Simpson v. Story

• Decision Date: 05 January 1888
• Parties: SIMPSON v. STORY et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

145 Mass. 497

14 N.E. 641

SIMPSON v. STORY et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

January 5, 1888

COUNSEL

Wm. A. Pew, Jr., for plaintiff.

OPINION

The eighteenth section of St.U.S.1884, c. 121, applies to vessels engaged in commerce, and does not, either in terms or by implication, and taken in connection with the rest of the chapter, apply to fishing vessels. The bill of exceptions shows that the liability sought to be enforced against the defendant Story was not one arising out of the fact of his being a ship or vessel owner. The defendant Story's liability was placed solely upon the ground of his own contract. The jury must have found that the defendant Story became a party to the contract by having authorized Wilson to make it, or by his subsequent ratification of it.

Charles A. Russell, for defendant Arthur D. Story.

The only question raised in this case is, what construction is to be given section 18 of the act of congress commonly known as the "Dingley Bill?" Up to the time of the passage of the act, under the established principles of the common and maritime law, which had theretofore prevailed in the United States, every vessel-owner, however small his interest therein, in the absence of special circumstances, was liable individually, on the general ground of agency, for all bills for repairs done and supplies furnished to the master for the vessel, to an indefinite amount, even though it should infinitely exceed the value of the vessel. In view of the extreme hazards of such an indefinite extent of liability to which vessel-owners, under the existing system of law, were thus exposed, this statute was enacted for the purpose of removing this burden from American shipping by limiting the responsibility of owners of vessels. There is nothing in the language or expressions of the statute indicating an intention to exclude from its wise and salutary provisions any class of vessels, or any kind of debts or liabilities contracted on such account. The contrary intention is clearly manifest. The word "ship-owner" is not restricted in meaning to vessels of that peculiar class. Such an interpretation would exclude from the operation of the statute barks, brigs, steam-boats; and other large vessels. The second sentence explains and qualifies the first in the statute, and clearly indicates and determines that the word "ship-owner" is used in the enlarged sense of "vessel-owner." In a nautical sense, the word "vessel" is a general name given to the different sorts of crafts which are navigated. Briggs v. A Light-Boat, 7 Allen, 298. See Rev.St. U.S. tit. 1 c. 1, § 3, and Rev.St. U.S. § 4612. The words "any or all debts and liabilities," in the statute, are also clear, precise, and comprehensive. The statute could not, and was not intended to, limit and apply only to the liability of a vessel-owner for debts incurred for such purposes in foreign ports. The effect of the statute is that the power and authority which one part owner or the master of a vessel formerly had, under our law, to pledge the personal credit of and bind his other part owner for debts arising out of contracts made on account of the vessel, is now restrained and limited to such proportional part thereof as his interest is in the vessel itself.

C ALLEN, J.

In construing an act of congress, the title of the act, the objects to be accomplished, the other provisions found in connection with those under especial consideration, the provisions and arrangement of the statutes which were amended, the mode in which the embarrassing words were introduced, as shown by the journals and records, the history of the times, and especially of prior legislation upon the same general subject, may all be considered. Myer v. Car Co., 102 U.S. 11, 12; U.S. v. Railroad Co., 91 U.S. 72, 79, 82; Hadden v. Collector, 5 Wall. 110 111; Blake v. Banks, 23 Wall. 307, 319. See, also Field v. Gooding, 106 Mass. 310, 313; Com. v. Bank, 4 Allen, 13; Holbrook v. Holbrook, 1 Pick. 250. Looking at the statute now under consideration (St.U.S.1884, c. 121, § 18) in this manner, it appears that it was not the design of congress to include fishing vessels within its provisions. Its title is "An act to remove certain burdens on the American merchant marine, and encourage the American foreign trade, and for other purposes." The object of the prior legislation, which was amended, as well as of the act in question, was to promote the building of ships, and to encourage persons engaged in the business of navigation, with special reference to the foreign carrying trade; so that American vessels might enter into this trade in competition with foreign vessels, and on more nearly the same ...