Simpson v. Simpson

• Decision Date: 09 March 1920
• Parties: SIMPSON v. SIMPSON.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

109 A. 254

SIMPSON

v. SIMPSON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 9, 1920.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Kennebec County, at Law.

Libel for divorce by Harry D. Simpson against Mae C. Simpson. There was a decree for libelant, and libelee filed a general motion for new trial. Motion dismissed.

Argued before CORNISH, C. J., and HANSON, PHILBROOK, DUNN, MORRILL, and DEASY, JJ.

Carl C. Jones, of Waterville, for libelant.

Harry Manser, of Auburn, for libelee.

CORNISH, C. J. This is a libel for divorce. The sole cause alleged is desertion. A jury trial was had under R. S. c. 65, § 8, and in answer to submitted questions the jury found the allegation of desertion to be true and that a divorce should be granted. The presiding justice thereupon signed the decree, and the libelee then filed a general motion praying that the verdict be set aside and a new trial granted, on which motion the cause is now before the law court.

Counsel for libelant contends at the outset that the law court has no authority to entertain this motion, and that the only remedy is by bill of exceptions. This contention is sound. Such power does not subsist in the law court, either at common law or under the statute.

The common law knows no right of appeal. A single justice in a court of common-law jurisdiction had and has the inherent right to set aside a verdict in an action tried before him. That was the only method by which a new trial could be granted at common law, and it so remained until statutory provisions extended the right of appeal and changed the practice. State v. Hill, 48 Me. 241; Brown v. Moore, 79 Me. 216, 9 Atl. 355. But our law court is not a court Of common-law jurisdiction, and therefore has no inherent power to grant new trials. It is purely a creature of statute, and as such can hear and determine only those matters authorized by statute and brought to it through the statutory course of procedure. It follows that the law court has no common-law jurisdiction over this motion from the court at nisi prius.

Nor do we find any statute authorizing the procedure taken here. The cases, and, as the statute itself states, the "only" cases, that can come before the law court, are specified in R. S. c. 82, § 46, and these are:

"Cases in which there are motions for new trials upon evidence reported by the justice; questions of law arising on reports of cases; bills of exceptions; agreed statements of facts; cases, civil or criminal, presenting a question of law; all questions arising in equity cases; motions to dissolve injunctions issued after notice and hearing or continued after a hearing; questions arising on writs of habeas corpus, mandamus and certiorari, when the facts are agreed on, or are ascertained and reported by a justice."

The pending cause falls within none of these provisions, unless it be the first:

"Cases in which there are motions for new trials upon evidence reported by the justice."

The procedure is regulated by R. S. c. 87, § 57. viz.:

"When a motion is made in the Supreme Judicial Court to have a verdict set aside as against law or evidence, a report of the whole evidence shall be signed by the presiding justice or authenticated by the certificate of the official court stenographer."

These provisions evidently refer to actions at law in which a verdict has been rendered in the ordinary form, and not to libels for divorce. While proceedings in divorce are civil in their nature, as distingushed from criminal, yet they are ecclesiastical in their origin, are regulated entirely by statute, and cannot be classed as civil actions or cases. This point is fully discussed by Chief Justice Shaw in Lucas v. Lucas, 3 Gray (Mass.) 136, where it was held that a writ of review, grantable under the Massachusetts statute in all civil actions, would not lie to revise a decree dismissing a libel for divorce.

Another and conclusive reason why this motion cannot lie in the proceedings under consideration is this: A general motion for a new trial in civil actions is made and entered after the verdict of the jury and before the judgment of the court is rendered. Judgment is deferred until a verdict is found and stands unreversed. If the motion is granted in a given case, a new trial is had. If the motion is denied, the verdict stands, and judgment follows automatically. The motion filed in this case follows the ordinary form and reads:

"And now said Mae C. Simpson, after verdict against her and before judgment, moves that said verdict be set aside and a new trial granted," etc.

This is not true. Here the motion was filed after both the findings of the jury and the judgment by the court, because the decree signed by the court was in the nature of a judgment. It was therefore filed, not before judgment, but after judgment, and the only remedy was by exceptions, to test the correctness of the ruling of the court. The situation is similar to that when a presiding justice in an ordinary civil action at law submits certain findings to the jury, and on the strength of those findings orders judgment for plaintif...