Simpson County v. Buckley

• Decision Date: 02 March 1903
• Citation: 33 So. 650,81 Miss. 474
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: SIMPSON COUNTY ET AL. v. THOMAS J. BUCKLEY ET AL

33 So. 650

81 Miss. 474

SIMPSON COUNTY ET AL. v. THOMAS J. BUCKLEY ET AL

Supreme Court of Mississippi

March 2, 1903

October 1902

FROM the chancery court of Simpson county. HON. HENRY C. CONN Chancellor.

Buckley and three hundred and seventy-five other persons, appellees who sued in behalf of themselves and all other citizens of Simpson county, were complainants in the court below; the county of Simpson, the board of supervisors thereof, the members of said board, the county treasurer of said county the clerk of the chancery court thereof, and another appellees, were defendants.

The bill of complaint charges that since the organization of the county of Simpson in the year 1824, the town of Westville had continuously been and still is the county seat of said county; that the board of supervisors of said county had unlawfully undertaken to remove the county seat from Westville to a place called Edna (now called Mendenhall), that an election had been ordered and held in the county on the subject of removal of the county seat from Westville to Edna, now Mendenhall; that the removal proposed was away from the center of the county, Edna, now Mendenhall, being more distance from the geographical center of the county than Westville; that at the election which was held a bare majority of the voters voted in favor of the removal, which majority was less than two-thirds of the voters at the election as required by the constitution of 1890, sec. 259, to remove the county seat from Westville to Edna, now Mendenhall; that a previous bill in chancery had been filed by several citizens seeking to prevent the removal of the county seat; that in the suit in which the bill was filed, a decree had been made in the cause falsely reciting that the case had been tried and disposed of on its merits; when in truth, and as a matter of fact, the case was never tried on its merits, and the decree was a collusive one, and was the result of a bargain and scheme between the complainants in said case and speculators, interested in town lots in the town of Edna, now Mendenhall, and that the decree rendered in said case was a fraud, and that a fraud had been practiced on the county, and that complainants were not estopped thereby.

The bill further charges that some of the members of the board of supervisors were interested in town lots in Edna, now Mendenhall, and for that reason were easily persuaded that the county seat could be removed from the center of the county on a bare majority vote; that the said board had, late one evening, passed an order for the removal of the records of Simpson county from Westville to said Edna, now Mendenhall, and they caused them to be transferred there in the night time in violation of law.

The bill further charges that the attorney-general and the district attorney had both been applied to and had both refused to institute any proceeding to prevent the wrong, and had declined to allow their names to be used in this or any other litigation to prevent the great outrage which the board of supervisors were seeking to put upon the good people of Simpson county.

The bill further charges corruption on the part of members of the board of supervisors, and that the whole proceeding was a fraud because of corruption.

The prayer of the bill was for an injunction compelling the officers of the county to return the public records to Westville, the legal county seat.

The defendants, the board of supervisors, demurred to the bill, assigning, among others, the following causes: No equity on the face of the bill. Complainants have not shown that they have suffered any injury or loss not shared by all other citizens of the county. Removal of the county seat cannot be ordered by the board of supervisors at the suit of private citizens. The finding of the board of supervisors that the county seat had been removed from Westville to Edna, now Mendenhall, and that the latter place had been chosen at an election held on the subject, is not reviewable at the suit of complainants. An order of removal of a county seat cannot be collaterally attacked. From a decree overruling the demurrer of the board of supervisors of the county to the bill of complaint the defendants, the board of supervisors, appealed to the supreme court.

Affirmed and remanded.

C. M. Whitworth and Alexander & Alexander, for appellants.

Can the removal of the county seat pursuant to an election, though irregularly held, be enjoined at the suit of private citizens or taxpayers? The general rule is stated in 7 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.), 1043.

"No person can have any property rights in the location of a county seat, and, therefore, a private citizen has no standing in court to maintain a suit to prevent a removal by the proper authorities." The authorities cited in support of the text are Armstrong v. Dearborn, 4 Blackf. (Ind.), 208; Luce v. Fensler, 85 Ia. 596; Walker v. Tarrant Co., 20 Tex. 16; Harrell v. Lynch, 65 Tex. 146; Permenter v. Bourne, 8 Wash., 45; 10 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 899; Branton v. County, 79 Miss. 277; Worsham v. Richards, 46 Tex. 441; Attorney-General v. Supervisors, 33 Mich. 289; Hipp v. Supervisors, 62 Mich. 456; McMellan v. Butler, 15 Kan. 62.

The ground of the foregoing decisions is that no citizen can have any pecuniary interest in the location of a county seat. Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U.S. 548.

The only state which holds to the contrary, so far as we can find, is Illinois. See Boven v. Smith, 47 Ill. 482; People v. Wiant, 48 Ill. 263.

But these cases are roundly condemned in other jurisdictions. See, for instance, the opinion in 8 Wash. 45; Mode v. Beasley, 143 Ind. 306; Davis v. Mayor, 2 Duer, 663.

The designation of a county seat by proper election belongs to the legislative department. Smith v. Adams, 130 U.S. 167.

"Taxpayers cannot by proceeding prevent a levy or enforcement of a tax nor dispute the validity of the previous judgment, nor relitigate any questions which were or might have been litigated in the original proceeding." 1 Freeman on Judg., sec. 178, and cases cited.

The canvass and decision of the board is conclusive for all purposes. Double v. McQueen, 96 Mich. 39; Pinkerton v. Staninger, 101 Mich. 273; Curry v. Paulson, 43 Minn. 411.

The finding of facts by the board are conclusive as against a collateral attack. Works on Courts and Jurisd., 144.

After the location is fixed the sufficiency of the original petition as to the number of names is not open to judicial investigation. 32 L. R. A., 723; Saunders v. Metcalf, 7 Tenn. ch. 419; McWhirter v. Brainard, 5 Ore., 426.

By analogy see, also, as to noninterference with contested elections. 41 La. Ann., 850 (13 Ib., 89; 32 Ga. 812).

As to the conclusiveness of the canvass of the board see also 7 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, sec. 1040, and cases cited.

Injunction does not lie, because there was a clear remedy by appeal. The code gives the right of appeal to any person aggrieved. The remedy by appeal was open to any citizen, even without giving bond, and failure to appeal bars the right to an appeal, even if it existed originally. 32 L. R. A., 725; Works on Courts, 144; State v. Nelson, 21 Neb. 572; Board of Commissioners of Clark County v. State, 61 Ind. 84; State v. Judge, 43 La. Ann., 125.

The rule is so universal that injunction does not lie where there is another remedy, that citation of authorities would seem to be useless. See, however, Brooks v. Shelton, 47 Miss. 243; Newman v. Morris, 52 Miss. 402.

It is held that one aggrieved by the action of the board in increasing his assessment must appeal, failing in which he has no standing in chancery. Anderson v. Ingersoll, 62 Miss. 73.

All taxpayers are concluded by the decree in the former injunction suit. It is well settled that a decree in a suit of this sort binds all other citizens of the same class. It would be intolerable to allow any, or all, of the thousands of Simpson county citizens successfully to enjoin the removal. See Linden v. Alameda Co. 45 Cal. 6; 32 L. R. A., 725; Hannon v. Auditor, 5 Am. St. Rep., 502; Freement on Judgt., 178.

This doctrine was not questioned by counse...