Sims v. Hastings
Decision Date | 27 June 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 05 C 1447.,05 C 1447. |
Citation | 375 F.Supp.2d 715 |
Parties | Daniel B. SIMS, Petitioner, v. Suzanne HASTINGS, and U.S. Parole Commission, Respondents. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Daniel B. Sims, Chicago, IL, pro se.
This case involves the petition of Daniel B. Sims ("Sims" or "Petitioner"), a current parolee from a 1982 federal sentence of 25 years' imprisonment. Sims demands termination of his federal parole supervision. See D.E. 12 ( ). For the reasons stated herein, the Court denies the petition.
On July 8th, 1982, Daniel B. Sims was sentenced in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan to twenty-five years' imprisonment. That sentence was imposed as a result of Sims's convictions on thirteen counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. See United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239, 1239-40 (6th Cir.1985). In the underlying federal prosecution, Sims was proved to have engaged in an extensive fraud scheme, which included the submission of fraudulent insurance claims "for deliberately set fires that damaged ... [Sims's] home and place of business, for staged burglaries, for staged automobile accidents, and for non-existent personal injuries." Id. at 1240. The district court's sentence represented a sentence of "five years on each of the first five counts, to run consecutively, and five years on each of the remaining eight counts, to run concurrently with each other and the sentences on the first five counts, or twenty-five years total." United States v. Sims, 791 F.2d 935, 1986 WL 16865, *1 (6th Cir.1986) (unpub); see also id. ( ).1 In connection with his sentence, Sims was entitled to 146 days credit for time spent in jail and the Bureau of Prisons computed the expiration of his maximum term of imprisonment, or full term date, as February 11, 2007 — or 25 years after Petitioner's sentencing date, less 146 days of good time credit. (D.E. 17, App. at 3, 7.)
On September 20, 2002, Sims was mandatorily released. (Id., App. at 7.) He signed a certificate acknowledging his obligation to remain under supervision until August 15, 2006. (Id., App. at 8-9.) Sims subsequently violated the terms of his parole by falsifying his supervision reports, and by failing to report to his U.S. Probation Officer as directed. (Id., App. at 10.) The Parole Commission revoked Sims's mandatory release for these violations, and Sims was returned to custody of the Bureau of Prisons via an order of August 12, 2003. (Id., App. at 10-12.)
On February 13, 2004, Sims was again released on parole from the FCI at Pekin, Illinois, with a total of 1,092 days remaining to be served. (Id., App. at 3, 13.) He is currently residing near Chicago, Illinois, and his parole certificate requires him to remain under supervision until February 9, 2007, in the Northern District of Illinois. (D.E. 16, D.E. 17, App. at 3, 13-14.)
On February 23, 2004, Sims filed his "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by a Person in Federal Custody." (D.E.12.) Sims argued that the date of his mandatory release on September 20, 2002 was the maximum sentence that he could serve, and that the Parole Commission lost jurisdiction over him on that date. (Id. at 2, 4.)
This petition was originally filed in February 2004 in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. (D.E. 12.) In February 2005, the case was transferred to this court because this is the district in which Sims is now on supervision as a parolee. (D.E.19.)
To raise a claim under 28 USC § 2241, the petitioner must be in custody. See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)) (per curiam). This court may hear this petition because Sims, as a parolee, fulfills the custody requirement, notwithstanding that he is not in prison. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242-43, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963).
Pro se pleadings, such as Sims's "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by a Person in Federal Custody" (D.E.12), are to be construed generously. See Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir.2001) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)). Precedent also teaches, however, that a court, of course, should not abandon its neutral role and begin creating arguments for a party, even an unrepresented one. See, e.g., Anderson, 241 F.3d at 545 (collecting cases).
Sims's argument in his petition is presented in quite a barebones fashion. He states that "Petitioner Maximum [sic] term of sentence imposed as provided by law end [sic] September 20, 2002 or there about." (D.E. 12 at 4.) In summarizing the grounds for relief, Petitioner further states that he was "arbitrarily and capriciously placed on parole under Pub.L. 98-473 sections 4163, 4164," and he adds that "[b]oth sections 4163, and 4164 were repealed by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. Law 98-473(act) effective November 1, 1992." (Id. at 5.) As best the Court can tell, Sims appears in his petition to allege that the United States Parole Commission lost jurisdiction over him on September 20, 2002, his original mandatory release date, because 18 U.S.C. § 4163 and § 4164, governing release of federal prisoners as parolees, were repealed in part by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.
Under the system of parole established in 18 U.S.C. §§ 4163-4164, Sims is properly subject to jurisdiction after being paroled. Once Sims was mandatorily released on parole pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4163 on September 20, 2002, he became subject to parole under § 4164 until the expiration of his maximum term, less 180 days. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4163-64; accord Martin v. Luther, 689 F.2d 109, 113 (7th Cir.1982) () (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4164). Furthermore, Sims remains under federal authority during that entire period of time, and if Sims violates the terms of his parole at any time during that period, he is subject to revocation and appropriate sanction, including his return to prison. See Martin, 689 F.2d at 113; accord, e.g., id. at 115 n. 5 () (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, Sims's main argument in his petition, which he repeatedly asserts, that "The Petitioner Maximum [sic] term of sentence imposed as provided by law end [sic] September 20, 2002," is without foundation. (D.E. 12 at 2; see also, e.g., id. at 4 ()).2
Although the parole provisions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 4163-64 have been partly repealed (in that there is no parole commission authority or parole provisions for people convicted in the post-Guidelines world), those provisions nonetheless apply to Sims because he was convicted of a crime committed prior to the enactment of legislation that first introduced the federal Sentencing Guidelines regime. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 only withdrew the authority of the parole commission and the related parole provisions, at least as relevant here, for offenses committed after November 1, 1987. See Norwood v. Brennan, 891 F.2d 179, 181 (7th Cir.1989); accord, e.g., United States ex rel. D'Agostino v. Keohane, 877 F.2d 1167, 1171 (3d Cir.1989) () . In addition, the Sentencing Reform Act specifically provided for the continuation of the Parole Commission to oversee the parole process for offenses committed prior to 1987. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3551 ( ). The continuation of the Parole Commission to oversee parole provisions for old offenses has been repeatedly extended, and such continuation currently has been extended until November 1, 2005. See Page v. Pearson, 261 F.Supp.2d. 528, 531 n. 3 (E.D.Va.2003) (Ellis, J.) ( ). Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit has squarely held that these extensions to the authority of the Parole Commission have addressed and eliminated any ex post facto concerns regarding the Parole Commission and its prospective elimination for offenses prosecuted after the enactment of the sentencing reform statutes. See, e.g., Norwood, 891 F.2d at 182 (collecting cases); see also H.R.Rep. No. 101-734, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, at *6866 ( ). Thus, Sims does not have any valid ex post facto claim.
As indicated, Sims's petition offers virtually no cited authority or argument in support of his demand. A review of the transferred record from the Central District of Illinois, however, reflects that at some point Sims filed a "memorandum of law" there. (See D.E. 4.) Nothing in Sims's three-page memorandum...
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