Simpson v. Com.

• Decision Date: 19 December 1889
• Parties: SIMPSON v. COMMONWEALTH.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

12 S.W. 630

89 Ky. 412

SIMPSON v. COMMONWEALTH.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

December 19, 1889

Appeal from circuit court, Harlan county.

"To be officially reported."

Indictment for false swearing.

J. G Forester, for appellant.

P. W Hardin, Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.

LEWIS C.J.

Appellant was indicted for the offense of false swearing, committed by tes tifying, as a witness at the trial of an action, that he never signed, or authorized any one to sign for him, a promissory note to one Blanton, to recover judgment on which said action was brought. The note appears to have been executed by E. W. & John Napin, as principals, and, if appellant was a party to it all, he was so as surety only. He did not sign it himself, nor was it signed by an authorized agent. Hence he was not bound to pay it; for section 1, c 22, Gen. St., provides that no action shall be brought to charge any one upon a promise to answer for the debt of another, unless the promise, or some memorandum or note thereof, be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by his authorized agent. It was in evidence that appellant gave verbal direction or authority to a person to write his (appellant's) name to the note, which was done in his presence. But he was not made, thereby, liable for putting the name of a surety to a note by another does not satisfy the statute, which in terms requires, in order to bind him, that it be signed by himself, or signed by an authorized agent. The note in question was not signed by either, but, instead, the name of the surety was simply written by another; not, in either the language or meaning of the statute, signed to it. To construe the statute so as to charge a person with the debt of another, upon such evidence, would not only do violence to the language used, but tend to defeat the object of it, which is to prevent frauds and perjuries. And no better illustration of the wisdom of the statute, and necessity for strict adherence to it, could be afforded than is presented by this case; for, in the civil action, out of which grew this prosecution, a surety was sought to be made liable on a note, to which his name was written by another, upon mere verbal authority, which, he stated on oath, in the trial of the civil action as well as in this case, he did not give, and, if given or understood by the other to be given, was probably done by him under misapprehension. We...