Singh v. United States
| Decision Date | 17 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | 1:09-cr-00369-AWI,1:13-cv-00070-AWI |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | SANDEEP SINGH, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
This matter arises from the guilty plea of Petitioner Sandeep Singh ("Petitioner"). Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Lompoc, California ("FCI Lompoc") and is proceeding in this matter in propria persona. Petitioner brings a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. Petitioner's complaint alleges the following grounds for relief: 1) a freestanding claim of factual innocence; 2) a claim of Fourth Amendment violation; 3) a claim of prosecutorial failure to disclose exculpatory evidence; 4) a claim that the plea entered was not knowing and voluntary; and 5) a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel - misadvising petitioner as to the consequences of his plea. For the following reasons, Petitioner's first, second, third, and fourth claims will be denied. Petitioner's fifth claim will be denied in part. The government will be ordered to respond to a portion of Petitioner's fifth claim.
On September 3, 2009, Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") agents traveled to Gilroy, California and established surveillance at a Union 76 gas station. At approximately 12:52 p.m., agents observed a vehicle driven by Michael Ho ("Ho") arrive at the gas station. Shortly thereafter, agents observed Petitioner arrive in a vehicle and park next to Ho. After meeting briefly, Ho and Petitioner got back into their vehicles and traveled in tandem to the Gilroy Outlet Mall.
Agents observed Ho and Petitioner exit their vehicles and engage in a conversation. After a short period of time, Ho entered the driver's side of his vehicle, pulled out a small black plastic bag and gave it to Petitioner. Ho and Petitioner were then observed getting back in their vehicles and leaving the area.
At 1:55 p.m., an officer with the California Highway Patrol (CHP), with the assistance of a DEA agent, conducted a traffic stop on Ho's vehicle. During this contact, Ho gave law enforcement consent to search his vehicle, which revealed ten colored tablets that were concealed in a glove box of the vehicle. Upon questioning, Ho stated the tablets were ecstasy and that they belonged to him. After identifying a picture of Petitioner, Ho stated Petitioner was his sole source of ecstasy and indicated that earlier in the day he had given him approximately $40,000 in payment for a previous ecstasy transaction. Ho further stated that he had given Singh $30,000 three weeks prior and that the total for this previous drug transaction was $70,000.
At approximately 2:24 p.m., a CHP officer initiated a traffic stop on the vehicle driven by Singh. While retrieving registration documents from the glove box, the CHP officer observed a brown paper bag that was wrapped in a plastic bag. When the officer asked Singh what was in the bag, he indicated it contained $30,000. Upon further questioning, Singh stated the money was given to him by his cousin in San Jose, California, and that he intended to use it to purchase a store in Fresno, California. Singh could not provide any further information regarding the store.
Petitioner subsequently indicated the bag contained $40,000. Responding CHP officers utilized a K-9 on Singh's vehicle. The K-9 alerted on the glove compartment, which contained the brown paper bag that was wrapped in a black plastic bag. The K-9 alerted on both the glovecompartment and the money for the presence of narcotics. Singh was arrested, and agents recovered his cellular telephone, which agents determined he had used that day to call Ho.
Petitioner was charged with a single count of conspiracy to distribute MDMA in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(C). The indictment contained no quantity or amount allegations. See Doc. 22.
A change of plea hearing was held on Monday, September 20, 2010, wherein Petitioner appeared with counsel, Anthony Capozzi, but without the assistance of an interpreter. The Court engaged in a standard plea colloquy with Petitioner and Petitioner answered all of the Court's questions without incident until the Court addressed the factual basis for the plea. Petitioner contended that the Government's statement of the facts was not true an accurate. Petitioner's counsel explained that it was the defense position that Petitioner received only $40,000 as proceeds from the sale of MDMA. With that clarification made and the understanding in mind that the Court would hold an evidentiary hearing to determine extent of the drug trafficking engaged in by Petitioner, Petitioner agreed that the statement of the facts was true and accurate. Based on that limited admission of factual basis Petitioner pled guilty.
A closed evidentiary hearing was held on the issue. The transcript from that hearing has been sealed.
The Court sentenced Petitioner on May 23, 2011. The Court fully reviewed the record, evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, and presentence report, heard argument from Petitioner and the Government, and determined - for purposes of sentencing - that Petitioner received $70,000.00 at a rate of $1.80 per pill in exchange for 38,888 pills of MDMA. The Court's conclusion was reviewed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upon direct review, whereupon the Circuit Court indicated, See Doc. 108.
The Court determined Petitioner's Offense Level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines to be level 32 and his Criminal History to be Category II. Petitioner is presentlycommitted to the Bureau of Prisons to serve a 168-month sentence which represents the high end of the guideline range. See Doc. 86.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides, in pertinent part: "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States ... may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." Habeas relief is available to correct errors of jurisdiction and constitutional error but a general "error of law does not provide a basis for collateral attack unless the claimed error constituted a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 60 L.Ed.2d 805 (1979).
Courts must "construe pro se habeas filing liberally." Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir.2003). Under Section 2255, "a district court must grant a hearing to determine the validity of a petition brought under that section, '[u]nless the motions and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.'" United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir.1994), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The court may deny a hearing if the petitioner's allegations, viewed against the record, fail to state a claim for relief or "are so palpably incredible or patently frivolous as to warrant summary dismissal." United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir.1996), citations omitted. Mere conclusory statements in a Section 2255 motion are insufficient to require a hearing. United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir.1980).
Under Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, when a court receives a section 2255 motion, the court must initially screen it, and dismiss it summarily if it plainly appears that the moving party is not entitled to relief. See United States v. Quan, 789 F.2d 711, 715 (9th Cir.1986). Summary dismissal pursuant to Rule 4 is appropriate only where the allegations of the petitioner are "vague [or] conclusory," "palpably incredible" or "patently frivolous or false." Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75-76.
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Petitioner entered a plea of guilty without the benefit of a Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11(c) plea agreement. A defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel "may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea...." Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); see United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (); Ronell v. United States, 2014 WL 2504742, *2 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (). Accordingly, the scope of Petitioner's brief may not extend beyond issues that affect the voluntariness of the plea.
Next, it is well settled that a habeas petition is not a vehicle for challenging the decision of a federal appellate court. See Feldman v. Henman, 815 F.2d 1318, 1321-22 (9th Cir.1987). Consequently, a criminal defendant who raises a claim or issue on direct appeal may not again assert that same claim or issue in a section 2255 habeas corpus petition. See United States v. Hayes, 231 F.3d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir.2000); US v. Redd, 759 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir.1985). Any contrary rule would contravene the longstanding "law of the case" doctrine, under which "a court generally is precluded from...
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