Sinfuego v. Curry Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs
| Decision Date | 19 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV 15-0563 JB\GF,CIV 15-0563 JB\GF |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
| Parties | AMANDA SINFUEGO, Plaintiff, v. CURRY COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, a political sub-division existing under the laws of the state of New Mexico; LANCE PYLE, in his Official capacity as County Manager, and individually, and TORI SANDOVAL, in her official capacity as Curry County Detention Center Administrator and in her individual capacity, Defendants. |
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant Curry County Board of County Commissioners' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, filed February 21, 2017 (Doc. 87)("Motion"). The Court held a hearing on August 30, 2017. The primary issues are: (i) whether under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the Memorandum Opinion and Order, No. CIV 15-0563, 2017 WL 3503380, filed February 14, 2017 (Doc. 85)("SJ MOO") that theHonorable Carmen E. Garza, Magistrate Judge for the District of New Mexico, wrote dismissing Amanda Sinfuego's claims of civil rights violations against Defendant Lance Pyle precludes Sinfuego from pursuing her same claims against Defendant Curry County Board of County Commissioners ("Curry County"); and (ii) whether the SJ MOO ruling precludes Sinfuego from pursuing her claims of civil rights violations against Curry County under the theory of law of the case.
Under collateral estoppel, the SJ MOO in Pyle's favor is not preclusive in the same action, because it is not a final adjudication. See Trujillo v. Rio Arriba Cty. ex rel. Rio Arriba Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 319 F.R.D. 571, 639 (D.N.M. 2016)(Browning, J.). The SJ MOO in Pyle's favor is interlocutory, so it has no preclusive effect as to another defendant in the case. See SJ MOO at 29, 2017 WL 3503380, at *13. The Court thus concludes that the SJ MOO for Pyle does not preclude Sinfuego from pursuing her claims against Curry County under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The Court also concludes that law of the case will not preclude Sinfuego from pursuing her claims against Curry County, because the SJ MOO is interlocutory and because new evidence may bear on Sinfuego's case against Curry County. Accordingly, the Court will deny the Motion.
The Court takes the facts from Sinfuego's Civil Complaint For Violation of Civil Rights and the Whistleblower Protection Act, filed July 1, 2015 (Doc. 1)("Complaint"). The same standards for evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion apply to a motion for a judgment on the pleadings. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1160 (10th Cir. 2000)("A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is treated as a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6)."). Thus, the Court accepts "all facts pleaded by the non-moving party as true and grantsall reasonable inferences from the pleadings in that party's favor." Sanders v. Mountain Am. Fed. Credit Union, 689 F.3d 1138, 1141 (10th Cir. 2012).
The Curry County Detention Center ("Curry Detention") hired Sinfuego in 2010. See Complaint ¶ 11, at 5. After beginning employment at Curry Detention, Sinfuego completed a one-year probationary period, and maintained "satisfactory" or better on all employee evaluations during her course of employment. Complaint ¶¶ 12, 18, at 5. Sinfuego was a member of the Teamsters Union and was active in efforts to organize the Curry Detention employees into a collective bargaining unit. See Complaint ¶ 15, at 5. On December 3, 2012, Sinfuego, along with another Curry Detention employee, spoke with Pyle, the Curry County Manager, about their concerns regarding conditions at Curry Detention, and Sinfuego discussed the potential for a collective bargaining unit to address these concerns. See Complaint ¶ 16, at 5-6. On December 6, 2012, Sinfuego sent a text message to all staff members of Curry Detention, in which she discussed Pyle and advised the staff members of the proposed next steps in forming a union. See Complaint ¶ 19, at 6. On December 13, 2012, Pyle sent an email to the Curry County attorney, in which Pyle stated that Sinfuego's message was "incorrect, misleading, and slanderous," and that he recommended that disciplinary action be taken against Sinfuego. Complaint ¶¶ 21, 22, at 7-8.
Sinfuego made multiple complaints to her supervisors regarding the lack of cleaning supplies and unsanitary conditions at Curry Detention, of which Tori Sandoval, the acting, and then later permanent Detention Center Administrator, was aware. See Complaint ¶¶ 24, 25, at 8-9. Sinfuego states that Curry Detention employees were not provided with adequate supplies to perform their daily tasks and safely interact with inmates. See Complaint ¶ 24, at 8. At the timethat Sinfuego filed her Complaint, portions of Curry Detention were closed because of toxic mold. See Complaint ¶ 26, at 9.
On December 3, 2013, Sinfuego was informed that her employment was to be terminated. See Complaint ¶ 27, at 9. On January 7, 2014, Pyle upheld Sinfuego's termination. See Complaint ¶ 28, at 9. Sinfuego states that her termination was in retaliation for her engagement in protected activities, namely, the union organization and complaints about the state of Curry Detention. See Complaint ¶ 28, at 9.
Sinfuego filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, alleging that: (i) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Defendants violated her First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America freedom-of-speech rights; (ii) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Defendants violated her First Amendment right to freely associate; (iii) pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 1983, the Defendants violated her First Amendment right to petition for the redress of grievances; and (iv) the Defendants retaliated against her in violation of the New Mexico Whistleblower Protection Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 10-16C-3(A), ("NMWPA"). See Complaint ¶¶ 29-60, at 10-15. On September 19, 2016, Sinfuego and the Defendants agreed to voluntarily dismiss Sandoval from the case. See Stipulated Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice of all Claims Against Defendant Tori Sandoval, filed September 19, 2016 (Doc. 53). Pyle then moved for summary judgment and qualified immunity on November 28, 2016. See Defendant Lance Pyle's Motion for Summary Judgment and Qualified Immunity, filed November 28, 2016 (Doc. 69)("SJ Motion"). Pyle argued that he was entitled to summary judgment, because Sinfuego failed to demonstrate that he violated her First Amendment rights as his only involvement in her employment termination was to confirm the termination recommendation and that the conversationbetween himself and Sinfuego pertaining to her union activity took place over one year before her termination. See SJ Motion at 8-9.
On February 14, 2017, Magistrate Judge Garza, granted Pyle's motion for summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice all charges against him. See SJ MOO at 1; 2017 WL 3503380, at *1.2 Regarding Sinfuego's contention that she was terminated in retaliation for her union activities, Magistrate Judge Garza concluded that, "[the] Plaintiff cannot show that her union activity was a substantial factor in the termination of her employment; consequently the Court will grant Defendant Pyle summary judgment." SJ Moo at 24; 2017 WL 3503380, at *11. Magistrate Judge Garza came to this conclusion after analyzing Sinfuego's claims under the test developed from Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) and Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), the Garcetti/Pickering test. Magistrate Judge Garza concluded that Sinfuego's claim did not pass the fourth and fifth steps of the Garcetti/Pickering test,3 because she "cannot show thather union activity was a substantial factor in the termination of her employment," and her employment was terminated following her violation of the Curry County sexual harassment policy. SJ MOO at 24; 2017 WL 3503380, at *11.
On February 21, 2017, Curry County filed the Motion. See Motion at 1-2. Additionally, Curry County filed a Memorandum Brief in Support of Defendant Curry County's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, filed February 21, 2017 (Doc. 88)( ). Curry County argues that the summary judgment in favor of Pyle precludes Sinfuego from pursuing her claims against Curry County under the doctrines of collateral estoppel and/or law of the case. See Motion at 1-2. Specifically, Curry County argues that Magistrate Judge Garza's earlier finding of a "lack of causation between Plaintiff's protected speech/activities and the termination of her employment with Curry County also necessitate the dismissal of the claims . . . brought against Curry County." Memo. Brief at 5. It follows, according to Curry County, that Sinfuego's constitutional rights were not violated, and thus "each of her Section 1983 claims against Curry County . . . fail as a matter of law." Memo. Brief at 6.
Regarding Sinfuego's claim under the NMWPA, Curry County also argues that Magistrate Judge Garza's "findings on the First Amendment retaliation theories preclude Plaintiff's NMWPA claim against Curry County." Memo. Brief at 7. Curry County argues that Sinfuego's "alleged'whistleblowing' activity . . . is exactly the same as her protected First Amendment activities." Memo. Brief at 8. Curry County argues that law of the case applies to "those issues that were 'implicitly resolved in prior proceedings in the same court.'" Memo. Brief at 8 (citing Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC, 840 F.3d 1239, 1241 (10th Cir. 2016)). Curry County argues that because the Court has implicitly resolved the issue of causation regarding her union activity and employment termination by deciding that the decision to terminate Sinfuego was appropriate, that law-of-the-case doctrine is appropriate and applicable. See Memo. Brief at 8. Further, Curry County argues that collateral estoppel applies to preclude Sinfuego's NMWPA claim against Curry County. See Memo....
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