Singh v. Lipworth

Decision Date03 July 2014
Docket NumberC073177
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesRAJ SINGH et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. STEPHEN LIPWORTH, Defendant and Respondent.

(Super. Ct. No.

34200900066746CUFRGDS)

A judgment entered against Raj Singh in a prior action (Super. Ct. Sacramento County, 2006, No. 00AS00602) was assigned to Stephen Lipworth, who moved successfully to amend the judgment to add certain aliases of Singh, namely Kaus Singh and Archana Singh. (Singh v. Lipworth (June 18, 2008, C053762) [nonpub. opn.].)1 Thereafter, the trial court granted Lipworth's application for sale of certain property, which Singh had transferred to his wife, Karen Singh, who in turn transferred theproperty to Suman Mehta. The trial court concluded, "Mehta is yet another alias adopted by [Singh] in his 'identity shell game,' " set aside the fraudulent transfers, and ordered the property sold to enforce the judgment. The order granting Lipworth's application for sale (sale order) became final after various appeals therefrom were dismissed.

In the present case, Singh, along with his wife Karen and alias Mehta, sued Lipworth alleging he used "fraudulent representations" to persuade the trial court in the prior case that Singh was "hiding some properties from his creditors using different names such as Archana Singh and Suman Mehta." After several frivolous motions were decided against Singh, the trial court invited Lipworth to file a motion to require Singh to furnish security or have the case dismissed pursuant to the vexatious litigant statutes. (Code Civ. Proc., § 391 et seq.)2 Lipworth did so. The same day, Lipworth filed both a demurrer and a special motion to strike pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute.3 (§ 425.16.) The trial court found Singh to be a vexatious litigant with no reasonable probability of prevailing in the litigation because the lawsuit amounted to an impermissible collateral attack on a prior final judgment and post-judgment orders. The trial court ordered "Raj Singh aka Suman Mehta" to furnish security in the amount of $15,000 and dismissed the lawsuit as to these plaintiffs when no such security was furnished. The trial court then granted the anti-SLAPP motion as to the remaining plaintiff, Karen Singh, and awarded $1,165 in attorney fees and costs.

Plaintiffs appeal. Their opening brief, filed by attorney Keith R. Oliver, is a rambling and disjointed series of accusations, much of which was lifted word for word from pleadings filed by Singh in the trial court, and none of which can be considered "meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in therecord that support the claim of error." (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) Indeed, the argument section of the brief contains no citations to the record at all. And the section purporting to provide "a summary of the significant facts" (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C)), instead contains a paragraph of accusations without citation to the record followed by three small paragraphs setting forth the procedural history in minimalist fashion.4 We consider all points asserted in this appeal to be forfeited as unsupported by "adequate factual or legal analysis." (Placer County Local Agency Formation Com. v. Nevada County Local Agency Formation Com. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 793, 814; Multani v. Witkin & Neal (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1457-1458; Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1078 ["suggestions of error without supporting argument or authority other than general abstract principles do not properly present grounds for appellate review"].)

This would be the end of the matter, except Lipworth has filed a motion for sanctions against plaintiffs and attorney Oliver pursuant to section 907 and rule 8.276 for bringing a frivolous appeal. As we explain, this appeal "indisputably has no merit" and "any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and completely without merit." (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650 (Flaherty).) While "sanctions should be used sparingly to deter only the most egregious conduct" (Kleveland v. Siegel & Wolensky, LLP (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 534, 557 (Kleveland)), we conclude they are warranted in this case. We therefore affirm the judgment and impose sanctions against plaintiffs and attorney Oliver in the amount of $7,478.75 payable to Lipworth, as well as $7,500 payable to the clerk of this court.

BACKGROUND

The Prior Lawsuit

U-Save Auto Rental of America, Inc. (U-Save) won an arbitration award against Singh. U-Save filed a petition in the trial court to confirm the award; Singh sued to set it aside, but failed. In February 2005, the trial court awarded U-Save a judgment of $127,690.25 plus interest. (Singh v. Lipworth, supra, C053762.)

The judgment was assigned to Lipworth. The assignment listed Singh's last known address as: "1625 28th Street, Sacramento, California, 95816." (Singh v. Lipworth, supra, C053762.) Lipworth moved to amend the judgment to add certain aliases of Singh, namely Kaus Singh and Archana Singh. In support of the motion, Lipworth submitted evidence establishing Singh had used these names in a previous lawsuit. Among other documents, Lipworth submitted a response to a request for admissions in which Singh admitted "[t]he individual using the name Raj Singh is the same person as the individual using the name Kaus Singh," as well as a minute order in that previous lawsuit that stated: "Raj Singh has filed a document in which he has conceded that he is Archana Singh, and that he has used the name Archana Singh in this litigation."5 Lipworth also obtained a temporary protective order restraining Singh and his alias Kaus Singh from conveying, transferring, or encumbering the real property located at 1625 28th Street, Sacramento, (the subject property) until the motion to amend the judgment could be heard. In opposition to the motion to amend, Singh claimed: "Raj Singh is not Kaus Singh who is the owner of 1625 28th Street, Sacramento." Despite a continuance to give Singh the opportunity to produce evidence Kaus Singh was aseparate person, Singh failed to produce any such evidence. (Singh v. Lipworth, supra, C053762.)

The trial court granted the motion to amend the judgment to add Singh's aliases. Thereafter, Lipworth filed an application for sale of the subject property. (Singh v. Lipworth, supra, C053762.) Ultimately, the trial court denied the application based on a "Stipulation for a Property" entered into in family court proceedings between Singh (using the name "Rag Singh") and his wife Karen (Super. Ct. Sacramento County (2006) No. 03FL00651) and signed, "[s]o ordered" by the family court judge. The stipulation stated the subject property "shall be Karen's sole separate and personal property" and further stated: "The parties also stipulate that Karen will transfer the above stated property to Kaus Singh if Kaus Singh, who lives outside California and who is not Raj Singh or Rag Singh, claims his interest in the above stated property." (Singh v. Lipworth, supra, C053762, italics omitted.) In denying the application, the trial court rejected Lipworth's argument that "since [Singh] had consistently denied owning the property, he was judicially estopped to claim that he owned it under the name Rag Singh and could lawfully transfer it to a third person." (Singh v. Lipworth, supra, C053762.)

In Singh v. Lipworth, supra, C053762, we held "the trial court erred by refusing to apply judicial estoppel" and explained: "[Singh] 'has made an egregious attempt to manipulate the legal system . . . "as egregious as it gets." ' [Citation.] [Singh] has played an endless game of 'Now you see it -- now you don't' with the courts. He has filed pleadings and made appearances in various actions under multiple names, to the point of being jailed for contempt of court. He has manufactured false or deceptive documents aside from the family court stipulation and order at issue here . . . . And the stipulation itself was a gross fraud on the family court. [¶] First, it did not reveal how 'Rag Singh' could properly claim title or transfer title to another. Second, it declared that 'Kaus Singh' had an unspecified interest in the property which would entitle him to claim it at any time from Karen Singh, yet did not explain how 'Rag Singh' could pass title withoutregard to that interest. Third, it declared that 'Kaus Singh' was not Raj Singh, though [Singh] knew that other courts had already found the two were one, and he had admitted the same under penalty of perjury in another action. Fourth, the record before us suggests that . . . when [Singh] originally submitted the stipulation to the family court, a restraining order in this action . . . barred [Singh] from conveying or transferring the subject property, but the stipulation failed to disclose that fact. Finally, in light of the above, the stipulation bore all the earmarks of a sham designed to 'transfer' the property (using Karen Singh as a conduit) from [Singh] as 'Rag Singh' to himself as 'Kaus Singh,' while concealing from the family court that his interest in the property was subject to an outstanding judgment. [¶] Being well aware of [Singh]'s attempts to trifle with the judicial system, the trial court could and should have used its equitable power to vindicate the system's integrity by applying judicial estoppel." (Singh v. Lipworth, supra, C053762.) We reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions that Karen be joined as a party, if possible, to protect whatever interest in the property she may have. (Singh v. Lipworth, supra, C053762.)

After we issued our decision, Karen transferred the property to "Suman Mehta, Trustee of the RadhaKrishna Living Trust." Lipworth filed another application for sale of the subject property. The trial court issued an...

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