Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Stevens

• Decision Date: 18 April 1944
• Docket Number: Case Number: 31365
• Parties: SINCLAIR PRAIRIE OIL CO. v. STEVENS et al.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

1944 OK 186

148 P.2d 176

194 Okla. 109

SINCLAIR PRAIRIE OIL CO. v. STEVENS et al.

Case Number: 31365

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Decided: April 18, 1944

Syllabus

¶0 1. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION--Right to compensation where accidental injury aggravates pre-existing disease or condition.

When an accidental injury received in an occupation within the Workmen's Compensation Act aggravates a pre-existing physical condition or disorder into a state of disability the injured workman may be awarded workmen's compensation for such disability.

2. SAME--Findings on jurisdictional questions of fact not conclusive on review by court.

On review of an order of the State Industrial Commission this court does not accept as conclusive the findings of the commission on jurisdictional questions of fact. On such questions this court weighs the evidence and makes its own independent findings with relation thereto.

3. SAME--Conclusiveness of findings on nonjurisdictional questions of fact.

On review of an order of the State Industrial Commission this court accepts the findings of the commission on nonjurisdictional questions of fact when there is any evidence reasonably tending to support the same.

4. SAME--Conclusiveness of finding on question of whether accidental injury occurred.

The question of whether a workman engaged in a hazardous employment actually sustained an accidental personal injury, when one of fact upon which conflicting evidence is presented, is nonjurisdictional and the finding of the commission thereon is accepted. by this court if there is any evidence, reasonably tending to support the same

5. SAME--Considerations determining whether payments by employer to employee constitute "compensation or remuneration in lieu of compensation."

In determining whether payments made by an employer to an employee constitute compensation (a money allowance payable to an employee for disability resulting from accidental personal injury sustained by the employee arising out of and in the course of the employment, 85 O. S. 1941 § 3, subs. 6, and. section 11) or remuneration in lieu of such compensation, the knowledge of the employer actual or imputed as of the time of payment with respect to the accidental personal injury and his intent as established or reasonably inferrable in making such payments must be taken into consideration.

6. SAME--Payments by employer to employee which do not excuse delay in filing claim for compensation.

Payments made by an employer to an employee, do not excuse delay in filing a claim for compensation before the State Industrial Commission unless such payments were compensation for disability due to accidental personal injury or remuneration in lieu of such compensation.

Original proceeding in the Supreme Court by the Sinclair Prairie Oil Company to review an award of the State Industrial Commission in favor of Sidney A. Stevens. Award vacated.

Pierce & Rucker, of Oklahoma City and Edward H. Chandler, of Tulsa, for petitioner.

Andrew Fraley, of Oklahoma City, O.B. Martin, of Blackwell, and Randell S. Cobb, Atty. Gen., for respondents.

DAVISON, J.

¶1 This is an original proceeding instituted in this court to obtain a review of an order of the State Industrial Commission entered on March 13, 1943, awarding to Sidney A. Stevens, as claimant, compensation for temporary total and permanent partial disability, found by the commission to have resulted from an accidental personal injury sustained by the claimant on February 20, 1940.

¶2 On and prior to February 20, 1940, the claimant was employed as a pumper for the Sinclair Prairie, Oil Company, hereinafter referred to as the company, at Shidler in Osage county, Okla. He had been an employee of the company for about 18 years.

¶3 The claimant was on the date mentioned suffering from Buerger's disease (a disorder of the circulatory system sometimes. resulting in a gangrenous condition and disability of a serious character).

¶4 Since February 20, 1940, the claimant has been disabled and has not worked. In June of 1940, claimant's left foot was amputated as a result of the disorder above mentioned.

¶5 Since 1936 the company has maintained and operated a plan described by it as a "sick and gratuity plan," designed to provide benefits to employees compelled to be absent from work by sickness, or other necessary causes not connected with accidental injuries sustained by the employee arising out of and in the course of employment. In other words, the plan was not designed or described by the company as one to comprehend the payment of compensation for disability resulting from accidental personal injuries compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Of course, the company could use the plan for the latter purpose if it chose to violate its own rules.

¶6 Beginning with the date on which the claimant ceased work, and continuing thereafter until November 30, 1940, he was paid in connection with the above mentioned plan. The payments averaged approximately $70 per month, the equivalent or slightly less than $18 per week, until the three months preceding November 30th , when the payments were reduced to about one-half the amount indicated above.

¶7 The various payments made by the company under its "sick and gratuity plan" were identified as such as each separate payment was made. The claimant upon receipt of each such payment executed a receipt on printed form prepared by the company. These form receipts stated that the money paid "constituted benefits under the company's sick and gratuity plan" and were for absence from duty "not occasioned by any injury received in the course of ... employment." On this point claimant testified in substance that he considered them as compensation for disability attributable to personal injury by reason of statements made to him by representatives of the company.

¶8 On October 11, 1941, within one year after the cessation of payments by the company under its "sick and gratuity plan" but more than one year after the claimant ceased actual work on February 20, 1940, the claimant filed with the State Industrial Commission his claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

¶9 Claimant asserted the occurrence on February 20, 1940, of an accidental personal injury sustained in the course of and arising out of his employment.

¶10 On subsequent hearing of the cause before the Industrial Commission, claimant's sworn testimony was that on the date stated and while on duty as an employee of the company he was starting or attempting to start a stationary gas engine, using his foot on the spoke of the wheel to turn the engine over or, as he said, "roll it." That he released or started to release the engine to get a "new hold" when it fired and hit his left foot behind the little toe causing him to feel as though his leg were paralyzed.

¶11 The claimant testified that late on the day of its occurrence he reported the accident to Mr. John Stoker, who was the company's district superintendent in charge of the Shidler district.

¶12 The testimony of Mr. Stoker on this point was in substance that he was advised by claimant that the claimant was experiencing difficulty with his foot, but that he was never advised of any accident or accidental injury.

¶13 It was claimant's theory in the presentation of this case that the accident of February 20, 1940, aggravated the pre-existing disorder (Buerger's disease), thus creating a condition resulting in the amputation of his foot, and also causing the disability which has prevented him from working since February 20, 1940. There is ample medical testimony in the record to support this view.

¶14 There is also evidence in the record indicating that Buerger's disease is seldom attended by such a disastrous consequence as claimant sustained in the absence of a "blow" of some kind.

¶15 Under our law, when an accidental injury received in an occupation within the Workmen's Compensation Act aggravates a pre-existing physical condition or disorder into a state of disability, the injured workman may be awarded workmen's compensation for such disability. Nease v. Hughes Stone Co. et al., 114 Okla. 170, 244 P., 778; Northwestern Refining Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 145 Okla. 72, 291 P. 533; Employees' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Coffman, 147 Okla. 227, 296 P. 395; Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Moore, 147 Okla. 243, 296 P. 390; Protho v. Nette, 173 Okla. 114, 46 P. 2d 942.

¶16 In presenting this cause to us for review the company first asserts that "no accidental injury was sustained." This is an assertion of fact directly contraryto the sworn testimony of claimant as inferentially corroborated by that portion of the medical testimony indicating that Buerger's disease would be unlikely to result as it did in this case unless claimant received a blow of some character.

¶17 The company points out that the evidence of claimant on this point is contradicted in many particulars and by the inferences to be drawn from many circumstances. It urges that we should weigh the conflicting evidence and formulate our own independent finding and judgment and that we should determine upon consideration of the weight of the evidence that no accidental injury was sustained by the claimant. Petitioner's theory is that the question of whether claimant sustained an accidental injury is a jurisdictional as distinguished from a nonjurisdictional question of fact. Petitioner is correct in pointing out that we review these two types of questions of fact in a different manner.

¶18 Our statute (85 O. S. 1941 § 26) makes the decision of the State Industrial Commission "final as to all questions of fact." Thus, generally speaking, such findings require only the existence of proof reasonably tending to support them in order to meet our approval on review. However, since the State Industrial Commission is an administrative board as distinguished from a court, it was decided by this court in McKeever Drilling Co. v. Egbert, 170 Okla....