Simpson v. Melecio
| Decision Date | 13 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 9:20-CV-36 (MAD/DJS) |
| Parties | SIMPSON, Petitioner, v. MELECIO, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
HON LETITIA JAMES PAUL B. LYONS, ESQ.
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER [1]
Pro se Petitioner Johnnie Simpson was convicted upon a guilty plea of Criminal' Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree. Dkt. No. 16-1, State Court Record (“SR.”) at pp. 1047-48. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of six years with two years of post-release supervision. SR. at p. 1048. Petitioner presently seeks a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on five grounds: (1) he “was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel”; (2) defense counsel had “an actual conflict of interest that was not sufficiently explained to the defendant”; (3) “the suppression court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into the actual conflict of interest”; (4) his “plea was rendered involuntary because he was denied the opportunity to retain conflict free counsel by the court”; and (5) “trial counsel's failure to file a speedy trial claim resulted in such prejudice to the defense that defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated.” Dkt. No. 1, Petition (“Pet.”) at p. 16. Respondent has filed a Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Petition. Dkt. No. 14, Resp. Mem. of Law. Petitioner filed a Traverse in further support of the Petition. Dkt. No. 20 (“Trav.”). For the reasons that follow, this Court recommends that the Petition be denied.
On March 27, 2014, Petitioner was arrested after law enforcement searched Petitioner's person and found that he was unlawfully in possession “of an aggregate weight of one-eighth ounce or more” of cocaine. SR. at pp. 7-9, 711, 1047. He was arraigned before the Kingston City Court and remanded without bail. The grand jury voted an indictment against Petitioner on April 2, 2014. SR. at pp. 8-9. Petitioner was thereafter named in a two-count indictment charging him with Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree and Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Fourth Degree. SR. at p. 8.
During counsel's representation of Petitioner, it was determined that counsel's firm represented Matthew Vladich, the confidential informant (“CI”) who participated in a series of controlled buys with Petitioner prior to Petitioner's arrest, “for the purpose of arraignment and/or bail.” SR. at pp. 236-48. Upon realizing that Mr. Vladich was the CI in Petitioner's case, the firm terminated its representation of Mr. Vladich. Id. The lower court became aware of the firm's representation of the CI and sought to explain how this would affect counsel's representation of Petitioner. SR. at p. 225-57. Upon next returning to court, Petitioner stated that he understood and expressed his interest in having counsel continue to represent him in the case. SR. at pp. 268-69.
On January 9, 2015, Petitioner pled guilty to Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree. SR. at p. 1123. As part of his plea, Petitioner waived his right to appeal. On April 15, 2015, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of six years in state prison, followed by two years of post-release supervision. SR. at p. 332, 1048. On the same day, Petitioner filed a Pro se Notice of Appeal with the Ulster County Clerk. SR. at p. 344.
Despite Petitioner's waiver of his right to appeal, he appealed to the New York Appellate Division. SR. at pp. 797, 1151, 1183. The Appellate Division affirmed Petitioner's conviction on January 19, 2017. SR. at p. 605. The New York State Court of Appeals also denied Petitioner's leave to appeal. SR. at p. 637. Petitioner thereafter sought to challenge his conviction by motioning to vacate the judgment on May 15, 2017. SR. at p. 638. The trial court denied Petitioner's first CPL § 440.10 motion on September 18, 2017. SR. at p. 732. Petitioner applied to the Appellate Division for leave to appeal, SR. at p. 735, which the Appellate Division denied, SR. at p. 746. Petitioner sought reargument, SR. at p. 747, which was also denied, SR. at p. 792. Petitioner later submitted a Pro se coram nobis motion, SR. at p. 793, as well as a second CPL § 440.10 motion to vacate his judgment, SR. at p. 837, both of which were denied by the Appellate Division, SR. at p. 833, 1008-11. The Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals also denied Petitioner's leave to appeal both motions. SR. at p. 836, 1213, 1216. Petitioner now seeks a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See generally, Pet. and Trav.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Jones v. Vacco, 126 F.3d 408, 415 (2d Cir. 1997); Rivera v. New York, 2003 WL 22234697, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2003). A federal court may not grant habeas relief to a state prisoner on a claim unless the state court adjudicated the merits of the claim and such adjudication either:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Hawkins v. Costello, 460 F.3d 238, 242 (2d Cir. 2006).
The Second Circuit has summarized the application of the standard of review under AEDPA as follows:
[u]nder AEDPA, we ask three questions to determine whether a federal court may grant habeas relief: 1) Was the principle of Supreme Court case law relied upon in the habeas petition “clearly established” when the state court ruled? 2) If so, was the state court's decision “contrary to” that established Supreme Court precedent? 3) If not, did the state court's decision constitute an “unreasonable application” of that principle?
Williams v. Artuz, 237 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) and Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2000)). The standard of review under § 2254(d) is “highly deferential” and “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010). “[A] state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).
The phrase “clearly established Federal law” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of th[e] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). A state court decision is “contrary to” established Supreme Court precedent “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by th[e] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than th[e] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 413. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application” of established Supreme Court precedent “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from th[e] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id. AEDPA also requires that “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct [and t]he applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also DeBerry v. Portuondo, 403 F.3d 57, 66 (2d Cir. 2005); Boyette v. LeFevre, 246 F.3d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 2001).
Petitioner raises several arguments alleging that trial counsel was confronted with a conflict of interest that interfered with his representation of Petitioner and that the lower court failed to properly make Petitioner aware of this conflict and act accordingly. First, Petitioner argues that counsel had “an actual conflict of interest that was not sufficiently explained to the defendant” because “counsel's law firm . . . represented the key witness against the defendant at some point during the . . . the legal proceedings.” Pet. at p. 19. Second, Petitioner asserts that the “suppression court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into the actual conflict of interest” because the “court failed to fully explain[] and make sure that . . . [Petitioner] understood the actual conflict of interest that [he] face[d] by keeping trial counsel as his attorney.” Id. Third, Petitioner argues that his “plea was rendered involuntary because he was denied the opportunity to retain ‘conflict free' counsel by the court.” Pet. at p. 20. In support of this proposition, Petitioner asserts that “[t]he trial court fail[ed] to provide [him] with a sufficient amount of time to obtain new counsel once trial counsel's conflict was known.” Id.
Counsel has “a duty to avoid conflicts of interest.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (citations omitted). “Where a constitutional right to counsel exists,” the Sixth Amendment holds that this right includes the “right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest.” Wood v Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981). “The right to conflict-free counsel applies equally to appointed, and, as here,...
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