealed. Thereafter, the parties entered into a stipulation, whereby the Treasurer agreed to pay unto the appellees, from the Fund, the sum of $9,900 (which has been done), the payment of costs and interest to abide the result of this appeal; consequently, the only monetary matter presently in issue is the question of interest and costs.

The appellees have moved to dismiss the appeal in the ground that the trial court was acting pursuant to a special, limited and summary jurisdiction, and, as it is conceded that no appeal to this Court is specified in the statute, this Court is without authority to review the action of the trial court. The appellants counter by claiming that the appeal is authorized under the provisions of Code (1957), Article 5, Section 1, and, even if said Article 5, Section 1, does not authorize the appeal and the lower court was acting under a special and limited jurisdiction, this Court still has the right and duty to review the action of that court, because it exceeded the jurisdiction granted by the Legislature, when it ordered the payment of the interest and costs.

I

Article 5, Section 1, is couched in broad and general terms. It provides that any party may appeal to the Court of Appeals, 'from any final judgment or determination of a court of law in any civil suit or action, * * * or in any prosecution for the recovery of any penalty or fine or damages * * *.' Despite this general language, which, if literally read, would seem broad enough to encompass almost every case and every question that can arise in the progress of any case, the law is well settled that in certain classes of cases no appeal to the Court of Appeals is allowed. 2 Poe, Pleading and Practice (5th Ed.), par. 826; Johnson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 196 Md. 400, 406, 76 A.2d 736, and Maryland cases cited therein. The general rule, as stated by Professor Poe, op. cit., par. 826, p. 800, is that where the lower court proceeds in the exercise of its usual and general jurisdiction, an appeal will lie from any final judgment it may pronounce in a civil case. See also Johnson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra, 196 Md. at page 406, 76 A.2d 736. But to this general rule, there are certain exceptions, and one of these exceptions is that where a special or limited jurisdiction is conferred upon the circuit courts, or any of the courts of Baltimore City, to be exercised in a particular mode, and not according to the ordinary course of the common law, no appeal will lie from their judgments, unless expressly provided for by statute. Poe, op. cit., par. 826, p. 799; 2 M.L.E., Appeals, par. 23. We must, therefore, determine whether the trial court, in this proceeding, was acting pursuant to its ordinary jurisdiction, or under a special and limited one.

In order to make this determination, it will be necessary to examine, somewhat in detail, the provisions of the statutes under which the lower court acted. After providing for the creation and maintenance of the Fund (Section 151), the creation of the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board (Board) to administer the Fund (Section 152), and certain procedural matters (Sections 154, 155, 156, 157), Section 158 states that when any qualified person (or his representative) recovers a valid judgment for an amount in excess of $100, exclusive of interest and costs, in any court of competent jurisdiction in this State, against any other person, who was the operator or owner of a motor vehicle, for injury to, or death of, any person or persons, or for damages to property (with exceptions), and any amount in excess of $100 remains unpaid thereon, upon the termination of all proceedings, the judgment creditors may file a verified claim in the court in which the judgment was entered and, upon ten days' notice to the Board, may apply to the court for an order directing payment out of the Fund, of the amount unpaid upon such judgment, subject to the limitations placed thereon by Section 162. Section 159 directs that the 'court shall proceed upon such application, in a summary manner,' and then sets forth what the applicant must show to obtain a court order as provided for in the next section. Section 160 follows by stating that the Court shall make an order directed to the Treasurer requiring him to make payment from the Fund of such sum, if any, as it shall find to be payable upon said claim, pursuant to the provisions of and in accordance with the limitations contained in 'this subtitle.' It is, we think, clear, from what has been said above, that the jurisdiction created by the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law with respect to the passing of orders for payments from the Fund is a special and limited one. The procedure outlined has little resemblance to the usual and ordinary adversary proceeding in a civil law suit. The court is directed, under Section 159, to proceed upon the application in a 'summary manner.' It is certain that the jurisdiction here under consideration did not exist at common law, and that it never could have been exercised until the Legislature established the Fund and all of the machinery relating to recovery therefrom. We hold that when the trial court signed the order, which is involved in this appeal, it was not acting pursuant to its usual and ordinary jurisdiction, but was proceeding under a special, limited and summary one; ² hence the provisions of Article 5, Section 1, do not afford the appellants a right to appeal to this Court in this case.

II

We noted under I, supra, the general rule that relates to appeals to this Court, and the exception thereto that relates to cases where the lower court has acted in virtue of a special and limited jurisdiction. To this exception, there is a further exception, namely, that if the lower court has acted without any jurisdiction, or exceeded the authority conferred by statute, an appeal to the Court of Appeals will lie. Johnson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra, 196 Md. at page 409, 76 A.2d 736; Stephens v. City of Crisfield, 122 Md. 190, 192, 193, 89 A. 429; 2 Poe, op. cit., par. 826, p. 800.

The appellants here to not claim that the lower court was totally without jurisdiction in passing the order appealed from, but claim that the court exceeded the statutory authority, when it allowed interest and costs in addition to the damages. Their position is based upon Section 162, which reads, in relevant part, as follows:

'(a) Maximum amounts.--The maximum amounts payable from the fund shall be ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), exclusive of interest and costs, on account of injury to, or death of, one person in any one accident * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.)

They argue that the quoted language means that recovery from the Fund is limited to an absolute maximum of $10,000 (actually $9,900 because of the deduction provision of $100 in Section 162(b)), and that if the damages recovered by the applicant for payment from the Fund equal or exceed that maximum, then the Fund cannot be required to pay interest or costs in any amount. The statute will not bear this construction; such an interpretation would be an extremely...