Sinderson v. Payne
| Decision Date | 13 January 1922 |
| Docket Number | 22,536 |
| Citation | 186 N.W. 237,151 Minn. 142 |
| Parties | C. T. SINDERSON v. JOHN BARTON PAYNE, AGENT UNDER THE TRANSPORTATION ACT, 1920 |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Ramsey county to recover $16,000 for personal injuries received while in the employ of defendant. The case was tried before Dickson, J., who at the close of the testimony granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict. From an order denying his motion for a new trial, plaintiff appealed. Reversed.
Negligence of master question for jury.
1. The plaintiff was working in a gravel pit of a railroad company used at the time as a place for the storage of coal used by the engines, some two miles from the city where he lived. He used the track in going to and from his work with the permission of the defendant. When going to his work in the evening he was struck by an engine. No warning was given. The question of the defendant's negligence was for the jury.
Comparative negligence rule applies to railroad worker going to work.
2. The plaintiff was watching the engine at the coal yards nights to keep it from freezing, and while at work there, and while going to his work upon the tracks of the defendant, was within the railway employers liability act, Laws 1915, c. 187, which adopts the comparative negligence doctrine; and if the defendant was negligent the plaintiff could recover, though negligent himself, his damages being reduced in accordance with the comparative negligence rule.
Contributory negligence of walker on track for the jury.
3. The plaintiff was on the way to his work in the evening of a cold December day, walking on the tracks, and was on a high and narrow fill when he saw by the light thrown on the tracks that a train was approaching from behind. Immediately ahead was a bridge and further ahead was a road crossing over the track. He started for the crossing and as he jumped off the track, shortly before reaching it, was struck and injured. Whether he was negligent was a question of fact for the jury. If negligent in fact, or even as a matter of law, a recovery could be had if the defendant was negligent, the amount being determined in accordance with the comparative negligence rule.
Duxbury & Bissell, for appellant.
M. M. Joyce and Donald Evans, for respondent.
Action to recover for personal injuries. The court directed a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff appeals from the order denying his motion for a new trial.
In December, 1919, the plaintiff, a man 66 years of age, was working for the director general in charge of the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad Company. He worked nights in a gravel pit about two miles north and west of Albert Lea where he lived. It was used as a place of storage of coal which was loaded from there onto the engines. About 5:30 in the afternoon he left the city for the gravel pit walking on the railroad track. This was his custom. It was the custom of others. There was snow on the ground and the night was cold. As he neared the gravel pit he noticed on the track the light of a train approaching from behind perhaps a distance of half a mile. He was then at the easterly side of a bridge some 30 feet in length covered with sheet iron. It may be inferred that it was so covered that people might walk over it. The track was on a narrow and steep fill, some 17 feet high at the bridge. There was a road-crossing some 600 feet to the west. The fill decreased in height to the west and was something like 3 1/2 feet at the crossing. The plaintiff started on a run, thinking he would make the crossing. Just as he stepped off to the side, a hundred feet or so before reaching the crossing, he was hit by the engine and injured. No warning was given.
1. The evidence is such as to sustain a finding that the defendant was negligent. The plaintiff was not a trespasser. He used the tracks to go to his work. So did other employes. The evidence justifies a finding that such use was with the consent of the railway people. It strikes one as unusual that railway men, working at a plant of the railroad two miles from town, should use a country road, if there was one, in going to and from their work, when the track was the more convenient. Naturally they would use the track. There is no evidence of another practicable way of reaching the plaintiff's place of work. The railroad owed him a duty when it allowed him, in going to and from his work as an employe, to use its tracks. No warning was given as the train approached.
2. The work of the plaintiff was so connected with railway operation that while at work at the gravel pit he was within the railway employers liability act, Laws 1915, p. 253, c. 187 as that act is construed in Seamer v. Great...
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