Sims v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 02 March 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-39,87-39
• Parties: , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 11,700 Marjorie SIMS, personally, and Marjorie Sims, as the next friend and guardian of Lara Sims, and Marjorie Sims, as the next friend and guardian of Margo Sims, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Appellee (Defendant).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 357

751 P.2d 357

56 USLW 2540, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 11,700

Marjorie SIMS, personally, and Marjorie Sims, as the next friend and guardian of Lara Sims, and Marjorie Sims, as the next friend and guardian of Margo Sims, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Appellee (Defendant).

No. 87-39.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

March 2, 1988.

Rehearing Denied March 23, 1988.

P. Richard Meyer of Spence, Moriarity & Schuster, Jackson, and Willis Geer of Willis Geer & Associates, Gillette, for appellants.

Robert W. Connor, Jr., Sheridan, and R.H. Bellingham and Tamara Annalora Scully of Moulton, Bellingham, Longo & Mather, P.C., Billings, Mont., for appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ.

MACY, Justice.

Plaintiffs/appellants Marjorie Sims, Margo Sims, and Lara Sims brought an action against defendant/appellee General Motors Corporation for injuries suffered by them when a seat belt buckle in an automobile manufactured by General Motors allegedly failed to release after the vehicle caught on fire. The trial court granted General Motors directed verdicts on part of Marjorie's and Lara's claims and on both claims asserted by Margo. The jury found in favor of General Motors on all remaining issues of liability. Plaintiffs moved for a new trial, but that motion was denied by the trial court.

We affirm.

Plaintiffs present the following issues on appeal:

"ISSUE I

"WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT ON THE ISSUE OF MANUFACTURING DEFECT.

"ISSUE Ia

"WHETHER THE INFERENCE OF DEFECT RULE APPLIES WHEN A JURY QUESTION EXISTS AS TO CAUSES NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE DEFENDANT.

"ISSUE II

"WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF PRIOR INCIDENTS OF SEAT BELT BUCKLES FAILING TO RELEASE, WHERE THE EVIDENCE WAS OFFERED TO PROVE DEFENDANT'S KNOWLEDGE OF AN INHERENT RISK ON THE ISSUES OF, 1)

FAILURE TO WARN, AND 2) NEGLIGENCE.

"ISSUE III

"WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING DEFENDANT'S RELIABILITY PERFORMANCE DATA, ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT COULD NOT BE USED TO PROVE DEFECT.

"ISSUE IV

"WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING LETTERS, CONSTITUTING ADMISSIONS, WRITTEN BY DEFENDANT IN RESPONSE TO COMPLAINTS FROM PEOPLE WHO COULDN'T GET THEIR SEAT BELT BUCKLES UNFASTENED.

"ISSUE V

"WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES CONCERNING SIMILAR ACCIDENTS.

"ISSUE VI

"WHETHER IN A STRICT LIABILITY ACTION, AN ALLEGATION OF A SPECIFIC DESIGN DEFECT PRECLUDES INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE MERELY BECAUSE IT DOES NOT TEND TO PROVE THE DESIGN DEFECT ALLEGED, WHEN THE EVIDENCE, 1) IS PROBATIVE ON NOTICE, OR 2) SUPPORTS AN INFERENCE OF DEFECT.

"ISSUE VII

"WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO LIMIT THE DEFINITION OF 'UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS' WHICH WAS GIVEN AS A JURY INSTRUCTION.

"ISSUE VIII

"WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT A DIRECTED VERDICT ON THE CLAIMS BROUGHT BY MARGO SIMS."

On July 28, 1978, Marjorie was driving on U.S. Highway 14 west of Sheridan, Wyoming, in a 1974 two-door Chevrolet Chevelle Malibu accompanied by her daughters, Margo and Lara, when she noticed flames coming from the left rear of the vehicle. Marjorie immediately told her daughters that the automobile was on fire and instructed them to exit the vehicle as soon as it stopped.

When the automobile was stopped, Lara, who was seated in the front passenger seat, unlatched the passenger door. Margo, who was seated in the back of the vehicle, pushed her way out between the front passenger seat and the door frame. Marjorie attempted to open the door on the driver's side but was unable to do so because of the intensity of the fire. Lara could not exit the automobile because she could not get her seat belt buckle apart. Marjorie, realizing that Lara was having trouble, tried to open Lara's seat belt buckle. After having no success in getting the seat belt buckle open, Marjorie grasped Lara under her arm and groin and jerked upward and outward, freeing Lara. Lara and Marjorie then escaped from the car on the passenger's side. However, upon noticing that the vehicle was rolling backwards out of control, Marjorie returned to the driver's seat to put the car in park and again exited the car on the passenger's side.

Tragically, as a result of being in the flaming automobile, Marjorie and Lara received serious burns. Margo received minor burns while she was helping move Lara further away from the vehicle.

On July 26, 1983, plaintiffs brought an action against General Motors for injuries resulting from the failure of the seat belt buckle to open. Marjorie and Lara grounded their claims upon strict liability on the bases of manufacturing defect, design defect, failure to warn, and negligence as a result of negligent design, failure to test, failure to recall, and failure to warn. Margo founded her claims upon the same negligence theories as Marjorie and Lara and added negligent infliction of emotional distress.

During discovery, plaintiffs obtained evidence of other incidents in which similar seat belt buckles in General Motors' automobiles had failed to open, data on product reliability monitoring tests performed by General Motors, and information about two other cases in which the occupants were trapped by their seat belts while they were in burning automobiles. However, the trial court excluded the introduction of all this evidence through a pretrial order in limine and at trial.

Prior to closing arguments, the trial court granted General Motors directed verdicts on the issue of strict liability on the basis of manufacturing defect and on both claims asserted by Margo. Also, the trial court gave its own jury instruction defining "unreasonably dangerous," even though plaintiffs had offered their own instruction for that term. Thereafter, the jury returned a verdict in favor of General Motors on all remaining issues of liability. Plaintiffs moved for a new trial, and that motion was denied by the trial court. This appeal followed.

I

Plaintiffs claim the court erred in directing a verdict for General Motors because that improperly placed the burden on plaintiffs to eliminate all other possible causes for the seat belt failure. According to plaintiffs, an inference that there was a defect existed by virtue of the failure itself, and it was for the jury to decide whether or not there were other causes not attributable to General Motors which kept the seat belt buckle from opening.

In Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Wyo., 716 P.2d 334 (1986), we held that the doctrine of strict liability in tort was a valid cause of action in Wyoming independent from those actions against a manufacturer or seller for negligence or breach of warranty. In that case, we adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), with regard to the doctrine of strict liability in tort. That section provides:

"402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer

"(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if

"(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and

"(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.

"(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although

"(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and

"(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller."

As stated in comment g of section 402A, supra:

"The seller is not liable when he delivers the product in a safe condition, and subsequent mishandling or other causes make it harmful by the time it is consumed. The burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition at the time that it left the hands of the particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff; and unless evidence can be produced which will support the conclusion that it was then defective, the burden is not sustained." (Emphasis added).

From the language in comment g, it is clear that section 402A, supra, applies only when the product is shown to have been unreasonably dangerous at the time it left the seller's hands. There is, however, an inference that a product was defective at the time it left the seller's hands if a prima facie case can be presented that there was no abnormal use of the product or that there were no reasonable secondary causes for the defect. In Valentine v. Ormsbee Exploration Corporation, Wyo., 665 P.2d 452, 462 (1983), we quoted with approval the rule set out in Tweedy v. Wright Ford Sales, Inc., 64 Ill.2d 570, 2 Ill.Dec. 282, 285, 357 N.E.2d 449, 452 (1976):

" 'A prima facie case that a product was defective and that the defect existed when it left the manufacturer's control is made by proof that in the absence of abnormal use or reasonable secondary causes the product failed "to perform in the manner reasonably to be expected in light of [its] nature and intended function." ' " (Emphasis added.)

We, therefore, agree with plaintiffs' contention that the "inference of defect rule" is applicable in Wyoming with regard to product liability cases. We fail, however, to see how this rule is of any aid to plaintiffs in supporting their contention.

In this case, mere proof that the seat belt buckle malfunctioned was not sufficient to create an inference of a defect. It was plaintiffs' additional burden to present evidence that there was no abnormal use and no reasonable secondary causes for the malfunction. Plaintiffs not only failed to meet this burden but presented evidence to the jury that the malfunction may have been caused by a foreign particle, such as a piece of wood, a toothpick, a small piece of metal, a coin, a grain of sand, an...