Simpson v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.

Decision Date06 May 1959
Docket NumberNo. 1,No. 37609,37609,1
Citation99 Ga.App. 629,109 S.E.2d 876
PartiesIVY L. SIMPSON v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY et al
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court

1. None of the three grounds of the motion to dismiss the writ of error is meritorious and the motion is denied.

2. The only provision of law for the State Board of Workmen's Compensation to review a settlement which had been made the judgment of the board is a review based on a change in condition, as provided in Code § 114-709, and the board is without jurisdiction to set aside a settlement allegedly procured by fraud and to decide that the injury sustained did not arise out of and in the course of employment as stipulated in the settlement. Consequently the court erred in affirming the director's award denying further compensation.

On November 7, 1957, Ivy L. Simpson filed with the State Board of Workmen's Compensation a claim for compensation. Thereafter, the claimant, the employer and the carrier entered into an agreement providing for compensation at the rate of $26.32 per week, which agreement was approved by the Board of Workmen's Compensation and made the award of said board on January 7, 1958. Compensation was paid to the claimant under the agreement until May 3, 1958, on which date the employer and the carrier, now defendants in error, filed written application with the board and requested a hearing 'to consider, pass upon and determine the following questions: (a) To determine whether or not there has been a change in the condition of said claimant, to review the aforesaid award and the agreement on which it was based, and to make an award ending or diminishing the compensation previously provided in said agreement. Applicants contend that the nature and extent of the change in condition are that the claimant no longer has any disability whatever. (b) To review said award and the settlement agreement on which it was based and to set aside the award and rescind the agreement on the ground of fraud in the procurement thereof. (c) To consider and pass upon the question of whether or not the particular disability resulting from the alleged compensable accident of June 27, 1957, whether it was an aggravation of an old injury or an independent disability, has ended and to make an award ending the compensation previously agreed upon.'

Pursuant to this application, a hearing, with notice to all concerned, was held on June 12, 1958. At the hearing evidence was introduced by all parties. On September 22, 1958, the State Board of Workmen's Compensation made an award as follows: 'Wherefore, based on the above and foregoing findings of fact the agreement between Ivy L. Simpson, employee, and Columbus Iron Works, employer, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, insurer, approved by the Workmen's Compensation Board January 7, 1958, and providing for compensation resulting from an injury of June 27, 1957, its nature being injury to the left elbow when claimant struck a dolly, is hereby rescinded on the ground that the same was procured by fraud. Employee, therefore, is not entitled to any further compensation under said agreement nor is he entitled to any further payments of medical expenses concerning his alleged injury of June 27, 1957. Any disability presently suffered by the claimant in his left arm or elbow is the result of his injury of November, 1956 in or near Dallas, Georgia and is in no way connected with his employment with Columbus Iron Works Company.' Thereafter, the claimant appealed to the Superior Court of Muscogee County, which on December 15, 1958, affirmed the foregoing award. The claimant assigns error on this judgment on the ground that the board did not have jurisdiction to set aside the agreement for fraud.

Richard H. Baker, Paul Blanchard, Columbus, for plaintiff in error.

Hatcher, Smith, Stubbs & Rothschild, Albert W. Stubbs, Columbus, for defendant in error.

FELTON, Chief Judge.

1. (a) In support of their motion to dismiss the writ of error, the defendants in error contend that the bill of exceptions does not name or specify a defendant in error. Code § 6-1202, as amended (Ga.L.1957, pp. 224, 227-229), states in pertinent portion: 'Essential Parties. Who are interested parties.--When the record shows clearly who were parties to the litigation in the court below, the writ of error shall not be dismissed because the bill of exceptions fails to specify or designate the parties plaintiff in error or defendant in error * * *' While it is true that the bill of exceptions does not contain the usual recital naming defendants in error as such, the record shows clearly who were the parties to the litigation in the court below. In addition, the bill of exceptions sets out all parties to the case and specifies Ivy Lee Simpson as plaintiff in error. Under these circumstances, the mere failure to designate the opposite parties as defendants in error is not a ground for dismissal. Anderson v. Heyward, 96 Ga.App. 683, 101 S.E.2d 110, cited by defendants, deals solely with the validity of service of a bill of exceptions, which issue is not here involved.

(b) The defendants in error also urge dismissal of the writ of error for the reason that the evidence introduced before the Workmen's Compensation Board has not been brought to this court in any manner authorized by law. The transcript of proceedings and testimony before the board was not included in the bill of exceptions originally tendered to the trial judge, but was added thereto by a purported amendment stating that plaintiff 'amends his Bill of exceptions heretofore tendered in the above-captioned case by adding the transcript of the evidence introduced before the director upon which he based his award * * *' The defendants in error contend that the transcript presented with the addition to the bill of exceptions cannot be considered because the 'amendment' presenting it was never allowed by the trial court. This contention, however, overlooks the fact that the transcript when tendered was not legally an amendment to the bill of exceptions, which had not been certified or allowed at that time. As stated in 4A C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 892, p. 839, '* * * it is generally recognized that the right to amend may be exercised only if there exists a valid bill of exceptions to amend. Thus, if a proffered bill of exceptions has not been settled and allowed according to law it is not subject to correction or amendment * * *' Since the transcript was therefore not added by way of amendment, it was not necessary for the trial judge to allow it as such. The cases cited by the defendants in error are all concerned with the necessity for the trial court's allowance of an amendment to a petition previously sanctioned, and their rulings do not apply to a mere proffered bill of exceptions. And finally, the erroneous designation of the addition as an 'amendment' by plaintiff in error's counsel is not controlling as to its legal nature.

(c) The defendants in error further contend that the writ of error must be dismissed because certain portions of the record...

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15 cases
  • St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Bridges, 39683
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • September 24, 1962
    ...of a 'change of condition.' Teems v. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 41 Ga.App. 100(1), 151 S.E. 826; Simpson v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 99 Ga.App. 629(2), 109 S.E.2d 876; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 101 Ga.App. 480(3), 114 S.E.2d 141; National Union Ins. Co. v. Mills, 99 Ga.Ap......
  • Hanover Ins. Co. v. Jones
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 28, 1978
    ...absence of a 'change of condition.' Teems v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 41 Ga.App. 100(1), 151 S.E. 826; Simpson v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 99 Ga.App. 629(2), 109 S.E.2d 876; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 101 Ga.App. 480(3), 114 S.E.2d 141; National Union Ins. Co. v. Mills, 99 Ga.App.......
  • Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York v. Parham
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • February 11, 1963
    ...82 Ga.App. 111(1)(b) (60 S.E.2d 419); Maryland Cas. Corp. v. Mitchell, 83 Ga.App. 99 (62 S.E.2d 415); Simpson v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 99 Ga.App. 629(1), 634, 635 (109 S.E.2d 876).' In considering this question we first turn to those portions of the Workmen's Compensation Act deemed to be ......
  • Gulf Ins. Co. v. Williamson
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • December 1, 1975
    ...47 S.E.2d 652, supra; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. King, 104 Ga.App. 261, 263, 121 S.E.2d 284. 9. The case of Simpson v. Liberty Mut. Insurance Co., 99 Ga.App. 629, 109 S.E.2d 876 was reviewed prior to an amendment of 1968 to Code Ann. § 114-709, and the statute now recognizes the finality of......
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