Singer v. Singer

• Decision Date: 18 January 1910
• Citation: 165 Ala. 144,51 So. 755
• Parties: SINGER v. SINGER.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

51 So. 755

165 Ala. 144

SINGER v. SINGER.

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 18, 1910

Appeal from Chancery Court, Chambers County; W. W. Whiteside Chancellor.

Suit by Irma H. Singer against Parrie Lou Singer. From a decree overruling a demurrer to the bill, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Strother Hines & Fuller, for appellant.

E. C Oliver and C. S. Moon, for appellee.

SIMPSON J.

The bill in this case was filed by the appellee against the appellant, praying a divorce a vinculo, and also that the defendant be required to convey to her certain lands which had been paid for with funds belonging to the complainant, or that the court will divest the legal title to said lands out of the respondent, and vest the same in complainant. This appeal is from a decree overruling a demurrer to the bill.

The question of multifariousness in bills in equity has been perplexing to courts and text-writers; so much so that it has sometimes been said that no general rules can be made applicable to every case, but the circumstances of each case must largely govern the discretion of the court. We have recently considered the subject at some length, and referred to the general rules suggested by eminent text-writers. Bentley et al. v. Barnes, 155 Ala. 659, 663, 47 So. 159. The question comes up more frequently where there are several parties, variously interested in the matters of litigation, although it is a rule that, even where there is but one defendant, a bill is multifarious which seeks relief as to two distinct subjects having no connection with or dependence on each other. In our own case of Heinz v. White, 105 Ala. 670, 17 So. 185, the bill was held to be multifarious, because the facts averred were inconsistent, and the rights of the complainant under the two phases of the bill were inconsistent with each other, and the relief prayed was wholly different. In the case of Truss et al. v. Miller, 116 Ala. 505, 22 So. 866, we said that, while multifariousness is not capable of accurate definition, "it is described generally as the joinder of distinct and independent matters, thereby confounding them; or the uniting, in one bill, of several matters perfectly distinct and unconnected against one defendant." In that case this court held that a bill which sought contribution from one joint maker of a note secured by a mortgage, and also that a portion of the land be declared subject to a vendor's lien, etc., was not multifarious.

The only case referred to in the brief of the appellant is that of Prickett v. Prickett, 147 Ala. 494, 42 So. 408, and it is probably nearer to this case, in facts, than any case we have. The bill in that case "sought to enforce a resulting trust in lands, and, at the same time, on independent averments, sought to have alimony decreed to complainant out of the estate of the respondent." This court said: "These were distinct and separate subjects, and in no way connected the one with the other. The relief prayed for is likewise separate and distinct. The bill, therefore, was demurrable for multifariousness." That was not a bill for divorce, but sought to have the resulting trust declared in the land, and also to compel the husband to provide for the maintenance and support of his wife.

In the case of People v. Morrill, 26 Cal. 336, the bill prayed that a patent (from the state) be canceled, that one of the defendants be enjoined from prosecuting certain suits for taking asphaltum from the land, and from removing asphaltum. The court said that the objection of multifariousness "is in many cases a matter of discretion, and no general rule can be laid down on the subject. * * * The parties are all interested in the principal question raised by the complaint; the issues tendered are simple, and foreshadow no embarrassment to a convenient and orderly trial; and by the joinder objected to a multiplicity of suits has been avoided." Page 361. The bill was consequently held not multifarious.

In a case in the New Jersey Chancery Court, where it was sought to prosecute in the same action a claim against the executor and against the estate, the court said: "No general rule defining what causes of action may properly be joined, and what cannot, can be laid down. The question is always one of convenience in conducting a suit, and not of principle, and is addressed to the sound discretion of the court (citing cases). If it appears that the causes of action or claims are so dissimilar or distinct in their nature that they cannot be heard and determined together, but must be heard piecemeal--first one and then the other--a clear case of misjoinder is presented; but where a complaint has two good causes of action, each furnishing the foundation of a separate suit, one the natural outgrowth of the other or growing out of the same...