Simpson v. Salsbery

Decision Date30 September 2021
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. H-20-2770
Parties Alfonzo SIMPSON, TDCJ #1427415, Plaintiff, v. Ian SALSBERY and Richard Pittman, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

Alfonzo Simpson, Huntsville, TX, Pro Se.

Jonathan M. Pena, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SIM LAKE, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

State inmate Alfonzo Simpson has filed a Prisoner's Civil Rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Complaint") (Docket Entry No. 1) alleging that he was injured when his prison transport bus struck a brick wall. At the court's request, Simpson has also filed Plaintiff's More Definite Statement ("Plaintiff's MDS") (Docket Entry No. 11), which provides additional information about his claims. Now pending before the court is Defendants [Ian] Salsbery and [Richard] Pittman's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendants’ MSJ") (Docket Entry No. 24). In response, Simpson has submitted an Objection to DefendantsMotion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Response") (Docket Entry No. 29). After considering all of the pleadings, the exhibits, and the applicable law, the Defendants’ MSJ will be granted and this case will be dismissed for the reasons explained below.

I. Background

Simpson is presently incarcerated by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Correctional Institutions Division ("TDCJ") at the Estelle Unit in Huntsville.2 Simpson's Complaint stems from an incident that occurred on September 26, 2018, at the Walls Unit, which is also located in Huntsville.3 The defendants are Ian Salsbery and Richard Pittman, who are employed by TDCJ as transportation officers.4

Simpson explains that he was on a prison transport bus with 17 other inmates when Salsbery, who was driving the bus, "crashed into a brick wall" while attempting to leave through the back gate of the Walls Unit facility.5 Simpson estimates that the bus was going "10 mph" when it struck the wall.6 At the time the crash occurred, Officer Pittman was outside the bus acting as a "guide man."7 Simpson alleges that Salsbery and Pittman failed to report the crash or contact the medical department to check whether any of the inmate passengers were injured.8 Instead, the officers made two more attempts to exit the back gate, crashing into the brick wall a second and third time.9 Simpson contends that he felt sharp pains in his neck, lower back, and right hip after the first crash occurred and that his discomfort worsened after each ensuing crash.10

Simpson alleges that he advised Salsbery and Pittman that he needed to go to the medical department because he felt "stiffness, soreness and pain" in his neck, lower back, and right hip.11 Simpson states that the officers pulled the bus into the back gate of the Walls Unit and contacted the medical department sometime after the third crash occurred.12 Although Simpson reported his injuries to an unidentified " ‘white male’ nurse" from the medical department, the nurse did not check his blood pressure or his pulse and did not perform a physical examination to "stabilize" Simpson's condition before the bus continued on its way to the Polunsky Unit,13 which is located in Livingston.14

Simpson reports that he did not receive medical treatment for his injuries until after he arrived at the Polunsky Unit.15 Upon arrival Simpson was escorted to the infirmary where an unidentified "intake nurse" told him that they were aware of the bus accident, but that he would need to submit a "sick call request" to receive treatment.16 Simpson received medical care at the Polunsky Unit on October 24, 2018, and he was examined by a specialist who took x-rays at the University of Texas Medical Branch ("UTMB") Hospital in Galveston on November 2, 2018.17 Simpson complains that he waited until December 16, 2019, to receive an "MRI" at the UTMB Hospital, where a doctor determined that he had a "spinal infection, massive swelling around [a] nerve, [a] lower back issue, and a need for hip replacement."18

Simpson appears to allege that Salsbery and Pittman failed to follow the "TDCJ Accident Policy" by not contacting the medical department immediately after the first crash that occurred at the Walls Unit on September 26, 2018.19 Simpson contends that Salsbery and Pittman acted with "reckless disregard" to his rights by denying him access to prompt medical attention or postponing treatment for the injuries he sustained during the bus accident.20 Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he seeks compensatory damages for his pain and suffering.21

Salsbery and Pittman move for summary judgment, arguing that Simpson failed to exhaust available administrative remedies regarding his claims against them before filing his Complaint.22 The defendants argue further that Simpson fails to establish a constitutional violation or to overcome their entitlement to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and qualified immunity from the claims against them.23 These arguments are examined below under the applicable standard of review.

II. Standard of Review

Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under this rule a reviewing court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (2021); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 , 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A fact is "material" if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

In deciding a summary judgment motion, the reviewing court must view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and resolve all factual disputes in his favor. See Shah v. VHS San Antonio Partners, L.L.C., 985 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 2021). If the movant demonstrates an "absence of evidentiary support in the record for the nonmovant's case," the burden shifts to the nonmovant to "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Sanchez v. Young County, Texas, 866 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Cuadra v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 812 (5th Cir. 2010) ). The nonmovant cannot avoid summary judgment by resting on his pleadings or presenting "[c]onclusional allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation." Jones v. Lowndes County, Mississippi, 678 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en bane) (a nonmovant cannot demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence).

The plaintiff represents himself in this case. Courts are required to give a pro se litigant's contentions a liberal construction. See Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, a pro se litigant is not excused from meeting his burden of proof of specifically referring to evidence in the summary judgment record and setting forth facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact remaining for trial. See Outley v. Luke & Associates, Inc., 840 F.3d 212, 217 (5th Cir. 2016) ; see also Bookman v. Shubzda, 945 F. Supp. 999, 1004 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (citing Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted)). The court has no obligation under Rule 56 "to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment." Adams v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of Connecticut, 465 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted).

III. Discussion
A. Lack of Exhaustion

The defendants have raised lack of exhaustion as an affirmative defense to liability.24 See Herschberger v. Lumpkin, 843 F. App'x 587, 590 (5th Cir. 2021) (emphasizing that "the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense and must generally be pled by defendants in order to serve as the basis for dismissal") (citations omitted). Because this case is governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 u.s.c. § 1997e(a), Simpson was required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a suit challenging prison conditions.25 See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2382-83, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (citing Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 122 S. Ct. 983, 988, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) ; Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 121 S. Ct. 1819, 1825, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) ); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 127 S. Ct. 910, 918-19, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007) (confirming that "[t]here is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court").

TDCJ has a formal two-step administrative grievance process. See Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 515 (5th Cir. 2004) ; see also Wendell v. Asher, 162 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 1998) (outlining the two-step procedure, which at Step 1 entails submitting an administrative grievance at the institutional level followed by a Step 2 appeal if the result is unfavorable). A Step 1 grievance, which is reviewed by officials at the inmate's assigned facility, must be filed within fifteen days of the alleged incident or challenged event. See Johnson, 385 F.3d at 515. Once an inmate receives a response to his Step 1 grievance, he then has ten days to file a Step 2 grievance to appeal an unfavorable result at the state level. See id.

The two step grievance process, which is outlined in the TDCJ Offender Orientation Handbook, takes approximately 90 days to complete -- depending on the type of...

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