Simpson v. Sperry Rand Corporation
Citation | 350 F. Supp. 1057 |
Decision Date | 20 November 1972 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 16888. |
Parties | Nelson SIMPSON, Jr. v. SPERRY RAND CORPORATION. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
Irving M. Greenberg, Gamm, Greenberg & Kaplan, Shreveport, La., for plaintiff.
John T. Cox, Jr., Blanchard, Walker, O'Quin & Roberts, Shreveport, La., for defendant.
Harold C. Nystrom, Associate Solicitor and Bobbye D. Spears, Atty., United States Dept. of Labor, Washington, D. C., for amicus curiae.
This controversy arises from the dismissal of plaintiff by defendant from its employ. Plaintiff is seeking reinstatement to his former position of employment and reimbursement of wages lost as a result of his wrongful discharge.
Simpson had been working for Sperry Rand Corporation at the Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant located in Webster Parish, Louisiana. October 9, 1970, the United States Government placed a levy on complainant's wages for income taxes accrued. Plaintiff's wages had been garnished previously September 4, 1970; however, both levies were for the same indebtedness. The discharge was based on company policy concerning financial responsibility and multiple seizures of his wages.
The jurisdictional basis for this action is alleged to be the Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub.L. 90-321, Title III, § 304, 82 Stat. 163—Restrictions on Garnishments, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1674. Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for summary judgment, were filed by defendant. The Department of Labor filed a brief as amicus curiae in this cause, but did not seek to intervene.
Plaintiff was a member of Local No. 228, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, which represented the workers at Sperry Rand's ammunition plant. The Union and the company had entered into a collective bargaining agreement prior to and in effect at the time of the discharge.
The motions of the defendant have been combined for decision. Since the only dispute involved concerns a legal issue, and not any material facts, we will consider the merits of the motion for summary judgment under Rule 56.
The single question presented is whether the legislation under which Simpson is attempting to proceed permits a civil action by an individual acting alone. The pertinent provisions read:
It is axiomatic that in the absence of clear Congressional intent to the contrary, "a federal statute passed to protect a class of citizens, although not specifically authorizing members of the protected class to institute suit, nevertheless implies a private right of action." Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557, 89 S.Ct. 817, 827, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969). Without doubt, the plaintiff falls within the specified class which the statute protects.
We find only one previous judicial decision upon the question presented. There the Court, in deciding whether or not to grant a declaratory judgment in a private civil action, concluded:
Higgins v. Wilkerson, 63 Labor Cases ¶ 32,379 (U.S.D. C.Kan.1970).
Subsequently, Judge Brown, in Higgins, supra, granted to the Secretary of Labor an injunction against the defendant and also amended his order previously issued, stating:
"In consequence of the relief today being granted to the Secretary, it becomes unnecessary for the Court to consider further the claim of the plaintiff Higgins." Higgins v. Wilkerson, 65 Labor Cases ¶ 52,523.
We conclude that a fair interpretation of the Kansas District Court's action in this situation is that the Court was doing no more than granting the proper person, the Secretary, who intervened after the first opinion, what it had already stated to be appropriate relief under the Act (injunctive). Therefore, we must reject plaintiff's and amicus curiae's contention that this decision no longer can be considered authority for the proposition that the Secretary is the...
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...See Smith, 609 F.2d at 110; McCabe v. City of Eureka, 500 F.Supp. 59, 61 (E.D.Mo.1980), aff'd, 664 F.2d at 682; Simpson v. Sperry Rand Corp., 350 F.Supp. at 1059. Clearly, the plaintiff in this case, an employee subjected to garnishment on a single indebtedness, is within the class for whos......
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...the provisions of Subchapter II can be implied. See Oldham v. Oldham, 337 F.Supp. 1039 (N.D. Iowa, 1972); Simpson v. Sperry Rand Corporation, 350 F.Supp. 1057 (W.D.La., 1972); Higgins v. Wilkerson, 63 Labor Cases, Paragraph 32,379, 65 Labor Cases, Paragraph 52,523 (D.C.Kan., 1970). Accordin......
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