Singh v. Riley's, Inc., CA
| Decision Date | 29 June 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. CA,CA |
| Citation | 878 S.W.2d 422,46 Ark.App. 223 |
| Parties | Douglas A. SINGH, Appellant, v. RILEY'S, INC., Appellee. 93-769. |
| Court | Arkansas Court of Appeals |
W. Michael Reif, Little Rock, for appellant.
Byron Freeland and Marshall S. Ney, Little Rock, for appellee.
The appellant in this civil case brought an action for breach of an employment contract against Riley's, Inc., seeking contractual severance pay of $36,000.00; $6,000.00 for wages earned in July 1991; $4,154.00 for accrued vacation; $8,295.00 for real estate commissions incurred from the sale of his house; $1,365.00 in moving expenses; $9,000.00 for an incentive bonus earned between February 1, 1991, and July 31, 1991; attorney's fees; and costs. After the conclusion of the appellant's case at a bench trial on February 12, 1993, in which Riley's, Inc., stipulated that Singh was entitled to $3,600.00 in accrued and unpaid wages, the trial court directed a verdict against the appellant with regard to the disputed elements of his claim, and awarded him $3,600.00 in wages and an attorney's fee of $360.00. From that decision, comes this appeal.
On appeal, Singh does not contest Riley, Inc.'s right to terminate his employment at will; however, he contends that he was entitled to certain benefits under the agreement because he was terminated without cause. The agreement, which was handwritten by Pat Riley, president of Riley's, Inc., provides in part:
This is a brief memorandum covering agreements reached by Riley and Singh as to his new position effective 8-1-90. Riley will develop a Job Description, Goals to be accomplished by Singh, Incentive Compensation and reasonable yardsticks to evaluate performance and timing of such evaluations. As for now the brief but pertinent outline is as follows:
....
Reports to: Pat M. Riley, Sr.--President and Chm. of Board.
....
Severance Pay--(1) If Singh resigns there will be none. (2) If he is released for cause there will be none. Cause does not mean failure to meet corporate goals or to earnings and other performance ratings. Nor does it mean failure to demonstrate the necessary qualifications for the position or extension of appropriate effort. It does mean fraud or dishonest acts and/or conduct in his daily life that is inappropriate to his executive position. (3) If he is released for other reason than cause as broadly defined above he will receive severance pay of $36,000.00 if it occurs prior to 8/1/93.
....
This constitutes all of the agreement.
(Italics supplied). Riley's, Inc. responds that although "cause" is frequently included in employment agreements, it is seldom completely defined and that the trial court correctly determined that the grounds for cause listed in the contract were not exclusive but merely illustrative. We do not agree. Instead, we think it clear that the trial court misread the handwritten contract and based his directed verdict on an erroneous belief that the failure to exert appropriate effort was included within the contractual definition of "cause." This is apparent from the trial judge's order, in which he stated that:
I think the extension of appropriate effort means exactly what it says. You simply are not going to tie yourself into a...
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