Sinclair v. State

• Decision Date: 28 July 1961
• Citation: 15 Cal.Rptr. 493,194 Cal.App.2d 397
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: G. S. SINCLAIR et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. STATE of California et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 6423.

Page 493

15 Cal.Rptr. 493

194 Cal.App.2d 397

G. S. SINCLAIR et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. STATE of California et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 6423.

District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, California.

July 28, 1961.

Hearing Denied Sept. 20, 1961.

Phill Silver, Hollywood, for appellants.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., Walter S. Rountree, Asst. Atty. Gen., N. B. Peek, Deputy Atty. Gen., Robert E. Reed, Chief Atty., Sacramento, Dept. of Public Works, George C. Hadley, Asst. Chief Atty., and Paul E. Overton, San Diego, for respondents.

COUGHLIN, Justice.

The plaintiffs, who are the appellants herein, as taxpayers and property owners along a proposed freeway, filed a complaint against the State of California, the California Highway Commission, the Secretary of State of the State of California and the Department of Public Works of the State of California, as defendants, who are the respondents herein, contending that the resolution of the commission locating the route for a proposed freeway was void; seeking a declaration to this effect; and asking that the defendants be enjoined from proceeding thereunder. The defendants demurred to the complaint; the demurrer was sustained without leave to amend; judgment of dismissal followed; thereafter, the plaintiffs moved for a reconsideration of the ruling on the demurrer, for an order vacating the judgment and for permission to file a proposed amended complaint; the motion was denied; and the plaintiffs appealed from the judgment and the order of denial.

The freeway in question involves a rerouting of State Route No. 2 (Sts. & Hy.Code sec. 302[a]) known also as United States Highway 101; would bisect the towns of Cardiff, Encinitas and Leucadia, which are located in the unincorporated territory of San Diego County; and is referred to by the plaintiffs as the 'Inland Route.'

The complaint, purportedly seeking declaratory relief and injunction, attempts to set forth three causes of action. The first cause of action concerns Section 90 of the Streets and Highways Code which provides that the Department of Public Works 'is authorized and directed to lay out and construct all state highways between the termini designated by law and on the most direct and practicable locations as determined by the commission,' and is based on the contention that this code section is unconstitutional because it 'does not provide an ascertainable standard to guide the Highway Commission in arriving at a determination as to what constitutes a 'most direct and practicable route." and, for this reason, constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the Highway Commission. The allegations of the first cause of action in the proposed amended complaint are similar to those in the original complaint except for the additional allegation that the code section in question violates the due process clause of the United States Constitution. The second cause of action is based on the contention that the language of Section 90 is vague and uncertain in that it cannot be ascertained therefrom whether 'the Highway Commission is required to select the most practicable route, or merely a practicable route,' which uncertainty renders the statute invalid and results in an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The allegations of the second cause of action in the proposed amended complaint elaborate on those contained in the original complaint but relate substantially the same subject matter and add the additional contention that the selection of any highway route under the subject code section would violate the due process clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. The third cause of action is based on the contention that Section 90 requires the Highway Commission to adopt the most practicable route, and in doing so it is required to apply seven criteria, i. e., whether the route should be preferred (1) which will bypass smaller towns, rather than one which will bisect such towns, (2) which will cause the displacement of the least number of homes, or (3) the least amount of disruption of existing public services, or (4) the least financial injury to the communities affected, or (5) the least adverse effect upon the general welfare of those communities, or (6) the loss of the least amount of tax revenue to the cities and counties affected, or (7) which will cause the State and the United States Governments the least total cost; and that in selecting the route in question the Highway Commission 'acted in excess of the powers vested in it and was guilty of arbitrary an capricious conduct constituting an abuse of discretion' in that it refused to apply the foregoing criteria. By the third cause of action in their proposed amended complaint the plaintiffs also claim that the action of the Highway Commission was 'a quasi judicial decision which is subject to judicial review'; and that an interpretation that the findings of the commission are not subject to review is a violation of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. Each cause of action contained allegations purporting to state the existence of a controversy between the parties respecting the contentions heretofore noted. The plaintiffs prayed that Section 90 be declared unconstitutional; that the resolution of the Highway Commission selecting the Inland Route be declared void; and that the defendants be enjoined from taking any further action thereon.

A comparison of the allegations of the original complaint with those of the proposed amended complaint leads to the ready conclusion that no substantial difference exists between them; that no purpose would be served in permitting further amendment; and that if the demurrer was well taken, the order sustaining the same without leave to amend was proper, Wing v. Forest Lawn Cemetery Ass'n, 15 Cal.2d 472, 485, 101 P.2d 1099, 130 A.L.R. 120; Town of Emeryville v. Durkee, 127 Cal.App.2d 152, 155, 273 P.2d 282; Barrier v. Alexander, 100 Cal.App.2d 497, 501, 224 P.2d 436.

, 2] The Legislature has the constitutionally vested power to establish a system of state highways (Calif.Const., art. IV, sec. 36), which includes the power to locate and relocate that type of highway known as a freeway (Holloway v. Purcell, 35 Cal.2d 220, 227-229, 217 P.2d 665); may delegate this power to an administrative agency 'within the framework of a sufficiently definite primary standard' (Holloway v. Purcell, supra, 35 Cal.2d 220, 231, 217 P.2d 665, 672); and has done so by the adoption of Sections 71, 90, 100.2 and 100.3 of the Streets and Highways Code, ¹ which designate the Highway Commission as such agency and fix thek standards by which it shall be governed in the exercise of this power. In Holloway v. Purcell, supra, 35 Cal.2d 220, 231-232, 217 P.2d 665, 672, the court said:

'The Legislature has adopted a policy of freeway construction in the public interest. It has properly delegated to the highway commission the authority to determine when and where freeways will be constructed, and it has properly required that the authority be exercised in accord with the needs of the public interest. Such a delegation of legislative power is valid.'

This conclusion followed a consideration of Sections 100.1, 100.2 and 100.3 of the Streets and Highways Code about which the court stated:

'The statutes in question require the commission to exercise its authority only on 'such terms and conditions as in its opinion will best subserve the public interest.' That requirement provides an adequate standard to guide the commission.' Holloway v. Purcell, supra, 35 Cal.2d 220, 231, 217 P.2d 665, 672.

However, the plaintiffs contend that the court in Holloway v. Purcell, supra, 35 cal.2d 220, 217 P.2d 665, did not consider the authority of the commission to select a highway route, which is derived from Section 90 of the Streets and Highways Code, and did not pass upon the constitutionality of this code section; that the provisions thereof, which authorize the commission to select a route 'on the most direct and practicable locations' between the termini designated by law, do not prescribe an adequate standard as a guide; that the language used therein is vague and uncertain in that it cannot be ascertained whether the commission is required to select the most practicable location or only a practicable location; that, for these reasons, Section 90 is an abortive, unconstitutional delegation of ligislative power to an administrative agency (Jersey Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal.2d 620, 642, 91 P.2d 577); and, therefore, the resolution of the commission selecting the route in question is void.

, 4] The standard prescribed by Section 90 of the Streets and Highways Code, which authorizes the commission to select the most direct and practicable location for a highway, is supplemented by the standard prescribed by Section 71 of that code, which authorizes the commission to change the location of any highway when such 'change is for the best interest of the State.' These standards are sufficiently definite to guide the commission in the exercise of the powers conferred upon it by the Legislature; limit the exercise of those powers within the confines of a 'primary standard' (Holloway v. Purcell, supra, 35 Cal.2d 220, 230, 217 P.2d 665); and conform to those approved by the courts in similar situations. Holloway v. Purcell, supra, 35 Cal.2d 220, 231, 217 P.2d 665; Ray v. Parker, 15 Cal.2d 275, 287-289, 101 P.2d 665; Jersey Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brock, supra, 13 Cal.2d 620, 641-643, 655, 91 P.2d 577; Hecke v. Riley, 209 Cal. 767, 770, 774, 290 P. 451; Dominguez Land Corp. v. Daugherty, 196 Cal. 468, 484-486, 238 P. 703; California State Automobile etc. Bureau v. Downey, 96 Cal.App.2d 876, 900-907, 216 P.2d 882; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S 190, 225-226, 63 S.Ct. 997, 87 L.Ed. 1344; J. W. Hamption, Jr. & Co. v. United...